CVE-2026-45718

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Budibase ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Informationen offenzulegen, Code auszuführen oder seine Rechte zu erweitern.

## Summary The row action trigger endpoint (`POST /api/tables/:sourceId/actions/:actionId/trigger`) fails to validate that the user-supplied `rowId` is within the scope of the view's row filters. A user with access to a filtered view can trigger row actions on any row in the underlying table, including rows explicitly excluded by the view's security filters. ## Details View filters in Budibase are treated as a security boundary. The search path (`packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/rows/search.ts:93-94`) explicitly enforces view query filters with the comment: *"that could let users find rows they should not be allowed to access."* However, the row action trigger path bypasses this enforcement entirely: 1. **Route** (`packages/server/src/api/routes/rowAction.ts:55-59`): Accepts a `sourceId` that can be a viewId. 2. **Middleware** (`packages/server/src/middleware/triggerRowActionAuthorised.ts:24-55`): Correctly validates that the user has READ permission on the view and that the row action is enabled for that view. However, at line 55 it sets `ctx.params.tableId = tableId` where `tableId` is the **underlying table** extracted from the viewId — the viewId is discarded. ```typescript // triggerRowActionAuthorised.ts:24-26 const tableId = isTableIdOrExternalTableId(sourceId) ? sourceId : getTableIdFromViewId(sourceId) // extracts underlying table // Line 55: viewId context is lost ctx.params.tableId = tableId ``` 3. **Controller** (`packages/server/src/api/controllers/rowAction/run.ts:11`): Reads only `tableId` from params — the view context is gone. ```typescript const { tableId, actionId } = ctx.params const { rowId } = ctx.request.body await sdk.rowActions.run(tableId, actionId, rowId, ctx.user) ``` 4. **SDK** (`packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/rowActions/crud.ts:254`): Fetches the row using `sdk.rows.find(tableId, rowId)` — directly from the table with no view filter enforcement. ```typescript const row = await sdk.rows.find(tableId, rowId) // No view filter check ``` The `sdk.rows.find` function (`packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/rows/internal.ts:67-88`) fetches the row by ID directly from the database, only validating that `row.tableId === tableId`. It never checks whether the row matches the view's query filters. ## PoC ```bash # Prerequisites: # 1. Create a table with a "status" column containing rows: "active" and "archived" # 2. Create a view filtering to status="active", assign it to BASIC role # 3. Enable a row action for that view # 4. Note the rowId of an "archived" row (not visible through the view) # As a BASIC-role user with access only to the filtered view: # Trigger the row action on a row OUTSIDE the view's filter scope curl -X POST 'http://localhost:10000/api/tables/<viewId>/actions/<actionId>/trigger' \ -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<basic_user_jwt>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"rowId": "<archived_row_id>"}' # Expected: 403 or 404 (row not in view scope) # Actual: 200 {"message": "Row action triggered."} # The automation executes with the full archived row data, # despite view filters excluding it from the user's access. ``` ## Impact A user with BASIC role access to a filtered view can execute row actions (automations) on **any row** in the underlying table, including rows hidden by the view's security filters. The impact depends on what the triggered automation does: - **Information disclosure**: The automation receives the full row data as input, which may contain fields/values the user should not see. - **Unauthorized data modification**: If the automation modifies rows, the attacker can cause changes to rows outside their authorized scope. - **Unauthorized actions**: If the automation sends notifications, calls webhooks, or performs other side effects, the attacker can trigger these for out-of-scope rows. This breaks the security model established by view filters, which are explicitly documented as preventing users from accessing rows they should not see. ## Recommended Fix The middleware should pass the `viewId` to the controller, and the SDK `run` function should validate the row against the view's filters before executing the automation. In `packages/server/src/middleware/triggerRowActionAuthorised.ts`, preserve the sourceId: ```typescript // Line 55: preserve the original sourceId for downstream filter validation ctx.params.tableId = tableId ctx.params.sourceId = viewId || tableId // ADD THIS ``` In `packages/server/src/api/controllers/rowAction/run.ts`, pass the sourceId: ```typescript export async function run( ctx: Ctx<RowActionTriggerRequest, RowActionTriggerResponse> ) { const { tableId, actionId, sourceId } = ctx.params const { rowId } = ctx.request.body await sdk.rowActions.run(tableId, actionId, rowId, ctx.user, sourceId) ctx.body = { message: "Row action triggered." } } ``` In `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/rowActions/crud.ts`, validate the row against view filters: ```typescript export async function run( tableId: any, rowActionId: any, rowId: string, user: User, sourceId?: string ) { const table = await sdk.tables.getTable(tableId) if (!table) { throw new HTTPError("Table not found", 404) } // If triggered from a view, validate the row is within the view's scope if (sourceId && isViewId(sourceId)) { const result = await sdk.rows.search({ viewId: sourceId, query: { equal: { _id: rowId } }, limit: 1, }) if (!result.rows.length) { throw new HTTPError("Row not found in view scope", 403) } } const { automationId } = await get(tableId, rowActionId) const automation = await sdk.automations.get(automationId) const row = await sdk.rows.find(tableId, rowId) // ... rest unchanged } ```