CVE-2026-75484

## Summary Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle CR, LF, or NUL characters into application-visible request headers via HTTP/2. `Bandit.HTTP2.Stream.read_headers/1` validates pseudo-header placement and uniqueness, header-name casing, connection-specific headers, the `te` value, and `content-length`, but never checks field *values*. Because HPACK carries arbitrary octets, a HEADERS block whose field values contain `\r`, `\n`, or `\0` decodes without error and the values land in `conn.req_headers` unchanged. The HTTP/1 path already rejects the same octets; HTTP/2 did not. Bandit itself is not a sink for the injected bytes: its own logging uses fixed strings or `inspect`, and HTTP/2 response headers are HPACK-encoded and separately rejected by Plug's `put_resp_header`, so response splitting is not reachable through this path. The risk is entirely in how a downstream application consumes header values, such as appending one verbatim to a plain-text log or concatenating it into an upstream request. A related gap bundled in the same fix: only `:method`, `:scheme`, and `:path` were checked for at most one occurrence; a duplicate `:authority` pseudo-header was accepted, with the first instance silently winning as `conn.host` while a conflicting value remained visible to the application. This issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.12.5.