CVE-2026-44498

highPriorität · verfolgen · 30EPSS 0.003 · 21. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.28% (21st) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
3 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · nvd · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to version 4.4.0, Zebra's block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS), allowing it to accept blocks that zcashd rejects with bad-blk-sigops. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while zcashd nodes do not. This issue has been patched in version 4.4.0.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

9.2
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · high–critical · 7.5–9.2

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v4.09.2criticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.09.2criticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.07.7highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (3)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-jv4h-j224-23ccZebra's Block Validator Undercounts Coinbase and P2SH Sigops2026-05-07ghsa · osvUS

    Zebra's block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (`MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS`), allowing it to accept blocks that `zcashd` rejects with `bad-blk-sigops`. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while `zcashd` nodes do not. Two distinct undercounts: #### A: Coinbase Hidden Legacy Sigops `zcashd`'s `GetLegacySigOpCount()` includes the coinbase input's `scriptSig`. Zebra's `Sigops` impl skipped the coinbase input entirely, so up to ~98 sigops (the 100-byte coinbase script length cap, less the height prefix) could be hidden inside the coinbase `scriptSig` without being charged against the block limit. #### B: Aggregate P2SH Sigops. `zcashd`'s `GetP2SHSigOpCount()` parses each P2SH input's redeem script with `accurate=true` and sums those sigops into the block-wide total via `ConnectBlock`. The check is per-block, not per-transaction, and the limit applies regardless of who mines the offending block — a miner just needs to include enough P2SH-spending transactions whose redeem scripts together exceed 20000 sigops. Zebra computed P2SH sigops only on the mempool-acceptance path (used for ZIP-317 weighting) and never accumulated them during block validation. A block whose aggregate redeem-script sigops exceed 20000 (e.g. 1334 P2SH spends × 15 sigops = 20010) would be accepted by Zebra and rejected by `zcashd`. ### Patches Fixed in this release: https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.4.0. ### Workarounds None. Operators relying on Zebra for consensus should upgrade. ### Resources - `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS` constant inherited from Bitcoin via the Zcash protocol spec's §7.6 catch-all "Other rules inherited from Bitcoin", tracked for explicit documentation in [zcash/zips#568](https://github.com/zcash/zips/issues/568). - `zcashd` `GetLegacySigOpCount`: <https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/v6.11.0/src/main.cpp#L826-L836> - `zcashd` `GetP2SHSigOpCount`: <https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/v6.11.0/src/main.cpp#L840-L852> - `zcashd` `ConnectBlock` aggregates per-tx sigops and compares against `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS`.

06

auch bekannt als (3)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-05-08geändert 2026-06-17
08

Referenzen (7)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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