CVE-2025-62427

highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 37 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.43% (37th) EPSS
CVSS 8.7 · high
Is it mine?
6 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
3 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

The Angular SSR is a server-rise rendering tool for Angular applications. The vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular's Server-Side Rendering package (@angular/ssr) before 19.2.18, 20.3.6, and 21.0.0-next.8. The function createRequestUrl uses the native URL constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., originalUrl or url) begins with a double forward slash (//) or backslash (\\), the URL constructor treats it as a schema-relative URL. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname. This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page's virtual location (accessible via DOCUMENT or PlatformLocation tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent relative HTTP requests made during the SSR process (e.g., using HttpClient.get('assets/data.json')) will be incorrectly resolved against the attacker's domain, forcing the server to communicate with an arbitrary external endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 19.2.18, 20.3.6, and 21.0.0-next.8.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

8.7
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.6–8.7

v4.08.7highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.08.7highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.06.6mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (6)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-q63q-pgmf-mxhrAngular SSR has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw2025-10-16ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact The vulnerability is a **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular's Server-Side Rendering package (`@angular/ssr`). The function `createRequestUrl` uses the native `URL` constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., `originalUrl` or `url`) begins with a **double forward slash (`//`) or backslash (`\\`)**, the `URL` constructor treats it as a **schema-relative URL**. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname. This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page's virtual location (accessible via `DOCUMENT` or `PlatformLocation` tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent **relative HTTP requests** made during the SSR process (e.g., using `HttpClient.get('assets/data.json')`) will be incorrectly resolved against the attacker's domain, forcing the server to communicate with an arbitrary external endpoint. #### Exploit Scenario A request to `http://localhost:4200//attacker-domain.com/some-page` causes Angular to believe the host is attacker-domain.com. A relative request to api/data then becomes a server-side request to `http://attacker-domain.com/api/data`. ### Patches - `@angular/ssr` 19.2.18 - `@angular/ssr` 20.3.6 - `@angular/ssr` 21.0.0-next.8 ## Mitigation The application's internal location must be robustly determined from the incoming request. The fix requires sanitizing or validating the request path to prevent it from being interpreted as a schema-relative URL (i.e., ensuring it does not start with `//`). #### Server-Side Middleware If you can't upgrade to a patched version, implement a **middleware** on the Node.js/Express server that hosts the Angular SSR application to explicitly reject or sanitize requests where the path begins with a double slash (`//`). **Example (Express/Node.js):** ```ts // Place this middleware before the Angular SSR handler app.use((req, res, next) => { if (req.originalUrl?.startsWith('//')) { // Sanitize by forcing a single slash req.originalUrl = req.originalUrl.replace(/^\/\/+/, '/'); req.url = req.url.replace(/^\/\/+/, '/'); } next(); }); ``` ### References - Report: https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/issues/31464 - Fix: https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/31474

06

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2025-10-16modified 2026-06-17
08

references (8)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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