CVE-2023-41329

mediumpriority · track · 26EPSS 0.006 · 50 %ileEURUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.63% (50th) EPSS
CVSS 6.6 · medium
Is it mine?
26 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses. These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. This issue has been addressed in version 2.35.1 of wiremock-jre8 and wiremock-jre8-standalone, version 3.0.3 of wiremock and wiremock-standalone, version 2.6.1 of the python version of wiremock, and versions 2.35.1-1 and 3.0.3-1 of the wiremock/wiremock Docker container. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should either configure firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations or to configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

6.6
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 3.9–6.6

v3.16.6mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 0.7 · impact 5.9
v3.16.6mediumAV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.13.9lowCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.13.9lowCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 0.5 · impact 3.4
v3.13.9lowCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · OSV
v3.16.1mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (26)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

showing 20 of 26
05

advisories (3)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-pmxq-pj47-j8j4Domain restrictions bypass via DNS Rebinding in WireMock and WireMock Studio webhooks, proxy and recorder modes2023-09-08ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in [Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses](https://wiremock.org/docs/configuration/#preventing-proxying-to-and-recording-from-specific-target-addresses). These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. ### Affected versions - WireMock 3,x until 3.0.3 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network - WireMock 2.x until 2.35.1 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network - Python WireMock until 2.6.1 - WireMock Studio - all versions, this proprietary product was discontinued in 2022 ### Patches - WireMock 3.0.3 + the 3.0.3-1 Docker image - WireMock 2.35.1 + the 2.35.1-1 Docker image - backport to WireMock 2.x - Python WireMock 2.6.1 ### Workarounds For WireMock: - Option 1: Configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names in the outbound URLs subject to DNS rebinding - Option 2: Use external firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations For WireMock Studio: N/A. Switch to another distribution, there will be no fix provided. The vendor of former WireMock Studio recommends migration to [WireMock Cloud](https://www.wiremock.io/product) ### References - CVE-2023-41327 - Related issue in the WireMock Webhooks Extension

  • BIT-wiremock-2023-41329Domain restrictions bypass via DNS Rebinding in WireMock and WireMock Studio2026-04-13vendor · osvUS

    WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses. These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.35.1-1 and 3.0.3-1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should either configure firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations or to configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names.

  • PYSEC-2026-2050Domain restrictions bypass via DNS Rebinding in WireMock and WireMock Studio webhooks, proxy and recorder modes2026-07-07vendor · osvUS

    ### Impact The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in [Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses](https://wiremock.org/docs/configuration/#preventing-proxying-to-and-recording-from-specific-target-addresses). These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. ### Affected versions - WireMock 3,x until 3.0.3 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network - WireMock 2.x until 2.35.1 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network - Python WireMock until 2.6.1 - WireMock Studio - all versions, this proprietary product was discontinued in 2022 ### Patches - WireMock 3.0.3 + the 3.0.3-1 Docker image - WireMock 2.35.1 + the 2.35.1-1 Docker image - backport to WireMock 2.x - Python WireMock 2.6.1 ### Workarounds For WireMock: - Option 1: Configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names in the outbound URLs subject to DNS rebinding - Option 2: Use external firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations For WireMock Studio: N/A. Switch to another distribution, there will be no fix provided. The vendor of former WireMock Studio recommends migration to [WireMock Cloud](https://www.wiremock.io/product) ### References - CVE-2023-41327 - Related issue in the WireMock Webhooks Extension

06

also known as (8)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2023-09-06modified 2026-06-17
08

references (7)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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