CVE-2025-29779

mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.002 · 8 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.18% (8th) EPSS
CVSS 5.4 · medium
Is it mine?
2 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
3 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing provides a Python implementation of Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme. In versions 0.8.0b2 and prior, the `secure_redundant_execution` function in feldman_vss.py attempts to mitigate fault injection attacks by executing a function multiple times and comparing results. However, several critical weaknesses exist. Python's execution environment cannot guarantee true isolation between redundant executions, the constant-time comparison implementation in Python is subject to timing variations, the randomized execution order and timing provide insufficient protection against sophisticated fault attacks, and the error handling may leak timing information about partial execution results. These limitations make the protection ineffective against targeted fault injection attacks, especially from attackers with physical access to the hardware. A successful fault injection attack could allow an attacker to bypass the redundancy check mechanisms, extract secret polynomial coefficients during share generation or verification, force the acceptance of invalid shares during verification, and/or manipulate the commitment verification process to accept fraudulent commitments. This undermines the core security guarantees of the Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme. As of time of publication, no patched versions of Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing exist, but other mitigations are available. Long-term remediation requires reimplementing the security-critical functions in a lower-level language like Rust. Short-term mitigations include deploying the software in environments with physical security controls, increasing the redundancy count (from 5 to a higher number) by modifying the source code, adding external verification of cryptographic operations when possible, considering using hardware security modules (HSMs) for key operations.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

5.4
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 2–5.4

v4.05.4mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.05.4mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.02lowCVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (2)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-r8gc-qc2c-c7vhPost-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing has Inadequate Fault Injection Countermeasures in `secure_redundant_execution`2025-03-14ghsa · osvUS

    **Description:** The `secure_redundant_execution` function in feldman_vss.py attempts to mitigate fault injection attacks by executing a function multiple times and comparing results. However, several critical weaknesses exist: 1. Python's execution environment cannot guarantee true isolation between redundant executions 2. The constant-time comparison implementation in Python is subject to timing variations 3. The randomized execution order and timing provide insufficient protection against sophisticated fault attacks 4. The error handling may leak timing information about partial execution results These limitations make the protection ineffective against targeted fault injection attacks, especially from attackers with physical access to the hardware. **Impact:** A successful fault injection attack could allow an attacker to: 1. Bypass the redundancy check mechanisms 2. Extract secret polynomial coefficients during share generation or verification 3. Force the acceptance of invalid shares during verification 4. Manipulate the commitment verification process to accept fraudulent commitments This undermines the core security guarantees of the Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme. **References:** * File: `feldman_vss.py` * Function: `secure_redundant_execution` * [Fault Attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fault_attack) - Wikipedia article on fault attacks. * Bar-El, H., et al. "The Sorcerer's Apprentice Guide to Fault Attacks" - https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/100.pdf * CWE-1279: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1279.html * NIST SP 800-90B section on implementation validation **Remediation:** Long-term remediation requires reimplementing the security-critical functions in a lower-level language like Rust. Short-term mitigations: 1. Deploy the software in environments with physical security controls 2. Increase the redundancy count (from 5 to a higher number) by modifying the source code 3. Add external verification of cryptographic operations when possible 4. Consider using hardware security modules (HSMs) for key operations

06

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2025-03-14modified 2026-06-17
08

references (11)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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