CVE-2022-39369

highpriority · track · 33EPSS 0.020 · 81 %ileDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
2.00% (81st) EPSS
CVSS 8 · high
Is it mine?
8 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
6 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

phpCAS is an authentication library that allows PHP applications to easily authenticate users via a Central Authentication Service (CAS) server. The phpCAS library uses HTTP headers to determine the service URL used to validate tickets. This allows an attacker to control the host header and use a valid ticket granted for any authorized service in the same SSO realm (CAS server) to authenticate to the service protected by phpCAS. Depending on the settings of the CAS server service registry in worst case this may be any other service URL (if the allowed URLs are configured to "^(https)://.*") or may be strictly limited to known and authorized services in the same SSO federation if proper URL service validation is applied. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to gain access to a victim's account on a vulnerable CASified service without victim's knowledge, when the victim visits attacker's website while being logged in to the same CAS server. phpCAS 1.6.0 is a major version upgrade that starts enforcing service URL discovery validation, because there is unfortunately no 100% safe default config to use in PHP. Starting this version, it is required to pass in an additional service base URL argument when constructing the client class. For more information, please refer to the upgrading doc. This vulnerability only impacts the CAS client that the phpCAS library protects against. The problematic service URL discovery behavior in phpCAS < 1.6.0 will only be disabled, and thus you are not impacted from it, if the phpCAS configuration has the following setup: 1. `phpCAS::setUrl()` is called (a reminder that you have to pass in the full URL of the current page, rather than your service base URL), and 2. `phpCAS::setCallbackURL()` is called, only when the proxy mode is enabled. 3. If your PHP's HTTP header input `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Server`, `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Forwarded-Protocol` is sanitized before reaching PHP (by a reverse proxy, for example), you will not be impacted by this vulnerability either. If your CAS server service registry is configured to only allow known and trusted service URLs the severity of the vulnerability is reduced substantially in its severity since an attacker must be in control of another authorized service. Otherwise, you should upgrade the library to get the safe service discovery behavior.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

8.0
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.18highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 2.1 · impact 5.9
v3.18highAV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.18highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.18highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 2.1 · impact 5.9
v3.18highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.17.3highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

03

affected products (8)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

04

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2023-2102Moodle: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2023-08-20csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Moodle ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen, Informationen offenzulegen und SQL-Injection- oder Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen.

  • GHSA-8q72-6qq8-xv64phpCAS vulnerable to Service Hostname Discovery Exploitation2022-11-01ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact The phpCAS library uses HTTP headers to determine the service URL used to validate tickets. This allows an attacker to control the host header and use a valid ticket granted for any authorized service in the same SSO realm (CAS server) to authenticate to the service protected by phpCAS. Depending on the settings of the CAS server service registry in worst case this may be any other service URL (if the allowed URLs are configured to "^(https)://.*") or may be strictly limited to known and authorized services in the same SSO federation if proper URL service validation is applied. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to gain access to a victim's account on a vulnerable CASified service without victim's knowledge, when the victim visits attacker's website while being logged in to the same CAS server. ### Patch phpCAS 1.6.0 is a major version upgrade that starts enforcing service URL discovery validation, because there is unfortunately no 100% safe default config to use in PHP. Starting this version, it is required to pass in an additional service base URL argument when constructing the client class. For more information, please refer to the upgrading doc. ### Workarounds This vulnerability only impacts the CAS client that the phpCAS library protects against. The problematic service URL discovery behavior in phpCAS < 1.6.0 will only be disabled, and thus you are not impacted from it, if the phpCAS configuration has the following setup: 1. `phpCAS::setUrl()` is called (a reminder that you have to pass in the full URL of the current page, rather than your service base URL), and 2. `phpCAS::setCallbackURL()` is called, only when the proxy mode is enabled. 3. Alternatively, if your PHP's HTTP header input `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Server`, `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Forwarded-Protocol` is sanitized before reaching PHP (by a reverse proxy, for example), you will not be impacted by this vulnerability. Otherwise, you should upgrade the library to get the safe service discovery behavior. If your CAS server service registry is configured to only allow known and trusted service URLs, the severity of the vulnerability is reduced substantially since an attacker must be in control of another authorized service. ### Acknowledgement We would like to thank Filip Hejsek for discovering this vulnerability, responsibly reporting it to the developers, and helping harden the patch. Henry Pan and Joachim Fritschi helped with the patch and release effort as phpCAS developers.

05

also known as (4)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

06

sources

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07

references (19)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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