CVE-2026-49997

In SurrealDB, records can be connected as a graph: a `RELATE` statement creates an edge record between two node records. If either endpoint node is deleted, SurrealDB automatically removes the edge row to keep the graph consistent. A user with permission to delete a node could also delete the edges connected to that node, even when the edge table's `PERMISSIONS FOR delete` clause should have stopped them. The automatic edge removal (`Document::purge_edges`) ran with permissions disabled (`opt.clone().with_perms(false)`), so the edge table's `PERMISSIONS FOR delete` and `PERMISSIONS FOR select` clauses were never consulted. The removal step could also observe edge state that the edge's SELECT clause should have hidden. ### Impact What an attacker **can** do: - Delete any edge connected to a node they can delete, regardless of the edge table's `PERMISSIONS FOR delete` clause. - Observe edge contents that `PERMISSIONS FOR select` should have hidden, as a side effect of the same edge-removal step. What it **can't** do: - Delete nodes on tables they do not hold `DELETE` on (the edge removal only runs from an authorised node delete). - Cross namespace or database isolation boundaries. - Escalate to root or operator-level privileges. ### Patches `Document::purge_edges` now propagates the caller's permission context into the edge removal. Each connected edge `DELETE` is evaluated against the edge table's `PERMISSIONS FOR delete` clause, matching a direct `DELETE`. Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected. ### Workarounds - Restrict node `DELETE` permission to principals trusted to delete all connected edge records. - Use namespace or database isolation as the primary boundary where edge-level `PERMISSIONS` is load-bearing for multi-tenant separation.