CVE-2026-44307
highPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.007 · 55. PerzentilEURUUSEPSS · bewertet 2026-10-28
Mako is a template library written in Python. Prior to 1.3.12, on Windows, a URI using backslash traversal (e.g. \..\..\ secret.txt) bypasses the directory traversal check in Template.__init__ and the posixpath-based normalization in TemplateLookup.get_template(), allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.12.
cvss
Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.
Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 6.6–8.7
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betroffene Produkte (5)
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Advisories (2)
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- GHSA-2h4p-vjrc-8xpqMako vulnerable to path traversal via backslash URI on Windows in TemplateLookup2026-05-06ghsa · osvUS
## Summary On Windows, a URI using backslash traversal (e.g. `\..\..\ secret.txt`) bypasses the directory traversal check in `Template.__init__` and the `posixpath`-based normalization in `TemplateLookup.get_template()`, allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory. ## Details The root cause is a mismatch between `posixpath` (used for URI normalization in `get_template()`) and `os.path` (used for file access via `os.path.isfile()` and validation via `os.path.normpath()` in `Template.__init__`). On Windows, `os.path` is `ntpath`, which treats `\` as a path separator, while `posixpath` treats it as a literal character. The vulnerability chain: 1. `get_template()` strips only leading `/` via `re.sub(r"^\/+", "", uri)` and normalizes with `posixpath` — backslash `\` is treated as a literal character, so `\..\ secret.txt` passes through with `..` undetected. 2. `Template.__init__()` validation uses `os.path.normpath()` — on Windows this resolves `\..\ secret.txt` to `\secret.txt`, which does not start with `..`, so the `startswith("..")` check passes. 3. `os.path.isfile()` on Windows interprets `\` as a path separator, resolving the `..` traversal and finding files outside the template directory. ### Affected code - `mako/lookup.py`: `TemplateLookup.get_template()` uses `posixpath.normpath`/`posixpath.join` for path construction but `os.path.isfile()` for existence check - `mako/template.py`: `Template.__init__()` URI validation uses `os.path.normpath()` which on Windows resolves backslash traversal to a form that passes the `startswith("..")` guard ## Impact If an application passes user-controlled template names or include paths to `TemplateLookup.get_template()`, an attacker on Windows may be able to load and disclose readable files outside the configured template directory. The primary impact is local file disclosure. If the targeted file contains Mako/Python template syntax, it may also be parsed and executed as a template. ## Remediation The fix should normalize backslashes to forward slashes early in the URI processing pipeline, before any path operations, to ensure consistent behavior across platforms.
- PYSEC-2026-2617Mako vulnerable to path traversal via backslash URI on Windows in TemplateLookup2026-07-13vendor · osvUS
## Summary On Windows, a URI using backslash traversal (e.g. `\..\..\ secret.txt`) bypasses the directory traversal check in `Template.__init__` and the `posixpath`-based normalization in `TemplateLookup.get_template()`, allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory. ## Details The root cause is a mismatch between `posixpath` (used for URI normalization in `get_template()`) and `os.path` (used for file access via `os.path.isfile()` and validation via `os.path.normpath()` in `Template.__init__`). On Windows, `os.path` is `ntpath`, which treats `\` as a path separator, while `posixpath` treats it as a literal character. The vulnerability chain: 1. `get_template()` strips only leading `/` via `re.sub(r"^\/+", "", uri)` and normalizes with `posixpath` — backslash `\` is treated as a literal character, so `\..\ secret.txt` passes through with `..` undetected. 2. `Template.__init__()` validation uses `os.path.normpath()` — on Windows this resolves `\..\ secret.txt` to `\secret.txt`, which does not start with `..`, so the `startswith("..")` check passes. 3. `os.path.isfile()` on Windows interprets `\` as a path separator, resolving the `..` traversal and finding files outside the template directory. ### Affected code - `mako/lookup.py`: `TemplateLookup.get_template()` uses `posixpath.normpath`/`posixpath.join` for path construction but `os.path.isfile()` for existence check - `mako/template.py`: `Template.__init__()` URI validation uses `os.path.normpath()` which on Windows resolves backslash traversal to a form that passes the `startswith("..")` guard ## Impact If an application passes user-controlled template names or include paths to `TemplateLookup.get_template()`, an attacker on Windows may be able to load and disclose readable files outside the configured template directory. The primary impact is local file disclosure. If the targeted file contains Mako/Python template syntax, it may also be parsed and executed as a template. ## Remediation The fix should normalize backslashes to forward slashes early in the URI processing pipeline, before any path operations, to ensure consistent behavior across platforms.
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Referenzen (10)
Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44307cnnvd
- https://www.makotemplates.org/Patchcnnvd
- https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/commit/72e10c573ca0fbcbddd4455abca8ce92a61780d7enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/issues/435enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/releases/tag/rel_1_3_12enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/security/advisories/GHSA-2h4p-vjrc-8xpqenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/commit/72e10c573ca0fbcbddd4455abca8ce92a61780d7nvd
- https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/issues/435nvd
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