CVE-2026-75838

Oracle heeft 16 kwetsbaarheden verholpen in diverse Database producten, waaronder Database Server, Autonomous Health Framework en Application Testing Suite.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM i ausnutzen, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, und um Dateien zu manipulieren.

### Summary During `IN_PLACE` sanitization, a hook that removes an element can leave that element's detached descendants executable. A descendant image can retain its attacker-provided `onload` handler and fire after `sanitize()` returns, even though the returned root is clean and the image remains disconnected from the document. ### Details In DOMPurify 3.4.12, `_sanitizeElements()` in `src/purify.ts:1862-1904` runs the `beforeSanitizeElements` or `uponSanitizeElement` hook and returns immediately when the hook detached the current node. The return does not call `_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode)`. The detached subtree is not added to `DOMPurify.removed`, so the post-walk `IN_PLACE` neutralization cannot reach it. If the browser queued a resource event while the application constructed the detached dirty root, a descendant can therefore retain its handler and execute after sanitization. The hook only rejects the containing element and does not add or approve the event handler. DOMPurify's ordinary removal path de-arms the same queued event; only the hook-detachment early return skips the existing subtree neutralization. ### PoC Load the published `dompurify@3.4.12` `dist/purify.js` before this script in Chromium: ```html <div id="result">not fired</div> <script> const root = document.createElement('div'); root.innerHTML = ` <footer> <img src="" onload="result.textContent = 'XSS after sanitize'"> </footer> <div>safe</div>`; DOMPurify.setConfig({ ALLOWED_TAGS: ['div', '#text', 'footer'], IN_PLACE: true }); DOMPurify.addHook('uponSanitizeElement', node => { if (node.tagName === 'FOOTER') node.remove(); }); DOMPurify.sanitize(root); document.body.append(root); </script> ``` `sanitize()` returns with no handler execution and the returned root contains only the safe `div`. After the event loop advances, the original image remains disconnected but its retained `onload` changes the page to `XSS after sanitize`. As the claim-matched control, use the same detached input with `ALLOWED_TAGS: ['div', '#text']` and no hook. DOMPurify's ordinary removal path removes the original image's handler, the returned root is still `<div>safe</div>`, and the marker does not fire. ### Impact In an application that uses `IN_PLACE` with the documented element-removal hook pattern, an attacker who can supply HTML can execute JavaScript in the integrating application's origin after the application sanitizes and renders that content. The required non-default configuration is `IN_PLACE` plus a hook that removes a containing element. The hook does not add or approve the event handler, and the dirty root never needs to be connected before sanitization. ### Suggested fix Reuse the existing `_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode)` helper before returning from both hook-detachment branches in `_sanitizeElements()`. Add regressions for `beforeSanitizeElements` and `uponSanitizeElement` that retain a reference to a descendant resource element and verify that its event handler is removed after the hook detaches its ancestor.