Suspicious Child Process Created as System
testhighlog source: windows · process_creationauthor Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (@Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR)date 2019-10-26
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description
What this is, in brief.
Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts
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tags
attack.privilege-escalationattack.stealthattack.t1134.002
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rule source (YAML)
title: Suspicious Child Process Created as System
id: 590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9d
status: test
description: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
- https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
- https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM
- https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1453123054243024897
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (@Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1134.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: ParentUser field needs sysmon >= 13.30'
detection:
selection:
ParentUser|contains:
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
ParentUser|endswith:
- '\NETWORK SERVICE'
- '\LOCAL SERVICE'
User|contains: # covers many language settings
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
User|endswith: # System
- '\SYSTEM'
- '\Système'
- '\СИСТЕМА'
IntegrityLevel:
- 'System'
- 'S-1-16-16384'
filter_rundll32:
Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'DavSetCookie'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
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detects techniques (1)
ATT&CK techniques this enables or maps to.
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references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.