CVE-2026-47734

Ein entfernter, anonymer oder authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in verschiedenen Komponenten von Drittanbietern in Oracle Solaris ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.

## Impact An uncontrolled-resource-consumption (memory exhaustion) denial-of-service vulnerability (CWE-400 / CWE-789). A client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received. Who is impacted: Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler. ## Patches Patched in 1.2.5. add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git's semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size. Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server's repository config to a sane bound for their environment. ## Workarounds On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should: - Restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetches. - Run the server under an OS-level memory limit (e.g. ulimit, cgroups/MemoryMax, or a container memory limit) so a malicious push is killed rather than taking down the host. ## Resources - git's receive.maxInputSize / git index-pack --max-input-size documentation - Reported by Liyi, Ziyue, Strick, Maurice and Chenchen @ University of Sydney

## Impact An uncontrolled-resource-consumption (memory exhaustion) denial-of-service vulnerability (CWE-400 / CWE-789). A client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received. Who is impacted: Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler. ## Patches Patched in 1.2.5. add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git's semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size. Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server's repository config to a sane bound for their environment. ## Workarounds On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should: - Restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetches. - Run the server under an OS-level memory limit (e.g. ulimit, cgroups/MemoryMax, or a container memory limit) so a malicious push is killed rather than taking down the host. ## Resources - git's receive.maxInputSize / git index-pack --max-input-size documentation - Reported by Liyi, Ziyue, Strick, Maurice and Chenchen @ University of Sydney