CVE-2026-49981

highPriorität · verfolgen · 33OT-Risiko · erhöhtEPSS 0.004 · 30. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.36% (30th) EPSS
CVSS 8.2 · high
Is it mine?
3 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · nvd · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-29

Twig is a template language for PHP. Prior to 3.27.0, the per-template filter, tag, and function allow-list verdict is computed when a Template instance is constructed and can remain cached after sandbox state changes between renders, allowing a later sandboxed render to reuse a template that was originally checked with a different or empty policy. This issue is fixed in version 3.27.0.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

8.2
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · low–high · 2.3–8.2

v3.18.2highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 4.2
v4.06mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.06mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.02.3lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (3)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-529h-vh3j-85hqTwig: Sandbox filter, tag and function allow-list bypass when sandbox state changes between renders for a cached `Template`2026-07-01ghsa · osvUS

    ### Description The per-template filter, tag and function allow-list check is compiled into the `checkSecurity()` method of each `Template` subclass and was invoked once from the constructor, gated by `SandboxExtension::isSandboxed($source)`. `Template` instances are then cached on the `Environment` in `$loadedTemplates`, so the verdict computed at construction time was sticky for the rest of the process. Any later change of sandbox state on the same `Environment` left that cached verdict in place: toggling `SandboxExtension::enableSandbox()`/`disableSandbox()`, swapping the policy via `setSecurityPolicy()`, a `SourcePolicyInterface` decision flip, or simply having a parent, macro or included template pre-instantiated outside the sandbox before a sandboxed render reached it. In all of these cases, the filters, tags and functions used by the affected template kept running with the original (typically empty) check, bypassing the `SecurityPolicy` allow-list. Method, property and `__toString` allow-lists are not affected: they are enforced at every call site at runtime through `SandboxExtension::checkMethodAllowed()`, `checkPropertyAllowed()` and `ensureToStringAllowed()`, which re-read the current state on every call. Long-lived workers (FrankenPHP, RoadRunner, Symfony Messenger consumers, FPM with hot autoloading) that share a single `Environment` between sandboxed and non-sandboxed renders are the most exposed: a single non-sandboxed render of a shared layout pre-warms its `Template` instance, after which any later sandboxed render that extends, uses, includes or imports from that layout silently skips the filter/tag/function allow-list for the pre-warmed instance. ### Resolution The allow-list check is no longer run from the constructor. `Template` gains a public `ensureSecurityChecked()` method that calls the compiled `checkSecurity()` only when `SandboxExtension::isSandboxed($source)` returns true for the current source, and it is invoked at every entry point that can reach a `Template` instance whose security has not yet been verified against the current state: `Template::yield()`, `Template::yieldBlock()` (on the resolved block template, which covers `extends`, `use`, traits and parent blocks), `Template::getParent()` (which evaluates user code when the parent name is dynamic) and `Template::getTemplateForMacro()` (on the resolved macro template). The explicit `checkSecurity()` calls previously emitted by `IncludeNode` and `CoreExtension::include()` are removed: the included template's own `yield()` now re-runs the check against the current sandbox state. The compiled `checkSecurity()` body is a cheap walk over compile-time-static arrays, so the per-render cost is negligible. Old cached compiled PHP files keep working unchanged: the constructor-time call they still contain is idempotent. ### Credits Twig would like to thank Fabien Potencier for reporting and fixing the issue.

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auch bekannt als (3)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

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quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-07-14geändert 2026-10-24
08

Referenzen (10)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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