CVE-2026-53814

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen, erhöhte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Informationen offenzulegen, Konfigurationen zu manipulieren, beliebige Befehle oder Code auszuführen sowie interne Systeme über SSRF anzugreifen.

### Summary OpenClaw hook ingress can start automated agent runs using a configured hook token. In affected releases, a hook-triggered run could select a bundled CLI backend that received owner-scoped MCP loopback authority instead of a scope appropriate for hook ingress. This issue affects the boundary between hook-token automation and owner-only MCP tools. It does not affect deployments with hooks disabled. ### Affected configurations This affects deployments where hooks are enabled, `/hooks/agent` is reachable with a valid hook token, and a bundled CLI backend can be selected for the hook-triggered run. ### Impact A caller with the hook token could cause the spawned CLI runtime to see or call MCP tools that should have been owner-only. The practical impact depends on which MCP tools are available; the reported proof used persistent cron state as a representative owner-only action. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.20`. Fixed in the `2026.5.20` stable release. ### Mitigations Upgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.20` or later. Keep hook tokens secret, restrict network access to hook endpoints, and disable hooks when they are not needed.