CVE-2025-52884

lowpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 35 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.41% (35th) EPSS
CVSS 1.7 · low
Is it mine?
2 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
3 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-26

RISC Zero is a zero-knowledge verifiable general computing platform, with Ethereum integration. The risc0-ethereum repository contains Solidity verifier contracts, Steel EVM view call library, and supporting code. Prior to versions 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the `Steel.validateCommitment` Solidity library function will return `true` for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero. This violates the semantics of `validateCommitment`, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel and leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of a program using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs. A fix has been released as part of `risc0-ethereum` 2.1.1 and 2.2.0. Users for the `Steel` Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using `Steel.validateCommitment` in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the ERC-20 counter example, and documentation. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action. Users not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

1.7
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v4.01.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:Usecondary · ENISA EU
v4.01.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.01.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (2)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2RISC Zero Ethereum invalid commitment with digest value of zero accepted by Steel.validateCommitment2025-06-25ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact Prior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the `Steel.validateCommitment` Solidity library function will return `true` for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero. This violates the semantics of `validateCommitment`, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs (e.g. having the guest commit to a digest of zero, or failing to check the zkVM proof). Because this bug does not risk application integrity, correctly written applications are not at risk. ### Fix Please see [#605] for a full description of the bug, and the fix. This fix has been released as part of `risc0-ethereum` [2.1.1] and [2.2.0]. ### Recommended actions Users for the `Steel` Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using `Steel.validateCommitment` in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the [ERC-20 counter example][example], and [documentation]. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action. Users not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel. ### Credit A thank you to Daniel526 on HackenProof for reporting this issue [#605]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/pull/605 [example]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/ff0cb9253a87945b653b825711b8b5075f8b7545/examples/erc20-counter/contracts/src/Counter.sol#L56-L63 [documentation]: https://docs.beboundless.xyz/developers/steel/how-it-works#verifying-the-proof-onchain [2.1.1]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.1.1 [2.2.0]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.2.0

06

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2025-06-24modified 2026-06-17
08

references (23)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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