CVE-2020-10291

mediumpriority · track · 31OT risk · elevatedEPSS 0.014 · 73 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
1.45% (73rd) EPSS
CVSS 5 · medium
Is it mine?
2 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
3 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Visual Components (owned by KUKA) is a robotic simulator that allows simulating factories and robots in order toimprove planning and decision-making processes. Visual Components software requires a special license which can beobtained from a network license server. The network license server binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0) and listensfor packets over UDP port 5093. No authentication/authorization is required in order to communicate with theserver. The protocol being used is a property protocol by RMS Sentinel which provides the licensing infrastructurefor the network license server. RMS Sentinel license manager service exposes UDP port 5093 which provides sensitivesystem information that could be leveraged for further exploitation without any kind of authentication. Thisinformation includes detailed hardware and OS characteristics.After a decryption process, a textual protocol is found which contains a simple header with the requested command,application-identifier, and some arguments. The protocol leaks information regarding the receiving serverinformation, license information and managing licenses, among others.Through this flaw, attackers can retreive information about a KUKA simulation system, particularly, the version ofthe licensing server, which is connected to the simulator, and which will allow them to launch local simulationswith similar characteristics, further understanding the dynamics of motion virtualization and opening doors toother attacks (see RVDP#711 and RVDP#712 for subsequent vulnerabilities that compromise integrity andavailability).Beyond compromising simulations, Visual Components provides capabilities to interface with industrial machinery.Particularly, their PLC Connectivity feature 'makes it easy' to connect simulations with control systems usingeither the industry standard OPC UA or other supported vendor specific interfaces. This fills the gap of jumpingfrom simulation to real and enables attackers to pivot from the Visual Components simulator to robots or otherIndustrial Control System (ICS) devices, such as PLCs.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 5–7.5

v2.05mediumAV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 10 · impact 2.9
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.07.5highCVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.07.5highCVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · cve@aliasrobotics.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.16.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

03

affected products (2)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

04

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

05

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2020-11-06modified 2026-06-17
07

references (5)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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