CVE-2026-9277

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Red Hat OpenShift ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.

### Summary `shell-quote`'s `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (`\n`, `\r`, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal `\n` as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways. Neither requires the parser to misbehave — `parse()` only emits ops from a fixed control set — but both are documented API surface: 1. **Direct construction.** A caller builds `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input (e.g. a deserialized argument array) and passes it to `quote()`. 2. **`envFn` return.** `parse(cmd, envFn)` is documented to splice the return value of `envFn` into the result array when it is an object. An attacker-influenced data source consulted by `envFn` can introduce an object token whose `.op` reaches `quote()`. ### Impact Shell command injection in callers that pass object tokens with attacker-influenced `.op` values to `quote()` and then hand the result to a shell. The preconditions are narrower than ordinary string injection — they require the caller to feed object tokens into `quote()` — but object tokens are a public, documented part of the API surface, and `quote()` is intended to be a shell-safety boundary. ### PoC ```js const { parse, quote } = require('shell-quote'); // Direct construction quote([{ op: ';\nid' }]); // → "\;\n\\i\\d" ← literal newline; second line executes as a command // Via parse() with an envFn returning attacker-shaped objects const tokens = parse('echo $X', () => ({ op: ';\nid' })); require('child_process').execSync(quote(tokens), { shell: true }); // Executes `id` after `echo \;`. ``` Confirmed under `sh`, `bash`, `dash`, and `zsh`. ### Patch Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation in `quote()`. The object-token branch now: - **`{ op }`** — `.op` must be a string from the same allowlist the parser emits (`||`, `&&`, `;;`, `|&`, `<(`, `<<<`, `>>`, `>&`, `<&`, `&`, `;`, `(`, `)`, `|`, `<`, `>`). Anything else throws `TypeError`. This is the direct fix for the reported issue and removes the entire class of `.op` injection. - **`{ op: 'glob', pattern }`** — `.pattern` must be a string with no line terminators. Glob metacharacters (`*`, `?`, `[`, `]`, `{`, `}`, `,`) pass through; all other shell-special characters are backslash-escaped. (Previously the pattern field was discarded entirely and the literal string `\g\l\o\b` was emitted — a latent bug, not security-relevant.) - **`{ comment }`** — `.comment` must be a string with no line terminators (line terminators would end the shell comment and resume command parsing — same injection shape). - **Any other object shape** — `TypeError`. The fix is allowlist-based rather than a targeted regex tweak, so it closes the reported vector and forecloses adjacent ones (U+2028 / U+2029 line separators in `.op`, line terminators in comments, unknown-shape objects coerced through `.replace`). ### Workarounds Prior to upgrading, callers that build object tokens from untrusted input should validate `.op` against the parser's operator set themselves, and never construct `{ op }` from attacker-controlled strings. ### Credits Reported by Akshat Sinha