CVE-2025-1801

highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.003 · 26 %ileDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.33% (26th) EPSS
CVSS 8.1 · high
Is it mine?
14 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · cert_bund

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

A flaw was found in the Ansible aap-gateway. Concurrent requests handled by the gateway grpc service can result in concurrency issues due to race condition requests against the proxy. This issue potentially allows a less privileged user to obtain the JWT of a greater privileged user, enabling the server to be jeopardized. A user session or confidential data might be vulnerable.

01

remediations

Vendor fix, mitigation, or workaround guidance, as published by each source.

A vendor fix is available.

  • Fixedautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8redhat_csaf

    Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954
  • Fixedautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8redhat_csaf

    Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954
  • Fixedautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9redhat_csaf

    Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954
  • Fixedautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9redhat_csaf

    Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954
  • Fixedautomation-gateway-config-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8redhat_csaf

    Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954
  • Fixedautomation-gateway-config-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9redhat_csaf

    Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954
  • Fixedautomation-gateway-server-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8redhat_csaf

    Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954
  • Fixedautomation-gateway-server-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9redhat_csaf

    Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954
  • Workaroundautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8redhat_csaf

    Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).

  • Workaroundautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8redhat_csaf

    Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).

  • Workaroundautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9redhat_csaf

    Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).

  • Workaroundautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9redhat_csaf

    Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).

  • Workaroundautomation-gateway-config-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8redhat_csaf

    Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).

  • Workaroundautomation-gateway-config-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9redhat_csaf

    Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).

  • Workaroundautomation-gateway-server-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8redhat_csaf

    Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).

  • Workaroundautomation-gateway-server-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9redhat_csaf

    Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).

02

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

8.1
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.18.1highAV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.18.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.18.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondary · secalert@redhat.com USexploitability 2.8 · impact 5.2
v3.17.4highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
v3.18.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondary · Red Hat Product Security US
03

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
04

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

05

affected products (14)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

06

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • RHSA-2025:1954Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 Product Security and Bug Fix Update2025-03-01csaf · redhat_csafUS

    An update is now available for Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.

  • WID-SEC-W-2025-0465Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform: Schwachstelle ermöglicht PrivilegieneskalationDeutsch2025-03-02csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen.

07

also known as (4)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

08

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

09

references (10)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

scry

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