CVE-2026-57132

highPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.005 · 43. PerzentilUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.51% (43rd) EPSS
CVSS 8.2 · high
Is it mine?
1 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.62, setting PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH to disabled makes verify_token accept requests to /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke without CALL_SERVER_TOKEN authentication. Deployments that use the application's advertised opt-out can expose registered agents and their connected tools or private context to unauthenticated invocation. The vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.62.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

8.2
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen

v3.18.2highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 4.2
v3.18.2highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (1)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqqPraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication2026-06-18ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary Setting `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` completely disables all authentication on the `/api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke` endpoint. This bypass is advertised in the application's own error messages, making it likely to appear in production Docker and Compose configurations. ### Details ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py:32 _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED = os.getenv('PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH', '').lower() == 'disabled' async def verify_token(...) -> None: if _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED: return # all authentication skipped unconditionally ``` The application's own error message advertises the bypass: > "Set CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled to run without authentication." This causes the setting to appear in Docker/Compose configurations as a convenience option. ### Proof of Concept ```python import os os.environ["PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH"] = "disabled" # verify_token() now returns immediately for any request # POST /api/v1/agents/any-agent/invoke → 200 OK (no token needed) ``` Common vulnerable deployment: ```yaml # docker-compose.yml environment: - PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled # auth completely disabled ``` ### Impact Full unauthenticated access to the agent invocation API. Any agent registered on the server can be triggered without credentials, potentially executing arbitrary actions depending on the agent's configured tools.

  • PYSEC-2026-3508PraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication2026-07-23vendor · osvUS

    ### Summary Setting `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` completely disables all authentication on the `/api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke` endpoint. This bypass is advertised in the application's own error messages, making it likely to appear in production Docker and Compose configurations. ### Details ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py:32 _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED = os.getenv('PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH', '').lower() == 'disabled' async def verify_token(...) -> None: if _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED: return # all authentication skipped unconditionally ``` The application's own error message advertises the bypass: > "Set CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled to run without authentication." This causes the setting to appear in Docker/Compose configurations as a convenience option. ### Proof of Concept ```python import os os.environ["PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH"] = "disabled" # verify_token() now returns immediately for any request # POST /api/v1/agents/any-agent/invoke → 200 OK (no token needed) ``` Common vulnerable deployment: ```yaml # docker-compose.yml environment: - PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled # auth completely disabled ``` ### Impact Full unauthenticated access to the agent invocation API. Any agent registered on the server can be triggered without credentials, potentially executing arbitrary actions depending on the agent's configured tools.

06

auch bekannt als (2)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-09-14geändert 2026-09-16
08

Referenzen (3) nvd

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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