CVE-2026-43865

highPriorität · verfolgen · 10EPSS 0.010 · 62. PerzentilExploit · PoCDEEUUS
grimoire priorityP1 · Urgent
Exploitable?
Public exploit
1 exploit · PoC
Likely / severe?
0.98% (62nd) EPSS
CVSS 8.1 · high
Is it mine?
15 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · cert_bund · nvd

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component. The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast's JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel's default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes Camel apply a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig (whitelisting the java., javax. and org.apache.camel. class-name prefixes and blacklisting java.net.) to instances it creates from its own default configuration, while leaving any user-supplied Config or HazelcastInstance untouched. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a deserialization filter on the Hazelcast instance (Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or the JVM-wide system property -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*) and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

8.1
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen

v3.18.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.18.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HsecondaryAusnutzbarkeit 2.2 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.18.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.17.7highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Psecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

Exploits (1)

Öffentlicher Proof-of-Concept- und Exploit-Code.

05

betroffene Produkte (15)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

06

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-2203Apache Camel: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-07-05csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.

  • GHSA-xww8-mxqw-m84wApache Camel-Hazelcast: Unsafe Java deserialization in default-configured managed Hazelcast instances enables remote code execution2026-07-06ghsa · osvUS

    Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component. The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast's JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel's default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes Camel apply a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig (whitelisting the java., javax. and org.apache.camel. class-name prefixes and blacklisting java.net.) to instances it creates from its own default configuration, while leaving any user-supplied Config or HazelcastInstance untouched. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a deserialization filter on the Hazelcast instance (Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or the JVM-wide system property -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*) and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster.

07

auch bekannt als (3)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

08

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-07-06geändert 2026-10-25
09

Referenzen (5)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

scry

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