CVE-2023-47122

mediumpriority · track · 21EPSS 0.004 · 31 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.37% (31st) EPSS
CVSS 5.3 · medium
Is it mine?
3 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Gitsign is software for keyless Git signing using Sigstore. In versions of gitsign starting with 0.6.0 and prior to 0.8.0, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unaffected. This issue was fixed in v0.8.0. No known workarounds are available.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

5.3
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.15.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 1.6 · impact 3.6
v3.14.2mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.14.2mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 0.5 · impact 3.6
v3.14.2mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.14.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

CWE-347USCWE-347US
04

affected products (3)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vcGitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client.2023-11-14ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact In certain versions of gitsign, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unlikely to be affected. ### Patches This was fixed in v0.8.0 via https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399 ### Workarounds n/a ### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model

  • GO-2023-2332Gitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client. in github.com/sigstore/gitsign2024-08-21vendor · osvUS

    Gitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client. in github.com/sigstore/gitsign

06

also known as (5)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

cnnvdenisa_euvdosvnvdNVDCVE.orgMITRE
published 2023-11-10modified 2026-06-17
08

references (13)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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