CVE-2026-55824

lowPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.002 · 15. PerzentilDEEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.24% (15th) EPSS
CVSS 2.6 · low
Is it mine?
10 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · cert_bund · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

Contao is an Open Source CMS. In versions 4.13.40 through 5.3.46 and 5.7.0-RC1 through 5.7.6, the crawler leaks auth credentials to external hosts. Contao's crawler tries to prevent confidential HTTP client options from being sent to external domains by creating a scoped client: full options for root page origins, cleaned options for everything else. The cleaner removes Cookie and Authorization headers, but it removes the non-Symfony option names basic_auth and bearer_auth instead of Symfony HttpClient's real auth_basic and auth_bearer options. When contao.crawl.default_http_client_options contains Basic or Bearer authentication for a protected staging/production site, those credentials remain in the "clean" client used for external links or configured additional URIs. An attacker who can get an external URL crawled, for example through a link on a crawled page while the broken-link checker is enabled, can receive the crawler credentials. This issue has been fixed in versions 5.3.47 and 5.7.7.

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cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

2.6
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen

v3.12.6lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.12.6lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 1.2 · Auswirkung 1.4
v3.12.6lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.12.4lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
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SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

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betroffene Produkte (10)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

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Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-1921Contao: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Offenlegung von InformationenDeutsch2026-06-14csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Contao ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen.

  • GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6Contao crawler leaks auth credentials to external hosts2026-08-06ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary Contao's crawler tries to prevent confidential HTTP client options from being sent to external domains by creating a scoped client: full options for root page origins, cleaned options for everything else. The cleaner removes `Cookie` and `Authorization` headers, but it removes the non-Symfony option names `basic_auth` and `bearer_auth` instead of Symfony HttpClient's real `auth_basic` and `auth_bearer` options. When `contao.crawl.default_http_client_options` contains Basic or Bearer authentication for a protected staging/production site, those credentials remain in the "clean" client used for external links or configured additional URIs. An attacker who can get an external URL crawled, for example through a link on a crawled page while the broken-link checker is enabled, can receive the crawler credentials. ## Technical Detail ### Root Cause ```php // core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:175-209 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0 private function createHttpClient(array $options = []): HttpClientInterface { $options = array_merge_recursive( [ 'headers' => [ 'accept' => 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8', 'user-agent' => self::USER_AGENT, ], 'max_duration' => 10, ], array_merge_recursive($this->getDefaultHttpClientOptions(), $options), ); $cleanOptions = $this->cleanOptionsFromConfidentialData($options); if ($options === $cleanOptions) { return ($this->httpClientFactory)($options); } $scopedOptionsByRegex = []; foreach ($this->getRootPageUriCollection()->all() as $rootPageUri) { $scopedOptionsByRegex[preg_quote($this->getOriginFromUri($rootPageUri))] = $options; } return new ScopingHttpClient(($this->httpClientFactory)($cleanOptions), $scopedOptionsByRegex); } ``` ```php // core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:226-247 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0 foreach ($options as $k => $v) { if ('headers' === $k) { foreach ($v as $header => $value) { if (\in_array(strtolower($header), ['authorization', 'cookie'], true)) { continue; } $cleanOptions['headers'][$header] = $value; } continue; } if ('basic_auth' === $k || 'bearer_auth' === $k) { continue; } $cleanOptions[$k] = $v; } ``` Symfony HttpClient authentication options are `auth_basic` and `auth_bearer`; Contao's own manual documents `auth_basic` for crawler Basic Authentication. Because the cleaner only strips `basic_auth` and `bearer_auth`, the "clean" default client for non-root-page hosts still carries the real auth options. The existing factory test intends to assert that `Authorization` is not sent to `www.foreign-domain.com`, but its mock client factory ignores the `$defaultOptions` argument, so it does not catch auth options that survive into `HttpClient::create($cleanOptions)`. ## Suggested Mitigation Strip the actual Symfony HttpClient authentication option keys from the clean client. Include NTLM as a defensive extension because Symfony documents it as another auth option. ```diff - if ('basic_auth' === $k || 'bearer_auth' === $k) { + if (\in_array($k, ['auth_basic', 'auth_bearer', 'auth_ntlm', 'basic_auth', 'bearer_auth'], true)) { continue; } ``` Also update the factory test so the mock factory records or preserves `$defaultOptions`; otherwise the test does not verify what `HttpClient::create($cleanOptions)` receives in production. ## Impact - **Direct primitive**: disclosure of crawler Basic/Bearer credentials to an external host reached by the crawler. - **Chain potential**: if those credentials protect a staging or pre-publication environment, an attacker can use them to access that environment. The impact depends on what the leaked credential unlocks. - **Realistic exploitation**: a content editor adds a link to `https://attacker.example/probe` on a page that the crawler visits. When an administrator or scheduled maintenance run starts the broken-link checker with crawler Basic/Bearer authentication configured, the request to the attacker URL includes the generated `Authorization` header.

06

auch bekannt als (3)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

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quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-07-31geändert 2026-07-31
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Referenzen (3)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

scry

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