CVE-2025-68478

highpriority · track · 2EPSS 0.058 · 93 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
5.79% (93rd) EPSS
CVSS 7.1 · high
Is it mine?
4 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, if an arbitrary path is specified in the request body's `fs_path`, the server serializes the Flow object into JSON and creates/overwrites a file at that path. There is no path restriction, normalization, or allowed directory enforcement, so absolute paths (e.g., /etc/poc.txt) are interpreted as is. Version 1.7.0 fixes the issue.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.1
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.5–7.1

v3.17.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Lsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Lsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 2.8 · impact 4.2
v3.17.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Lsecondary · OSV
v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (4)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-f43r-cc68-gpx4External Control of File Name or Path in Langflow2025-12-19ghsa · osvUS

    **Vulnerability Overview** If an arbitrary path is specified in the request body's `fs_path`, the server serializes the Flow object into JSON and creates/overwrites a file at that path. There is no path restriction, normalization, or allowed directory enforcement, so absolute paths (e.g., /etc/poc.txt) are interpreted as is. **Vulnerable Code** 1. It receives the request body (flow), updates the DB, and then passes it to the file-writing sink. https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py#L154-L168 ```python @router.post("/", response_model=FlowRead, status_code=201) async def create_flow( *, session: DbSession, flow: FlowCreate, current_user: CurrentActiveUser, ): try: db_flow = await _new_flow(session=session, flow=flow, user_id=current_user.id) await session.commit() await session.refresh(db_flow) await _save_flow_to_fs(db_flow) except Exception as e: ``` 2. Applies authentication dependency (requires API Key/JWT) when accessing the endpoint. https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/utils/core.py#L36-L38 ```python CurrentActiveUser = Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user)] CurrentActiveMCPUser = Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user_mcp)] DbSession = Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_session)] ``` 3. The client can directly specify the save path, including `fs_path`. https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py#L66-L70 ```python ): try: await _verify_fs_path(flow.fs_path) """Create a new flow.""" ``` 4. It attempts to create the file (or *the* file, in the case of a path without a parent) directly without path validation. https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py#L45-L49 ```python async def _verify_fs_path(path: str | None) -> None: if path: path_ = Path(path) if not await path_.exists(): await path_.touch() ``` 5. Serializes the Flow object to JSON and writes it to the specified path in "w" mode (overwriting). https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/ac6e2d2eabeee28085f2739d79f7ce4205ca082c/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py#L52-L58 ```python async def _save_flow_to_fs(flow: Flow) -> None: if flow.fs_path: async with async_open(flow.fs_path, "w") as f: try: await f.write(flow.model_dump_json()) except OSError: await logger.aexception("Failed to write flow %s to path %s", flow.name, flow.fs_path) ``` **PoC Description** When an authenticated user passes an arbitrary path in `fs_path`, the Flow JSON is written to that path. Since `/tmp` is usually writable, it is easy to reproduce. In a production environment, writing to system-protected directories may fail depending on permissions. **PoC** - **Before Exploit** <img width="1918" height="658" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fe3c2306-091d-4cb0-b4dc-c7fb63c03d8d" /> - **After Exploit** ```bash curl -sS -X POST "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "x-api-key: sk-8Kyzf9IQ-UEJ_OtSTaJq4eniMT9_JKgZ7__q8PNkoxc" \ -d '{"name":"poc-etc","data":{"nodes":[],"edges":[]},"fs_path":"/tmp/POC.txt"}' ``` <img width="1918" height="742" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cc0b0c96-1c2d-4d56-b558-5ba97e0ec174" /> ### Impact - **Authenticated Arbitrary File Write (within server permission scope):** Risk of corrupting configuration/log/task files, disrupting application behavior, and tampering with files read by other components. - **Both absolute and relative paths are allowed, enabling base directory traversal.** The risk of overwriting system files increases in environments with root privileges or weak mount/permission settings. - **The file content is limited to Flow JSON,** but the impact is severe if the target file is parsed by a JSON parser or is subject to subsequent processing. - **In production environments, it is essential to enforce a save root, normalize paths, block symlink traversal, and minimize permissions.**

  • PYSEC-2025-1252025-12-19vendor · osvUS

    Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, if an arbitrary path is specified in the request body's `fs_path`, the server serializes the Flow object into JSON and creates/overwrites a file at that path. There is no path restriction, normalization, or allowed directory enforcement, so absolute paths (e.g., /etc/poc.txt) are interpreted as is. Version 1.7.0 fixes the issue.

06

also known as (6)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

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published 2025-12-19modified 2026-06-17
09

references (5)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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