CVE-2026-59896
mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.003 · 22. PerzentilEUUSEPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.11.8 before 4.12.27, hono/jsx did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering, allowing createContext, useContext, jsxRenderer, or useRequestContext data from a different in-flight request to be used after an await in an async component. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.27.
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- GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfjhono/jsx does not isolate context per request, leading to cross-request data disclosure2026-07-21ghsa · osvUS
### Summary `hono/jsx` did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering. While an async component was suspended on `await`, its provided context value stayed observable to other requests rendering concurrently, so `useContext()` could return a value from a different in-flight request. ### Details During server-side rendering, context values were kept in a process-wide structure rather than scoped to each request's render. While an async component awaited, another request entering the same provider could observe or replace the value; when the first render resumed, it could read the other request's context. This affects the usual ways request-scoped data is passed through a server-rendered JSX tree: - `createContext()` / `useContext()` - the `jsxRenderer` middleware and `useRequestContext()` It arises only when context is read after an `await` inside an async component while requests render concurrently. Reading context synchronously (before any `await`), purely synchronous rendering, and client-side (DOM) rendering are not affected. ### Impact Under concurrent requests, a response could be rendered with another request's context. A user may receive HTML rendered for a different user, and an authorization check performed after an `await` may be evaluated against another user's data. This may lead to: - disclosure of rendered output intended for another user - authorization decisions made with the wrong request's context - cross-request mixing of session or other request-scoped state
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Referenzen (10)
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- https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/fab3b13639339cbd5ba1166a5b23d9ac30c5f64fcnnvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/releasesPatchcnnvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.12.27cnnvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfjcnnvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/fab3b13639339cbd5ba1166a5b23d9ac30c5f64fenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.12.27enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfjenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/fab3b13639339cbd5ba1166a5b23d9ac30c5f64fPatchnvd
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