CVE-2024-58262

mediumpriority · track · 20EPSS 0.002 · 6 %ileEURUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.17% (6th) EPSS
CVSS 5.1 · medium
Is it mine?
5 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

The curve25519-dalek crate before 4.1.3 for Rust has a constant-time operation on elliptic curve scalars that is removed by LLVM.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

5.1
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 2.9–5.1

v3.15.1mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 1.4 · impact 3.6
v3.12.9lowAV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.12.9lowCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.12.9lowCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · cve@mitre.org USexploitability 1.4 · impact 1.4
v3.12.9lowCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.14.7mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (5)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-x4gp-pqpj-f43qcurve25519-dalek has timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`2024-06-18ghsa · osvUS

    Timing variability of any kind is problematic when working with potentially secret values such as elliptic curve scalars, and such issues can potentially leak private keys and other secrets. Such a problem was recently discovered in `curve25519-dalek`. The `Scalar29::sub` (32-bit) and `Scalar52::sub` (64-bit) functions contained usage of a mask value inside a loop where LLVM saw an opportunity to insert a branch instruction (`jns` on x86) to conditionally bypass this code section when the mask value is set to zero as can be seen in godbolt: - 32-bit (see L106): https://godbolt.org/z/zvaWxzvqv - 64-bit (see L48): https://godbolt.org/z/PczYj7Pda A similar problem was recently discovered in the Kyber reference implementation: https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/hqbtIGFKIpU/m/cnE3pbueBgAJ As discussed on that thread, one portable solution, which is also used in this PR, is to introduce a volatile read as an optimization barrier, which prevents the compiler from optimizing it away. The fix can be validated in godbolt here: - 32-bit: https://godbolt.org/z/jc9j7eb8E - 64-bit: https://godbolt.org/z/x8d46Yfah The problem was discovered and the solution independently verified by Alexander Wagner <alexander.wagner@aisec.fraunhofer.de> and Lea Themint <lea.thiemt@tum.de> using their DATA tool: https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/DATA

  • RUSTSEC-2024-0344Timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`2024-06-18vendor · osvUS

    Timing variability of any kind is problematic when working with potentially secret values such as elliptic curve scalars, and such issues can potentially leak private keys and other secrets. Such a problem was recently discovered in `curve25519-dalek`. The `Scalar29::sub` (32-bit) and `Scalar52::sub` (64-bit) functions contained usage of a mask value inside a loop where LLVM saw an opportunity to insert a branch instruction (`jns` on x86) to conditionally bypass this code section when the mask value is set to zero as can be seen in godbolt: - 32-bit (see L106): <https://godbolt.org/z/zvaWxzvqv> - 64-bit (see L48): <https://godbolt.org/z/PczYj7Pda> A similar problem was recently discovered in the Kyber reference implementation: <https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/hqbtIGFKIpU/m/cnE3pbueBgAJ> As discussed on that thread, one portable solution, which is also used in this PR, is to introduce a volatile read as an optimization barrier, which prevents the compiler from optimizing it away. The fix can be validated in godbolt here: - 32-bit: <https://godbolt.org/z/jc9j7eb8E> - 64-bit: <https://godbolt.org/z/x8d46Yfah> The problem was discovered and the solution independently verified by Alexander Wagner <alexander.wagner@aisec.fraunhofer.de> and Lea Themint <lea.thiemt@tum.de> using their DATA tool: <https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/DATA>

06

also known as (5)

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07

sources

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published 2025-07-27modified 2026-06-17
08

references (10)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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