CVE-2024-36121

criticalpriority · track · 36EPSS 0.003 · 19 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.27% (19th) EPSS
CVSS 9.1 · critical
Is it mine?
3 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · nvd · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

netty-incubator-codec-ohttp is the OHTTP implementation for netty. BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

9.1
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–critical · 5.9–9.1

v3.19.1criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 3.9 · impact 5.2
v3.15.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.15.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 1.6 · impact 4.2
v3.15.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.18.3highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (3)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-g762-h86w-8749BoringSSLAEADContext in Netty Repeats Nonces2024-06-05ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat. ### Details 1. There is no overflow detection or enforcement of the maximum sequence value. (This is a missed requirement from the draft Chunked Oblivious OHTTP RFC and so should be inherited from the HPKE RFC 9180, Section 5.2). 2. The sequence number (seq) is stored as 32-bit int which is relatively easy to overflow. https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/blob/1ddadb6473cd3be5491d114431ed4c1a9f316001/codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAEADContext.java#L112-L114 ### Impact If the BoringSSLAEADContext is used to encrypt more than 2^32 messages then the AES-GCM nonce will repeat. Repeating a nonce with AES-GCM results in both confidentiality and integrity compromise of data encrypted with the associated key.

06

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2024-06-04modified 2026-06-17
09

references (7)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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