CVE-2019-6477

mediumpriority · track · 31EPSS 0.041 · 91 %ileEURUUS

grimoire priorityP3 · Track

Exploitable?

—

no known exploitation

Likely / severe?

4.06% (91st) EPSS

CVSS 5 · medium

Is it mine?

195 products

Check your exposure

Who says so?

5 sources

cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

With pipelining enabled each incoming query on a TCP connection requires a similar resource allocation to a query received via UDP or via TCP without pipelining enabled. A client using a TCP-pipelined connection to a server could consume more resources than the server has been provisioned to handle. When a TCP connection with a large number of pipelined queries is closed, the load on the server releasing these multiple resources can cause it to become unresponsive, even for queries that can be answered authoritatively or from cache. (This is most likely to be perceived as an intermittent server problem).

remediations

Vendor fix, mitigation, or workaround guidance, as published by each source.

A vendor fix is available.

Fixedbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-license-32:9.11.13-3.el8.noarch as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Fixedpython3-bind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.noarch as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845
Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-license-32:9.11.13-3.el8.noarch as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
Workaroundpython3-bind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.noarch as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.5

010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 5–7.5

v2.05mediumAV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:Pprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 10 · impact 2.9

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6

v3.07.5highCVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · Red Hat Product Security US

v3.16.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU

v3.17.5highAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · security-officer@isc.orgexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

CWE-400USprimaryCWE-400USCWE-400US

affected products (195)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

ISC BIND9≤ 9.11.6-P1 -> 9.11.12, 9.12.4-P1 -> 9.12.4-P2, 9.14.1 -> 9.14.7, and versions 9.11.5-S6 -> 9.11.12-S1 of BIND 9 Supported Preview Edition. Versions 9.15.0 -> 9.15.5 of the BIND 9.15 development branch are also affectedenisa_euvdEU
Fedora Project Fedora≤ 31fstec_bduRU
Fedora Project Fedora≤ 30fstec_bduRU
Internet Systems Consortium BIND≤ 9.11.13fstec_bduRU
Internet Systems Consortium BIND≤ 9.15.6fstec_bduRU
Internet Systems Consortium BIND≤ 9.14.8fstec_bduRU
Red Hat Inc. Red Hat Enterprise Linux≤ 7.0fstec_bduRU
Red Hat Inc. Red Hat Enterprise Linux≤ 8.0fstec_bduRU
АО «ИВК» Альт 8 СПall versionsfstec_bduRU
АО «Концерн ВНИИНС» ОС ОН «Стрелец»≤ 1.0fstec_bduRU
АО «НТЦ ИТ РОСА» ROSA Virtualization≤ 2.1fstec_bduRU
ООО «РусБИТех-Астра» Astra Linux Special Edition≤ 1.6 «Смоленск»fstec_bduRU
ООО «РусБИТех-Астра» Astra Linux Special Edition для «Эльбрус»≤ 8.1 «Ленинград»fstec_bduRU
Сообщество свободного программного обеспечения Debian GNU/Linux≤ 9fstec_bduRU
Сообщество свободного программного обеспечения Debian GNU/Linux≤ 8fstec_bduRU
fedoraproject fedora= 30nvdUScpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
fedoraproject fedora= 31nvdUScpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
isc bind= 9.11.12nvdUScpe:2.3:a:isc:bind:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
isc bind= 9.11.5nvdUScpe:2.3:a:isc:bind:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
isc bind= 9.11.6nvdUScpe:2.3:a:isc:bind:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

showing 20 of 195

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

RHSA-2020:1845Red Hat Security Advisory: bind security, bug fix, and enhancement update2020-04-28csaf · redhat_csafUS
An update for bind is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.

also known as (4)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

cnnvd enisa_euvd fstec_bdu nvd redhat_csaf NVD CVE.org MITRE

published 2019-11-26modified 2026-06-17

related (9,616)

Related entries.

ID	severity	EPSS	exploitable	published
CVE-2026-28318US	—OT critical	43.7% (99th)	KEV	2026-06-04
SolarWinds Serv-U is susceptible to specially crafted POST requests that crash the Serv-U service without authentication using Content-Encoding: deflate. Mitigation steps are provi…
CVE-2026-45498US	high7.5OT critical	63.1% (99th)	KEV	2026-05-20
Microsoft Defender Denial of Service Vulnerability
CVE-2023-44487US	high7.5OT critical	100.0% (100th)	KEV	2023-10-10
The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through…
CVE-2023-38180US	—OT critical	14.1% (97th)	KEV	2023-08-08
.NET and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability
CVE-2021-44228US	critical10.0OT critical	100.0% (100th)	KEV	2021-12-10
Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect agai…

+9611 more

references (45)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

scry

Attackers weaponise vulnerabilities like this against internet-exposed services. See what is exposed on your perimeter with a free passive scan.

Free scan