CVE-2024-53861
highpriority · track · 30EPSS 0.008 · 57 %ileDEEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
pyjwt is a JSON Web Token implementation in Python. An incorrect string comparison is run for `iss` checking, resulting in `"acb"` being accepted for `"_abc_"`. This is a bug introduced in version 2.10.0: checking the "iss" claim changed from `isinstance(issuer, list)` to `isinstance(issuer, Sequence)`. Since str is a Sequnce, but not a list, `in` is also used for string comparison. This results in `if "abc" not in "__abcd__":` being checked instead of `if "abc" != "__abc__":`. Signature checks are still present so real world impact is likely limited to denial of service scenarios. This issue has been patched in version 2.10.1. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
remediations
Vendor fix, mitigation, or workaround guidance, as published by each source.
A vendor fix is available.
- Fixedpython311-PyJWT-0:2.12.1-slfo.1.1_1.1.noarch as component of SUSE Linux Micro 6.1suse_csaf
To install this SUSE Security Update use the SUSE recommended installation methods like YaST online_update or "zypper patch".
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–high · 2.2–7.5
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
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affected products (3)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (3)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- SUSE-SU-2026:20879-1Security update for python-PyJWT2026-03-26csaf · suse_csafDE
Security update for python-PyJWT
- GHSA-75c5-xw7c-p5pmPyJWT Issuer field partial matches allowed2024-12-02ghsa · osvUS
### Summary The wrong string if check is run for `iss` checking, resulting in `"acb"` being accepted for `"_abc_"`. ### Details This is a bug introduced in version [2.10.0](https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/1570e708672aa9036bc772476beae8bfa48f4131#diff-6893ad4a1c5a36b8af3028db8c8bc3b62418149843fc382faf901eaab008e380R366): checking the "iss" claim changed from `isinstance(issuer, list)` to `isinstance(issuer, Sequence)`. ```diff - if isinstance(issuer, list): + if isinstance(issuer, Sequence): if payload["iss"] not in issuer: raise InvalidIssuerError("Invalid issuer") else: ``` Since str is a Sequnce, but not a list, `in` is also used for string comparison. This results in `if "abc" not in "__abcd__":` being checked instead of `if "abc" != "__abc__":`. ### PoC Check out the unit tests added here: https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt-ghsa-75c5-xw7c-p5pm ```python issuer = "urn:expected" payload = {"iss": "urn:"} token = jwt.encode(payload, "secret") # decode() succeeds, even though `"urn:" != "urn:expected". No exception is raised. with pytest.raises(InvalidIssuerError): jwt.decode(token, "secret", issuer=issuer, algorithms=["HS256"]) ``` ### Impact I would say the real world impact is not that high, seeing as the signature still has to match. We should still fix it.
- PYSEC-2026-1814PyJWT Issuer field partial matches allowed2026-07-07vendor · osvUS
### Summary The wrong string if check is run for `iss` checking, resulting in `"acb"` being accepted for `"_abc_"`. ### Details This is a bug introduced in version [2.10.0](https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/1570e708672aa9036bc772476beae8bfa48f4131#diff-6893ad4a1c5a36b8af3028db8c8bc3b62418149843fc382faf901eaab008e380R366): checking the "iss" claim changed from `isinstance(issuer, list)` to `isinstance(issuer, Sequence)`. ```diff - if isinstance(issuer, list): + if isinstance(issuer, Sequence): if payload["iss"] not in issuer: raise InvalidIssuerError("Invalid issuer") else: ``` Since str is a Sequnce, but not a list, `in` is also used for string comparison. This results in `if "abc" not in "__abcd__":` being checked instead of `if "abc" != "__abc__":`. ### PoC Check out the unit tests added here: https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt-ghsa-75c5-xw7c-p5pm ```python issuer = "urn:expected" payload = {"iss": "urn:"} token = jwt.encode(payload, "secret") # decode() succeeds, even though `"urn:" != "urn:expected". No exception is raised. with pytest.raises(InvalidIssuerError): jwt.decode(token, "secret", issuer=issuer, algorithms=["HS256"]) ``` ### Impact I would say the real world impact is not that high, seeing as the signature still has to match. We should still fix it.
also known as (6)
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sources
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references (10)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2024-53861cnnvd
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/1570e708672aa9036bc772476beae8bfa48f4131#diff-6893ad4a1c5a36b8af3028db8c8bc3b62418149843fc382faf901eaab008e380R366cnnvd
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/33022c25525c1020869c71ce2a4109e44ae4ced1cnnvd
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-75c5-xw7c-p5pmcnnvd
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/1570e708672aa9036bc772476beae8bfa48f4131#diff-6893ad4a1c5a36b8af3028db8c8bc3b62418149843fc382faf901eaab008e380R366enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/33022c25525c1020869c71ce2a4109e44ae4ced1enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-75c5-xw7c-p5pmenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/1570e708672aa9036bc772476beae8bfa48f4131#diff-6893ad4a1c5a36b8af3028db8c8bc3b62418149843fc382faf901eaab008e380R366Patchnvd
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