CVE-2026-52804

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gogs ausnutzen, um erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, beliebigen Code auszuführen – sogar mit erweiterten Berechtigungen, was zur vollständigen Kontrolle über das System führen kann –, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen, Benutzer auf bösartige Websites umzuleiten oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.

## Summary A repository admin collaborator can escalate their privileges to owner-level access by exploiting an off-by-one error in the `ChangeCollaborationAccessMode` function. ## Vulnerable Code In `internal/database/repo_collaboration.go`, line 129: ```go func (r *Repository) ChangeCollaborationAccessMode(userID int64, mode AccessMode) error { // Discard invalid input if mode <= AccessModeNone || mode > AccessModeOwner { return nil } ``` `AccessModeOwner` has value 4. The check `mode > AccessModeOwner` evaluates to `4 > 4 = false`, allowing `AccessModeOwner` to pass through. The correct check should be `mode >= AccessModeOwner`. The web route at `internal/route/repo/setting.go:413-416` takes the mode as a raw integer from query parameters: ```go func ChangeCollaborationAccessMode(c *context.Context) { if err := c.Repo.Repository.ChangeCollaborationAccessMode( c.QueryInt64("uid"), database.AccessMode(c.QueryInt("mode"))); err != nil { ``` This allows an admin collaborator to POST `mode=4` and escalate to owner. ## Impact A repository admin collaborator (AccessModeAdmin = 3) can escalate to owner-level access (AccessModeOwner = 4), gaining the ability to: - **Delete the repository** - **Transfer repository ownership** to another user - **Erase wiki data** - Perform all other owner-only operations The `access` table is also updated (line 181), so the escalated permissions persist across sessions. ## Contrast The API route at `internal/route/api/v1/repo_collaborators.go:46` uses `ParseAccessMode()` which only returns Read, Write, or Admin - never Owner. The API endpoint is not affected. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. User A creates a private repository 2. User A adds User B as a collaborator with **Admin** access (mode=3) 3. User B logs in and navigates to the repository settings collaboration page 4. User B sends a POST request: ``` POST /{owner}/{repo}/settings/collaboration/access_mode?uid={B_uid}&mode=4 ``` 5. User B now has **Owner** access - the "Danger Zone" section appears with "Delete This Repository" and "Transfer Ownership" buttons ## Suggested Fix Change the validation in `internal/database/repo_collaboration.go` line 129 from: ```go if mode <= AccessModeNone || mode > AccessModeOwner { ``` to: ```go if mode <= AccessModeNone || mode >= AccessModeOwner { ```

Gogs Vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Collaboration Access Mode Validation in gogs.io/gogs. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: gogs.io/gogs before v0.14.3.