CVE-2022-29247

mediumpriority · track · 39EPSS 0.010 · 64 %ileEURUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
1.05% (64th) EPSS
CVSS 6.8 · medium
Is it mine?
18 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript (JS), HTML, and CSS. A vulnerability in versions prior to 18.0.0-beta.6, 17.2.0, 16.2.6, and 15.5.5 allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` enabled which in turn allows effective access to `ipcRenderer`. The `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` option does not implicitly grant Node.js access. Rather, it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If an application is sandboxed, then `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs, which include `ipcRenderer`. If the application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC `senderFrame` validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to `ipcRenderer` can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled. Electron versions 18.0.0-beta.6, 17.2.0, 16.2.6, and 15.5.5 contain a fix for this issue. As a workaround, ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate `senderFrame`.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

9.8
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–critical · 2.2–9.8

v2.06.8mediumAV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:Pprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 8.6 · impact 6.4
v3.19.8criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 3.9 · impact 5.9
v3.19.8criticalAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.12.2lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.12.2lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 0.7 · impact 1.4
v3.12.2lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.19criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (18)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-mq8j-3h7h-p8g7Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled2022-06-16ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` enabled which in turn allows effective access to `ipcRenderer`. Please note the misleadingly named `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing `sandbox` setting. If your application is sandboxed then `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes `ipcRenderer`). If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC `senderFrame` validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to `ipcRenderer` can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled. ### Patches This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix: * `18.0.0-beta.6` * `17.2.0` * `16.2.6` * `15.5.5` ### Workarounds Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate `senderFrame` as per our [security tutorial here](https://github.com/electron/electron/blob/main/docs/tutorial/security.md#17-validate-the-sender-of-all-ipc-messages). ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org).

06

also known as (4)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2022-06-13modified 2026-06-17
08

references (4)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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