CVE-2026-73420
criticalPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.007 · 54. PerzentilEUUSEPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27
NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, the defaultNormalizer used by the email and magic-link sign-in flow validates an address before applying Unicode normalization. An address can contain a Unicode character such as U+FF20 FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT that is not ASCII at-sign but canonicalizes to an ASCII at-sign under NFKC or NFKD normalization. The address passes the normalizer's single-at-sign check, but a downstream sendVerificationRequest mail library or delivery service that normalizes the address can then see two at-sign separators and deliver the passwordless sign-in link to an attacker-controlled recipient. Applications are affected when the email provider uses the built-in normalizer rather than a custom normalizeIdentifier and the downstream sender applies Unicode normalization. An attacker who knows a victim's email address can request the misrouted magic link and sign in as the victim without victim interaction. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.
cvss
Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.
Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–critical · 6.9–9.1
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betroffene Produkte (6)
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Advisories (1)
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- GHSA-7rqj-j65f-68whAuth.js: Email normalizer validates the address before Unicode normalization, allowing a homoglyph @ bypass2026-07-23ghsa · osvUS
## Summary The default email-address normalizer used by the email/magic-link sign-in flow validates the address **before** applying Unicode normalization. An address can contain a Unicode character that is not an ASCII `@` (U+0040) but canonicalizes to one under NFKC/NFKD normalization (the normalization commonly applied by mail libraries and services for internationalized email). Such an address passes the normalizer's single-`@` check, but a downstream mail library that normalizes the string then sees two `@` separators and may deliver the passwordless sign-in link to a different recipient than intended. This is an instance of validating before canonicalizing. ## Am I affected? You may be affected if **all** of the following hold: - You use `next-auth` `>= 4.0.0, < 4.24.14`, or `@auth/core` `>= 0.1.0, < 0.41.3`. - You have the email / magic-link (passwordless) provider enabled. - You rely on the built-in default identifier normalizer (you have not supplied your own `normalizeIdentifier`). - Your `sendVerificationRequest` implementation uses a mail library or delivery service that applies Unicode normalization to recipient addresses (most internationalized-email/SMTPUTF8-capable senders do). You are **not** affected if you do not use the email provider, or if your normalizer/mailer rejects or canonicalizes non-ASCII addresses before they are validated. ## Impact - Account takeover: an attacker who knows a victim's email address can request a magic link that is delivered to an attacker-controlled mailbox, then use it to sign in as the victim. - No victim interaction is required to misroute the link; the attacker initiates the flow. ## Patched version The fix applies Unicode (NFKC) normalization before the address is validated, so homoglyph separators are collapsed and rejected up front. Upgrade to the first release containing this fix (pending; this advisory will be updated with the exact patched version before publication). No application code changes are required after upgrading. ## Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately: - Supply a custom `normalizeIdentifier` on the email provider that calls `identifier.normalize("NFKC")` (and lower-cases/trims) **before** any validation, and rejects addresses that do not contain exactly one `@` after normalization. - Or reject any address whose local part or domain contains non-ASCII characters, if your user base does not require internationalized email addresses. ## Credit Reported by @kakashi-kx. Thank you for the responsible disclosure.
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Referenzen (12)
Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/19d2feb24359fa8c79418907fc68d9ec8152ca94enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/a63eee12a1a20cb35209e44195b097868517b9a0enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/@auth/core@0.41.3enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@4.24.15enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@5.0.0-beta.32enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-7rqj-j65f-68whenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/19d2feb24359fa8c79418907fc68d9ec8152ca94nvd
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/a63eee12a1a20cb35209e44195b097868517b9a0nvd
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