CVE-2026-55540

### Summary PraisonAI's `praisonai.code` tool wrappers (exported as `CODE_TOOLS` for agents) expose a `workspace` setting that the module itself treats as a path-traversal **security boundary** — `read_file`, `write_file`, `apply_diff`, and `search_replace` explicitly call `is_path_within_directory()` and return `"… is outside the workspace"` on violations. That boundary is enforced **unsoundly and inconsistently**: 1. The containment helper uses `os.path.abspath()`, not `realpath()`/`Path.resolve()`. A symlink located **inside** the workspace whose target is **outside** has an `abspath()` that is still inside the workspace, so it passes the check while `open()` follows the link. This bypasses read, write, apply_diff, and search_replace (CWE-59). 2. `list_files()` resolves `path` against the workspace but **never** calls the containment helper at all — `../` and absolute paths escape directly (CWE-22). 3. `execute_command()` takes a `workspace` argument documented "for security validation" but performs **no** `cwd` containment check; `code_execute_command()` resolves a relative `cwd` against the workspace and also never validates it (and never even passes `workspace` to the low-level helper). A relative `cwd="../outside"` runs commands from outside the workspace (CWE-22). An attacker who can influence an agent that has these tools attached (untrusted prompt, indirect prompt injection, or a server-exposed agent) can read, overwrite, list, and execute from outside the configured workspace, bounded only by the process user's filesystem permissions. ## Technical Detail ### 1. Unsound containment helper (symlink bypass — CWE-59) ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/code/utils/file_utils.py — is_path_within_directory() abs_file = os.path.abspath(file_path) # does NOT resolve symlinks abs_dir = os.path.abspath(directory) if not abs_dir.endswith(os.sep): abs_dir += os.sep return abs_file.startswith(abs_dir) or abs_file == abs_dir.rstrip(os.sep) ``` `read_file`/`write_file`/`apply_diff`/`search_replace` call this with the configured workspace (e.g. `read_file.py`: `# Security check - ensure path is within workspace`). Because `abspath()` does not canonicalize symlinks, a link at `WORKSPACE/link_to_secret.txt` → `/outside/secret.txt` has `abspath` `WORKSPACE/link_to_secret.txt` (inside) and passes, while `open()` follows it to the real outside target. ### 2. `list_files()` has no containment check (CWE-22) ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/list_files.py if workspace and not os.path.isabs(path): abs_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(workspace, path)) # ../ collapses out of workspace else: abs_path = os.path.abspath(path) # absolute path used as-is # ... os.path.isdir(abs_path) then listed. is_path_within_directory() is NEVER called. ``` ### 3. `execute_command()` never validates `cwd` (CWE-22) ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/execute_command.py — workspace param doc: "for security validation" if cwd: if workspace and not os.path.isabs(cwd): work_dir = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(workspace, cwd)) # ../ escapes; no containment check else: work_dir = os.path.abspath(cwd) # subprocess.run(args, cwd=work_dir, ...) # no is_path_within_directory() anywhere ``` ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/code/agent_tools.py — code_execute_command() if work_dir and _workspace_root and not os.path.isabs(work_dir): work_dir = os.path.join(_workspace_root, work_dir) # joins, never validates result = _execute_command(command=command, cwd=work_dir, timeout=120) # workspace not even passed ``` Note: `execute_command` rejects `shell=True` and runs `shlex.split(command)` via `subprocess.run` (no shell), so shell metacharacters (`&&`, `>`, pipes) do not work — but any binary still runs with attacker-chosen argv **from the escaped cwd**, which is sufficient to read/write outside the workspace. ### The workspace is an intended boundary (pre-empts "by design") The module asserts this control itself: `read_file.py` "Security check - ensure path is within workspace"; `write_file.py` "default workspace is cwd so relative paths cannot escape"; `is_path_within_directory` docstring "(prevents path traversal)"; `execute_command` `workspace` param "for security validation". The bug is that the asserted control is unsound (abspath vs realpath) and not applied to `list_files`/`execute_command` cwd. ## Proof of Concept Self-contained, local temp fixtures only; no network, no untrusted commands. Real `praisonai.code` agent tools were called. ``` workspace = /tmp/.../workspace outside = /tmp/.../outside [1] baseline plain ../ read -> BLOCKED: "Path '../outside/secret.txt' is outside the workspace" [2] symlink read (in-WS link) -> SUCCESS: returned "SECRET_OUTSIDE_WORKSPACE" [3] symlink write (in-WS link) -> SUCCESS: outside file now contains "OVERWRITTEN_VIA_SYMLINK" [4] code_list_files("../outside") -> SUCCESS: "Contents of ../outside: 📄 secret.txt" [5] code_execute_command(cwd="../outside","pwd") -> SUCCESS: stdout "/tmp/.../outside" [6] code_execute_command(cwd="../outside", python3 -c open('planted.txt','w')...) -> SUCCESS: new file created OUTSIDE workspace, "PWNED_OUTSIDE_WORKSPACE" ``` Steps 2–6 each cross the configured workspace boundary; step 1 shows the plain-`../` guard that the symlink and unscoped vectors bypass. ## Impact - **Confidentiality**: read files outside the workspace (in-workspace symlink; or list/enumerate outside dirs via `list_files`). - **Integrity**: overwrite outside files via symlink; create/modify files outside the workspace via `execute_command` running in an escaped cwd. - **Execution boundary**: run arbitrary available binaries (argv-controlled) from a directory outside the workspace. Bounded by the process user's permissions. In a code-agent or server-exposed agent processing untrusted input, this exposes secrets / project-adjacent / host files and breaks the project-boundary integrity guarantee the workspace setting advertises. ## Suggested Fix - Replace `is_path_within_directory()` with a `realpath()` / `Path.resolve()`-based containment check, and compare with `os.path.commonpath()` rather than `startswith`. - Apply that check consistently to every file path, directory path, backup path, diff/search-replace target, **and command working directory**, after full canonicalization (resolve the symlink's real target, not the link path). - `list_files()`: reject absolute paths and `../` escapes when `workspace` is set. - `execute_command()`: validate `cwd` containment when `workspace` is set; `code_execute_command()` should pass `_workspace_root` to the low-level helper or validate itself. - Regression tests: symlink read/write/diff/search-replace to outside targets; `list_files("../outside", workspace=…)`; `execute_command(cwd="../outside", workspace=…)`; absolute outside paths with a workspace set.

### Summary PraisonAI's `praisonai.code` tool wrappers (exported as `CODE_TOOLS` for agents) expose a `workspace` setting that the module itself treats as a path-traversal **security boundary** — `read_file`, `write_file`, `apply_diff`, and `search_replace` explicitly call `is_path_within_directory()` and return `"… is outside the workspace"` on violations. That boundary is enforced **unsoundly and inconsistently**: 1. The containment helper uses `os.path.abspath()`, not `realpath()`/`Path.resolve()`. A symlink located **inside** the workspace whose target is **outside** has an `abspath()` that is still inside the workspace, so it passes the check while `open()` follows the link. This bypasses read, write, apply_diff, and search_replace (CWE-59). 2. `list_files()` resolves `path` against the workspace but **never** calls the containment helper at all — `../` and absolute paths escape directly (CWE-22). 3. `execute_command()` takes a `workspace` argument documented "for security validation" but performs **no** `cwd` containment check; `code_execute_command()` resolves a relative `cwd` against the workspace and also never validates it (and never even passes `workspace` to the low-level helper). A relative `cwd="../outside"` runs commands from outside the workspace (CWE-22). An attacker who can influence an agent that has these tools attached (untrusted prompt, indirect prompt injection, or a server-exposed agent) can read, overwrite, list, and execute from outside the configured workspace, bounded only by the process user's filesystem permissions. ## Technical Detail ### 1. Unsound containment helper (symlink bypass — CWE-59) ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/code/utils/file_utils.py — is_path_within_directory() abs_file = os.path.abspath(file_path) # does NOT resolve symlinks abs_dir = os.path.abspath(directory) if not abs_dir.endswith(os.sep): abs_dir += os.sep return abs_file.startswith(abs_dir) or abs_file == abs_dir.rstrip(os.sep) ``` `read_file`/`write_file`/`apply_diff`/`search_replace` call this with the configured workspace (e.g. `read_file.py`: `# Security check - ensure path is within workspace`). Because `abspath()` does not canonicalize symlinks, a link at `WORKSPACE/link_to_secret.txt` → `/outside/secret.txt` has `abspath` `WORKSPACE/link_to_secret.txt` (inside) and passes, while `open()` follows it to the real outside target. ### 2. `list_files()` has no containment check (CWE-22) ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/list_files.py if workspace and not os.path.isabs(path): abs_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(workspace, path)) # ../ collapses out of workspace else: abs_path = os.path.abspath(path) # absolute path used as-is # ... os.path.isdir(abs_path) then listed. is_path_within_directory() is NEVER called. ``` ### 3. `execute_command()` never validates `cwd` (CWE-22) ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/execute_command.py — workspace param doc: "for security validation" if cwd: if workspace and not os.path.isabs(cwd): work_dir = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(workspace, cwd)) # ../ escapes; no containment check else: work_dir = os.path.abspath(cwd) # subprocess.run(args, cwd=work_dir, ...) # no is_path_within_directory() anywhere ``` ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/code/agent_tools.py — code_execute_command() if work_dir and _workspace_root and not os.path.isabs(work_dir): work_dir = os.path.join(_workspace_root, work_dir) # joins, never validates result = _execute_command(command=command, cwd=work_dir, timeout=120) # workspace not even passed ``` Note: `execute_command` rejects `shell=True` and runs `shlex.split(command)` via `subprocess.run` (no shell), so shell metacharacters (`&&`, `>`, pipes) do not work — but any binary still runs with attacker-chosen argv **from the escaped cwd**, which is sufficient to read/write outside the workspace. ### The workspace is an intended boundary (pre-empts "by design") The module asserts this control itself: `read_file.py` "Security check - ensure path is within workspace"; `write_file.py` "default workspace is cwd so relative paths cannot escape"; `is_path_within_directory` docstring "(prevents path traversal)"; `execute_command` `workspace` param "for security validation". The bug is that the asserted control is unsound (abspath vs realpath) and not applied to `list_files`/`execute_command` cwd. ## Proof of Concept Self-contained, local temp fixtures only; no network, no untrusted commands. Real `praisonai.code` agent tools were called. ``` workspace = /tmp/.../workspace outside = /tmp/.../outside [1] baseline plain ../ read -> BLOCKED: "Path '../outside/secret.txt' is outside the workspace" [2] symlink read (in-WS link) -> SUCCESS: returned "SECRET_OUTSIDE_WORKSPACE" [3] symlink write (in-WS link) -> SUCCESS: outside file now contains "OVERWRITTEN_VIA_SYMLINK" [4] code_list_files("../outside") -> SUCCESS: "Contents of ../outside: 📄 secret.txt" [5] code_execute_command(cwd="../outside","pwd") -> SUCCESS: stdout "/tmp/.../outside" [6] code_execute_command(cwd="../outside", python3 -c open('planted.txt','w')...) -> SUCCESS: new file created OUTSIDE workspace, "PWNED_OUTSIDE_WORKSPACE" ``` Steps 2–6 each cross the configured workspace boundary; step 1 shows the plain-`../` guard that the symlink and unscoped vectors bypass. ## Impact - **Confidentiality**: read files outside the workspace (in-workspace symlink; or list/enumerate outside dirs via `list_files`). - **Integrity**: overwrite outside files via symlink; create/modify files outside the workspace via `execute_command` running in an escaped cwd. - **Execution boundary**: run arbitrary available binaries (argv-controlled) from a directory outside the workspace. Bounded by the process user's permissions. In a code-agent or server-exposed agent processing untrusted input, this exposes secrets / project-adjacent / host files and breaks the project-boundary integrity guarantee the workspace setting advertises. ## Suggested Fix - Replace `is_path_within_directory()` with a `realpath()` / `Path.resolve()`-based containment check, and compare with `os.path.commonpath()` rather than `startswith`. - Apply that check consistently to every file path, directory path, backup path, diff/search-replace target, **and command working directory**, after full canonicalization (resolve the symlink's real target, not the link path). - `list_files()`: reject absolute paths and `../` escapes when `workspace` is set. - `execute_command()`: validate `cwd` containment when `workspace` is set; `code_execute_command()` should pass `_workspace_root` to the low-level helper or validate itself. - Regression tests: symlink read/write/diff/search-replace to outside targets; `list_files("../outside", workspace=…)`; `execute_command(cwd="../outside", workspace=…)`; absolute outside paths with a workspace set.