CVE-2024-32646

mediumpriority · track · 21EPSS 0.005 · 39 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.46% (39th) EPSS
CVSS 5.3 · medium
Is it mine?
4 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Vyper is a pythonic Smart Contract Language for the Ethereum virtual machine. In versions 0.3.10 and prior, using the `slice` builtin can result in a double eval vulnerability when the buffer argument is either `msg.data`, `self.code` or `<address>.code` and either the `start` or `length` arguments have side-effects. It can be easily triggered only with the versions `<0.3.4` as `0.3.4` introduced the unique symbol fence. No vulnerable production contracts were found. Additionally, double evaluation of side-effects should be easily discoverable in client tests. As such, the impact is low. As of time of publication, no fixed versions are available.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

5.3
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.15.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 3.9 · impact 1.4
v3.15.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.15.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 1.4
v3.15.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.14.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (4)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-r56x-j438-vw5mvyper performs double eval of the slice start/length args in certain cases2024-04-25ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary Using the `slice` builtin can result in a double eval vulnerability when the buffer argument is either `msg.data`, `self.code` or `<address>.code` and either the `start` or `length` arguments have side-effects. A contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production. Having side-effects in the start and length patterns is also an unusual pattern which is not that likely to show up in user code. It is also much harder (but not impossible!) to trigger the bug since `0.3.4` since the unique symbol fence was introduced (https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/2914). ### Details It can be seen that the `_build_adhoc_slice_node` function of the `slice` builtin doesn't cache the mentioned arguments to the stack: https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/4595938734d9988f8e46e8df38049ae0559abedb/vyper/builtins/functions.py#L244 As such, they can be evaluated multiple times (instead of retrieving the value from the stack). ### PoC with Vyper version `0.3.3+commit.48e326f` the call to `foo` passes the `asserts`: ```vyper l: DynArray[uint256, 10] @external def foo(cs: String[64]) -> uint256: for i in range(10): self.l.append(1) assert len(self.l) == 10 s: Bytes[64] = b"" s = slice(msg.data, self.l.pop(), 3) assert len(self.l) == 10 - 2 return len(self.l) ``` ### Patches Patched in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/3976. ### Impact No vulnerable production contracts were found.

  • PYSEC-2024-2072024-04-25vendor · osvUS

    Vyper is a pythonic Smart Contract Language for the Ethereum virtual machine. In versions 0.3.10 and prior, using the `slice` builtin can result in a double eval vulnerability when the buffer argument is either `msg.data`, `self.code` or `<address>.code` and either the `start` or `length` arguments have side-effects. It can be easily triggered only with the versions `<0.3.4` as `0.3.4` introduced the unique symbol fence. No vulnerable production contracts were found. Additionally, double evaluation of side-effects should be easily discoverable in client tests. As such, the impact is low. As of time of publication, no fixed versions are available.

06

also known as (6)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

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published 2024-04-25modified 2026-06-17
08

references (4)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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