CVE-2026-47073

### Summary The WebSocket client in `src/hackney_ws.erl` imposes no upper bound on memory consumption across three distinct code paths. In each case, an attacker-controlled WebSocket server can exhaust the connecting process's memory without any authentication or special client configuration. ### Details **1. Handshake response buffer (`read_handshake_response/3`)** The function accumulates received bytes into a growing buffer waiting for `\r\n\r\n`. The per-receive timeout resets on every chunk, so a server that trickles bytes indefinitely without completing the HTTP upgrade response grows the buffer until OOM. No total-size cap exists. **2. Frame payload accumulation (`parse_payload/9`, `parse_active_payload/8`)** `parse_payload/9` (lines 816–817 and 825–826) appends each received chunk into a `Buffer` binary via `<<Buffer/binary, MoreData/binary>>` whenever the frame parser returns `{more, ...}`. `parse_active_payload/8` does the same in active mode by appending each incoming `tcp`/`ssl` message to `#ws_data.buffer`. RFC 6455 permits payload lengths up to 2⁶³-1 bytes, and neither path validates the declared `Len` against any limit. The `recv_timeout` applies per chunk, not to the whole frame, so a slow trickle never triggers it. **3. Fragmentation buffer (`frag_buffer`)** The `frag_buffer` field of `#ws_data{}` accumulates continuation frames. A server that sends an unbounded stream of non-final (`nofin`) fragments without ever sending a final (`fin`) frame grows `frag_buffer` without bound. ### PoC 1. Stand up a WebSocket server and connect to it with hackney's WebSocket client. 2. Trigger any of the three paths: (a) never send `\r\n\r\n` during the handshake; (b) announce a very large frame payload and dribble bytes slowly; (c) send an endless stream of `nofin` continuation frames. 3. Observe the hackney process's memory growing until the BEAM OOM-kills it or the node crashes. ### Impact Denial of service via unbounded memory consumption. Affects hackney 2.0.0 through 4.0.0 for any application using the WebSocket client against an attacker-controlled server. No authentication or special configuration is required on the client side. CVSS v4.0: **8.7 (HIGH)**. ## Resources * Introduction commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/690cecaf236fba49526da404a5bc889a24367a3e * Patch commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/ce0109e2970ace6e20ff29bae9d05c3ac22ec6dc

## Summary Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Flooding. The WebSocket client in src/hackney\_ws.erl imposes no upper bound on memory consumption in three code paths. First, read\_handshake\_response/3 accumulates received bytes into a growing buffer with no size cap; the per-receive timeout resets on every chunk, so a server that streams bytes without ever sending \\r\\n\\r\\n causes the buffer to grow until memory is exhausted. Second, parse\_payload/9 and parse\_active\_payload/8 do not validate the declared frame payload length against any limit; because RFC 6455 allows payload lengths up to 2^63-1 bytes, a server that announces a very large frame and dribbles bytes causes the accumulation buffer to grow until OOM. Third, the frag\_buffer field in #ws\_data{} accumulates continuation frames indefinitely; a server that sends an endless stream of non-final (nofin) fragmented frames without ever sending a final (fin) frame grows frag\_buffer without bound. In all three cases the attacker only needs to control the WebSocket server the hackney client connects to, with no authentication or special client configuration required. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.0.1.