CVE-2022-27666

mediumpriority · track · 43EPSS 0.055 · 93 %ileexploit · PoCDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP1 · Urgent
Exploitable?
Public exploit
3 exploits · PoC
Likely / severe?
5.52% (93rd) EPSS
CVSS 4.6 · medium
Is it mine?
154 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
6 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

A heap buffer overflow flaw was found in IPsec ESP transformation code in net/ipv4/esp4.c and net/ipv6/esp6.c. This flaw allows a local attacker with a normal user privilege to overwrite kernel heap objects and may cause a local privilege escalation threat.

01

remediations

Vendor fix, mitigation, or workaround guidance, as published by each source.

A vendor fix is available.

  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debuginfo-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debuginfo-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debugsource-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debugsource-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debuginfo-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debuginfo-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debugsource-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debugsource-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debuginfo-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debuginfo-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debugsource-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debugsource-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debuginfo-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debuginfo-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debugsource-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debugsource-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debuginfo-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debuginfo-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debugsource-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debugsource-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debuginfo-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debuginfo-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debugsource-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debugsource-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Fixedkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-kvm-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debug-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debuginfo-common-x86_64-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-debuginfo-common-x86_64-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-kvm-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Fixedkernel-rt-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debuginfo-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debuginfo-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debugsource-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debugsource-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debuginfo-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debuginfo-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debugsource-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debugsource-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debuginfo-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debuginfo-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debugsource-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debugsource-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debuginfo-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debuginfo-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debugsource-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debugsource-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debuginfo-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debuginfo-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debugsource-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debugsource-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debuginfo-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debuginfo-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debugsource-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debugsource-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-kvm-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debuginfo-common-x86_64-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debuginfo-common-x86_64-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-kvm-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

02

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.8
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 4.6–7.8

v2.04.6mediumAV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:Pprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 3.9 · impact 6.4
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 1.8 · impact 5.9
v3.17.8highAV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.17.4highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Psecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · Red Hat Product Security US
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

CWE-787USprimaryCWE-119USCWE-122USCWE-787US
04

exploits (3)

Public proof-of-concept and weaponised exploit code.

05

affected products (154)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

showing 20 of 154
06

advisories (5)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • RHSA-2022:4942Red Hat Security Advisory: kpatch-patch security update2022-06-08csaf · redhat_csafUS

    An update is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.1 Update Services for SAP Solutions. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.

  • RHSA-2022:5344Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel-rt security and bug fix update2022-06-28csaf · redhat_csafUS

    An update for kernel-rt is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.

  • WID-SEC-W-2022-0157Linux Kernel: Schwachstelle ermöglicht nicht spezifizierten AngriffDeutsch2022-03-22csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2022-0887Android Patchday August 2022Deutsch2022-08-02csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Google Android ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erweitern, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen und beliebigen Code auszuführen.

  • PUB-A-2274528562022-08-01vendor · osvUS
07

also known as (5)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

08

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

cnnvdenisa_euvdfstec_bduosvcert_bundredhat_csafNVDCVE.orgMITRE
published 2022-03-23modified 2026-09-01
10

references (60)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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